DISEC I: Nucler Disarmament 

Letter from the dais

Dear Delegates,

First and foremost, welcome to Yale Model United Nations Taiwan 2018. My name is Eujin Jang, and I am excited to be serving as Director of this year’s DISEC committee. We have some very interesting topics this year, and I am looking forward to seeing all the great debate and collaborative interactions that will arise from our efforts. If you are a beginner to Model United Nations, I am especially excited to welcome you to our committee. I participated in MUN throughout my high school years, and it truly was a uniquely valuable experience that I learned countless things from -- after our time together, I hope you will be able to say the same. I hope to make YMUNT the most refreshing and enriching educational experience as possible for everyone involved, so I hope you are as excited and eager as I am.

Now for a bit more about myself: I am a sophomore in Silliman College at Yale pursuing a major in Economics and Mathematics. I went to high school in Atlanta, GA, though my family currently lives in Boston, MA. At Yale, I’ve been involved in a whole variety of other Yale International Relations Association conferences including Yale Model United Nations, Yale Model Government Europe, International Relations Symposium at Yale. I will also be serving as Secretary-General for the upcoming iteration of Yale Model United Nations Korea. Outside of international relations, I am also involved in New Haven small business development with the Elmseed Enterprise Fund, Dwight Hall Socially Responsible Investment Fund, and the Yale College Council Business Team. I also enjoy a wide variety of music (especially hip-hop), and I’ve been playing basketball for over ten years and actively follow the NBA. And of course, I could not be more excited to try all the delicious food options available in Taiwan!

Our DISEC committee addresses some of the greatest security concerns of the international community, and the current trends in nuclear weaponization and terrorism leave lots of room for innovative solutions and in-depth debate. As you prepare and research, I hope you find these topics intriguing, challenging, and critical in today’s world. Meanwhile, please free feel to reach out with any questions, comments, or concerns about our committee or the conference as a whole. You can contact me at eujin.jang@yale.edu. Again, I look forward to meeting you in Taiwan this March.

Best Regards,

Eujin Jang

In August of 1945, the world’s first nuclear bomb test was conducted in the state of New Mexico in the United States. Soon enough, the history of warfare and the dynamic of international relations would be forever altered. The immense capacity for destruction introduced the international community to a paradoxical challenge unlike any it had faced before -- while certain countries gained unbalanced amounts of hard power, the cost of war and conflict escalated to record high levels, leaving states more fearful but also more averse to war than ever before. In a strange way, the danger of imminent destruction by nuclear weapons has shaped the way to a global peace that has been preserved to this day, and nuclear weapons still lie at the focal point of any international security debate. In light of nuclear weapons’ influence on both stability and conflict, the DISEC committee is charged with the task of determining how the international community should treat and regulate the existence of nuclear weapons.

The Origin of Nuclear Weapons and Early Response

Just three weeks after the United States’ initial nuclear bomb tests, the history of warfare and international security would forever be altered when the United States dropped two nuclear bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World World II. President Truman triumphantly announced to the world, “It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe. The force from which the sun draws its power has been loosed against those who brought war to the Far East” [1]. However, his words would largely undermine the scale of destruction caused by these weapons.

The primary target of the first nuclear bombing mission was the Japanese city of Hiroshima, an industrial center and military headquarter. People on the ground reported seeing a pika (brilliant flash of light) followed by a don (loud booming sound). Around 70,000-80,000 people (about 30% of the city’s population) were killed by the blast and resulting firestorm, and another 70,000 were injured. In addition, 92% of the 76,000 buildings in the city were destroyed by the blast and fire. 60% of buildings, as far away as 5 kilometers, were also heavily damaged [2]. The effects of radiation emitted from the atomic bomb were even further destructive. Immediate effects included sickness and death due to initial radiation exposure, as well as from residual radiation. Delayed effects of the radiation were culminations of burns, injuries, and radiation effects. Acute sickness entailed digestive symptoms, nerve symptoms, bleeding symptoms, inflammation symptoms, blood symptoms, and genital organ symptoms, together claiming 140,000 more lives. Most of the survivors of the first 5 months after the bombing later became afflicted with long-term illnesses, such as keloids, traumatic cataracts, leukemia, cancer, and nerve problems. The effects of the second attack on Nagasaki would be just as comparable in destruction [3].

After the world had witnessed the destructive power of nuclear weapons, a sense of urgency rippled through the international community as it attempted to grapple with the consequences of this groundbreaking development. The very first General Assembly resolution passed by the newly established United Nations led to the creation of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to specifically deal with the “problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy.” Yet in 1946, the United States remained the sole country with nuclear capabilities, directing the world to turn to them for leadership regarding nuclear controls. The first major development in controlling nuclear proliferation was the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, which called for the creation of an independent international nuclear authority to oversee all aspects of nuclear science, including “the mining and use of fissile materials, the operation of all nuclear facilities that could produce weaponry, and the right to dispense licenses to those countries wishing to pursue peaceful nuclear research [4].”

The United States would take the Acheson-Lilienthal Report as the basis for its Baruch Plan, which in reality framed the United States as a benevolent party in the post-war world and the Soviets as the aggressive militant party [5]. By this time, the main priority for Soviet leadership was to compete against US influence in Western Europe and thus turned its attention to developing its nuclear program. In the Baruch Plan, to debilitate the Soviet nuclear program the US agreed to turn over all of its nuclear weapons under the condition that all other countries cease production and agree to a thorough system of inspection. As expected, the U.S.S.R. rejected the Baruch Plan, as the Soviets were wary of a US-dominated United Nations. In turn, the Soviets proposed its own plan for universal nuclear disarmament. However, both proposals were eventually rejected by the United Nations, and the international community failed to agree upon controlling the first wave of nuclear proliferation. Nuclear weapons were first detonated by the Soviet Union on August 29th, 1949, the beginning of a decades-long nuclear arms race and stalemate between the two world superpowers.

Nuclear Proliferation and the Cold War

After a decade of a policy of secrecy with its nuclear technology, the US began to support the selective sharing of technology to pursue peaceful measures. President Eisenhower’s famous ‘Atoms for Peace’ speech in 1953 became a turning point for nuclear proliferation. The release of nuclear technology would be safeguarded by routine inspections and the continued restriction of enrichment procedures – the precursor to the development of a nuclear weapon – to make sure that all research was for the pure purpose of developing energy, not weapons. The US advocated for governments to “make joint contributions from their stockpiles of...fissionable materials to an international atomic energy agency...set up under the aegis of the United Nations [6].” His speech would spur the creation of the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), which was critically different from the Baruch Plan in that the IAEA lacked ownership and punishment powers. While this turn was able to establish trust and begin an arms control dialogue, there was also “an unintended outcome of Atoms for Peace [that] was the proliferation of worldwide nuclear research and power programs, several of which would eventually be converted into the production of nuclear weapons [7].”

That is, the safeguards created were not enough to dampen the risk of weaponization. In the following decades, lax enforcement of IAEA policies would allow nuclear technology recipients such as India, Pakistan, South Africa, and Israel to develop their own nuclear weapon programs. For example, one of today’s most contested nuclear programs, Iran, originally began as a peaceful energy program in the 1950s with US assistance. Slowly but surely, the optimism held for nuclear energy transformed into skepticism and fear of nuclear weaponry, leading to the next trend in the nuclear dialogue.

The Turn to Nonproliferation

On March 1, 1954, the United States would conduct its largest nuclear test yet, coined Castle Bravo [8]. However, the resulting poisoning of Japanese fishing crew members would lead to intense international backlash. While the initial US response was denial and indifference, Castle Bravo and other incidents would serve as ammunition for nuclear abolitionists such as Indian Prime Minister Jawaharal Nehru, one of the first international leaders to call for the abolition of nuclear testing [9]. Nehru became especially influential in rallying support from non-nuclear countries who felt increasingly threatened by powers such as the US.

Eventually these trends led to the passing of the first test ban treaty, the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), signed and ratified by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union in 1963. The PTBT prohibits parties from carrying out atmospheric and exoatmospheric tests of nuclear weapons if the fallout would cross national borders, although there were no inherent measure for international verification. The PTBT would be followed by the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) in July 1974, signed by the US and the USSR [10]. Aiming to increase trust and curb the arms race between the two countries, the treaty included enforcement mechanisms, including the mandatory exchange of scientific and geologic data from the test.

In the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis and rising tensions between the US and USSR, the international community began to really crunch down on nuclear nonproliferation policy: the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) [11] was introduced to the world in 1968 and formally passed in 1970. One of the largest arms control agreements in the world, the NPT is signed by 189 states and parties and serves as the basis for all international efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The treaty has three basic “pillars” of the “the nonproliferation regime,” or the international community’s aversion to the spread of nuclear weapons. By focusing on nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the treaty proposes bargains that “the NPT non-nuclear-weapon states agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclear-weapon states in exchange agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals [12].” Thus, NPT nuclear-weapons states pay off non-nuclear states in technology transfers to prevent them from instead investing in nuclear programs. In the most simple terms, the five nuclear states named in the NPT pledge not to transfer nuclear weapons or aid non-nuclear states in acquiring weapons, while the non-nuclear states agree not to pursue nuclear weapons programs and accept safeguards from the IAEA to ensure they are not diverting from nuclear energy initiatives in favor of weapons programs. Ultimately, nuclear states are urged to pursue disarmament and pledge to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament.”

Evaluation of Past Efforts

In this section, we aim to evaluate the effectiveness of nonproliferation acts made in history.

All in all, the following are considered nonproliferation successes achieved via threat or the use of force:

- Germany -- defeated by the Allies during World War II

- Iraq -- facilities were destroyed in the First Gulf War, followed by a series of intrusive international inspections

- Libya -- cut back in 2003 in response to improved relations with the West

- Syria -- nuclear reactor destroyed by an Israeli raid in 2007

There are also cases of successful disarmament resulting from solutions to various security threats and tensions that previously provoked the need for nuclear security:

- Argentina and Brazil -- tensions reduced by democratic revolutions

- South Africa -- voluntarily disarmed itself after the collapse of the Soviet Union

However, nonproliferation has not been an overwhelming success story, and therefore remains relevant to DISEC and countless other international parties to this very day. The nuclear club has expanded far beyond the original 5 Security Council; most notably, it now includes India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. A common narrative among these cases seems to be that these states developed nuclear weapons to enhance their perceptions of security in the midst of an insecure regional, geopolitical environment:

- India and Pakistan -- developed weapons to maintain stalemate, deter each other from engaging in conflict

- North Korea -- through nuclear tests, maintain leverage in international community and attract international aid

- Israel -- developed weapons after the Six Day War in 1967 as an additional defense mechanism against various neighboring Arab states

Most notably, none of the four aforementioned states are signatories to the NPT, which highlights the difficulties of nonproliferation through diplomacy, especially when the possession of nuclear weapons seems to promise a greater level of security.

Most of the cases mentioned above will be re-mentioned and elaborated upon in the latter parts of this topic guide, where we will more in depth examine recent developments and the current situation.

Framing the Debate

Before we delve deeper into the current state of affairs regarding nuclear weapons, it is important to frame the debate in which this committee will engage itself in. That is, we must examine the currently existing main schools of thought regarding nuclear weapons and the potential of nonproliferation and disarmament.

One might easily ask, “If nuclear weapons are such a threat, why haven’t there been any major wars involving them since the initial introduction in the 1940s?” The most concise answer agreed upon by most scholars would be that nuclear weapons allow states to protect their sovereignty and well being, not through direct defense and military power, but through deterrence [13]. The massive destruction potential associated with nuclear powers deters all parties from engaging in war; that is, if nuclear war were to break out, there would be mutually assured destruction for everyone involved. It would be impossible in today’s day and age for any state to launch a nuclear attack on any other nuclear nation (that has secure second-strike capabilities) without seeing itself reduced to nothing more than radioactive ash as well. This is the main reasoning behind Direct (Type I) deterrence -- nuclear balance between two individual states – the more nuclear arsenals are balanced, the more a second strike capability exists, so conflict is impossible.

Meanwhile Extended (Type II) deterrence is the deterrent effect a nuclear power’s arsenals have against an attack on an ally. Type II deterrence is best illustrated by state of deadlock during the Cold War. The less likely a nuclear exchange is to occur between two states, the less credibility exists behind a promise of protection. This can drive the development of nuclear programs amongst states who feel insecure in an alliance system; for example, this was a major cause of proliferation during the Cold War. Even today, this phenomenon greatly contributes to regional instability in the Middle East, where certain states feel rightfully threatened by the existence of a nuclear Israel.

Reasons for Proliferation

States most frequently want nuclear weapons for three broad reasons: to ensure power and security, because of domestic politics (the preferences of elites and bureaucrats), and because of prestige and norms (nuclear programs signal great powers/developed states). However, factors such as cost, organizational capability, pressure from the international community, technology supply restrictions, preventive strikes, and allied coercion can all present formidable challenges to the acquirement of nuclear weapons. Most often, states with serious security threats especially desire nuclear weapons – unless they have an ally that can protect them. Weak states, as a rule, can only get nuclear weapons under the protection of a more powerful ally.

There are three main pathways to proliferation. The first is proliferation of a powerful state under high-threat conditions, as was the case with the US and the Soviet Union, where no other nation can reasonably threaten counterproliferation.

The second type of proliferation occurs when a weaker state finds itself in a threatening geopolitical situation with a stronger ally who is both unreliable and unwilling to invest more in the defenses of the weaker state. The weaker state has extremely limited goals and is usually uninterested in leveraging nuclear weapons to project power. This proliferation environment produced the nuclear programs of China, who developed nuclear technology after their relationship with the Soviet Union deteriorated; India and Pakistan, who found themselves torn between the US and Soviet Union in an extremely insecure region of the world; Israel, North Korea, and South Africa.

The final type of proliferation involves a weaker state with broad ambitions in a relationship with a more powerful ally who is compliant and coercion-averse, as was the case with Britain and France in the years immediately following World War II. They amassed nuclear weapons in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union and profited from American concerns over the potential Soviet influence over Europe.

Scholars are divided over whether proliferation is a boon or a bane to international stability. Some believe that the existence of more nuclear states may lead to less conflict since nuclear powers do not go to war against each other. That is, having more nuclear states reduces the instability inherent in nuclear deterrence and raises the costs of war to such a high level that conflict becomes an impossibility. However, others believe that this sort of thinking is too optimistic, as states and people do not always act rationally. According to the other side of the debate, there can be multiple failure points inherent in each state’s bureaucracy, leading to nuclear launches that wouldn’t be predicted under deterrence theory. Skeptics also question the ability of leaders to control their nuclear arsenals. States that buy into this type of ideology are more likely to support a general nonproliferation regime (such as the NPT, the IAEA, and international monitoring and controls).

Nuclear Energy and NPT Compliance

One unique feature of the NPT is the establishment of a review process that occurs every five years to assure that the provisions of the treaty are being realized. The next conference – the major event to forge nuclear disarmament policy – will take place in 2020, where states will discuss lingering issues on the pathway to total disarmament. One major issue delegates will have to address is the challenge of nuclear energy versus nuclear weapons programs. For example, the Middle East is the world region that produces the greatest pressure for states to proliferate; in this region, fourteen states have begun efforts to explore nuclear energy or sign nuclear cooperation agreements—the greatest fractional proportion of any geopolitical area in the world. Although states have every right to develop peaceful nuclear energy programs – it’s a right protected in the NPT – the same enrichment and reprocessing technology (known as ENR) that allows states to run energy reactors can also be repurposed to develop nuclear weapons. While the process to restructure into weapon development is extremely difficult, it is important to note that it is often difficult for expert inspectors to distinguish fuel production for energy from weapon production.

There are several major issues facing the non-proliferation regime that must be addressed by this committee. Since there are so many facets of this issue to address, there is no need to answer every single question in your position papers or your speeches. Instead, the following questions exist to guide your research for the conference.

1) Should the NPT address the nuclear environment in the Middle East and other critical regions, and in what ways can nations implement their nuclear policy through incentives?

2) Should a state be prevented from withdrawing from the treaty after technology transfers? Should a state be denied its right to vote on revision after treaty violations? How can the NPT send a tougher message towards nuclear aspirants, if that is the policy your nation chooses to take?

3) Should the NPT address weapons programs which nuclear weapons states have historically preferred not to recognize? (ex: Israeli program; remember Israel is not a signatory of the NPT, so it is neither bound by its provisions nor susceptible to its penalties)

4) What further cooperatie disarmament conferences and actions should take place between nuclear powers? How can non-nuclear states encourage those to take place? What should global disarmament goals be in the short term?

5) In a world that is struggling to maintain the non-nuclear standard, is ‘global zero’ and complete abolition a feasible goal for the next half-century? Why or why not?

6) Do all states have an inalienable right to nuclear energy? What about uranium enrichment? What new international technology controls should be implemented, if any?

7) Should the NPT be edited to focus on ‘nuclear security?’ How should nations address the threat of illicit trafficking of technology, and how can the NPT promote the safety and security of nuclear weapon stockpiles?

Endnotes

[1] "Statement by the President Announcing the Use of the A-Bomb at Hiroshima." Public Papers Harry S. Truman, 1945-1953.

[2] "Facts About the Hiroshima & Nagasaki Bombing." Hiroshima Committee. 2008.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Barnard, Chester I, et.al. "A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy." March 16, 1946.

[5] Issacs, Jeremy. "Cold War : An Illustrated History, 1945-1991." Jeremy Issacs Productions and Turner Original Productions, 1998.

[6] "Address by Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, to the 470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly." International Atomic Energy Association, December 8, 1953.

[7] Lavoy, Peter R., "The Enduring Effects of Atoms for Peace," Arms Control Association, December 1, 2003.

[8] "Castle Bravo," Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization, 2012, https://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/1-march-1954-castle-bravo/

[9] "Nehru Appeals for Disarmament," History.com, 2010, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/nehru-appeals-for-disarmament

[10] "Treaty Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (and Protocol Thereto) (TTBT)," July 3, 1974, https://www.state.gov/t/isn/5204.htm

[11] "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)," United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/

[12] Graham Jr., Thomas, "The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices," Arms Control Association, July, 2004.

[13] Walt, Stephen M., "Deterrence Theory 101?" Foreign Policy, January 19, 2009, http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/01/19/deterrence-theory-101/