DISEC II: Terrorism in North Africa

LETTER FROM THE DAIS

Dear Delegates,

First and foremost, welcome to Yale Model United Nations Taiwan 2018. My name is Eujin Jang, and I am excited to be serving as Director of this year's DISEC committee. We have some very interesting topics this year, and I am looking forward to seeing all the great debate and collaborative interactions that will arise from our efforts. If you are a beginner to Model United Nations, I am especially excited to welcome you to our committee. I participated in MUN throughout my high school years, and it truly was a uniquely valuable experience that I learned countless things from -- after our time together, I hope you will be able to say the same. I hope to make YMUNT the most refreshing and enriching educational experience as possible for everyone involved, so I hope you are as excited and eager as I am.

Now for a bit more about myself: I am a sophomore in Silliman College at Yale pursuing a major in Economics and Mathematics. I went to high school in Atlanta, GA, though my family currently lives in Boston, MA. At Yale, I’ve been involved in a whole variety of other Yale International Relations Association conferences including Yale Model United Nations, Yale Model Government Europe, International Relations Symposium at Yale. I will also be serving as Secretary-General for the upcoming iteration of Yale Model United Nations Korea. Outside of international relations, I am also involved in New Haven small business development with the Elmseed Enterprise Fund, Dwight Hall Socially Responsible Investment Fund, and the Yale College Council Business Team. I also enjoy a wide variety of music (especially hip-hop), and I’ve been playing basketball for over ten years and actively follow the NBA. And of course, I could not be more excited to try all the delicious food options available in Taiwan!

Our DISEC committee addresses some of the greatest security concerns of the international community, and the current trends in nuclear weaponization and terrorism leave lots of room for innovative solutions and in-depth debate. As you prepare and research, I hope you find these topics intriguing, challenging, and critical in today’s world. Meanwhile, please free feel to reach out with any questions, comments, or concerns about our committee or the conference as a whole. You can contact me at eujin.jang@yale.edu. Again, I look forward to meeting you in Taiwan this March.

Best Regards,

Eujin Jang

Ever since the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, terrorism has taken its place as one of the most pressing topics of debate on the international stage. While terrorism exists in many forms in nearly every region of the world, this year’s DISEC will focus its attention to terrorism specifically in North Africa. The countries of North Africa are linked by the Sahara Desert and the Sahel region towards the desert’s southern end. Various shared social, economic, structural, and historical factors have rendered the region especially vulnerable to insecurity, with organized crime and religiously-linked terrorism grasping a hold in the region. Organizations such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Daesh are especially historically notorious, frequently engaging in violent confrontations with regional state authorities.

Regional Vulnerability

While many of these groups and events are more frequently featured on the news today, the North African region has always had a long, strained history with terrorism. As early as the 1990’s, Mujahideen fighters (guerilla fighters in Islamic countries) returned from Afghanistan and formed the Salafist Group for Preaching and Jihad (GSPC) [1]. This group would become most well known for being a violent extremist group that resisted the Algerian government after elections were cancelled in 1991. Afterwards, the group would disperse through the North African region. Extremist terrorists also played a critical role in Libya, eventually ousting Muammar Gaddafi.

The longevity and growth of groups such as AQIM and Daesh in North Africa have mainly relied upon their ability to exploit insecurity and vulnerability in the states they strategically embed themselves in. For example, the government of Libya is currently divided between two rival coalitions, and this fragmentation of political authority has allowed clan-like militias to more easily seize power. In the midst of this conflict, Al Qaeda inserted itself. In Mali, there was a similar case, with weak government leading to an especially vulnerable northern region where AQIM took over a prominent foothold. In 2013, French troops had to intervene to assist the Mali government in ousting the terrorist fighters, leading the group to scatter to other regions [2].

Terrorist Strategies

Many of the most prominent terrorist groups in the North African region have taken root by inserting themselves into local struggles and insecurity. For example, Daesh had great success throughout the decade because it took advantage of religious strife between Sunni and Shia Muslims in various countries. It rode the extremist narrative, drawing upon the “caliphate” to recruit terrorist fighters in both local and international regions. Meanwhile, Al-Qaeda (AQ) has adopted other strategies, purposefully distinguishing itself from groups such as Daesh by working with local populations, providing them services, and avoiding brute violence against civilians to gain their initial support. In Mali, AQ has also embedded itself within local groups opposing the government, leveraging clan identity for its own benefit. AQ has also established a reputation of issuing justice and administration in the absence of state services under a weak government.

Since 9/11, a disturbing trend of security challenges from non-state actors has emerged in the Maghreb, Sahel, and other parts of North Africa. The trend is clearly demonstrated by the escalation in violent attacks in countries ranging from Libya and Mali to Somalia and many more. The diverse perpetrators are motivated by ethnic, racial, religious, tribal, and national ideologies. Several extremist groups have taken hold of region, some including: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, Ansaru, Ansar Dine, Ansar al-Sharia, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MJUAO), al-Mourabitoun, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MLNA), al-Shabaab, and many more.

Ever since various terrorist organizations suffered critical losses in places such as Syria and Iraq (i.e. ISIS), Northern Africa has become the next battleground and target for several terrorist groups. We will introduce the current situation of terrorism in North Africa and the challenges of counter-terrorism by closely examining specific case studies:

Case Study: Libya

The conflict in Libya is perhaps the region’s most pressing terrorist concern. Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Prime Minister Fayez al Sarraj, requested U.S. support in the fight against ISIS and cooperated consistently with international counterterrorism efforts. In 2016, local Libyan forces, with the assistance of American troops, were able to remove ISIS from it’s stronghold in Sirte, Libya. More than 1,700 ISIS terrorists were killed during the Sirte counterterrorism operation [3], but many members of the terrorist organization fled to Libya’s western and southern deserts, abroad, or into nearby urban centers. However, other terrorist organizations, including Ansar al-Shari’a Darnah, Ansar al-Shari’a Benghazi, and AQIM remain in Libya [4]. These groups continue to take advantage of the absence of effective governance in many parts of the country, though the Libyan National Army has significantly degraded their capacity to do so in some areas.

Like many other countries in North Africa struggling in the fight against terrorism, Libya lacks a comprehensive counterterrorism law. In 2013, the General National Congress (GNC) (at that time Libya’s official government) adopted laws outlining a plan to disband non-state militias and integrate them into state security forces; however, neither law was implemented into practice. However, Libya has ratified the African Union’s Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism [5], which mandates states to criminalize terrorist acts under their national laws. The main challenge of law enforcement is primarily due to the internal political conflict and disruptive effect of having numerous, influential militias. Libyan law enforcement personnel lacks the resources and authority to deal with terrorist incidents, and so in most parts of the country, law enforcement functions are provided by armed militias rather than state institutions. National police and security forces are fragmented and inadequately trained and equipped, leading to lack of organization, coordination, and ineffectiveness. Meanwhile, prosecutors and judges are targeted in kidnappings and assassinations by terrorists, resulting in the continued suspension of court operations in Benghazi and Darnah. So far, counterterrorism operations conducted by the state have ultimately failed to significantly reduce the level of terrorist activity.

Comprehensive border security is also lacking in Libya, as is the case for many Northern African states. The inability to secure the country’s thousands of miles of land and maritime borders has largely enabled the illicit flow of goods, weapons, narcotics, migrants, and foreign terrorist recruits. In fact, border security infrastructure damaged during the 2011 revolution largely remains unrepaired. Security at airports is minimal, with limited document screening and the absence of passenger name record systems or biometric technology. Moreover, existing legislation outlining border management is vague and often contradictory, resulting in ad-hoc and poorly coordinated efforts. To address this issue, the European Union (EU) Border Assistance Mission to Libya [6] was mandated to plan a possible future EU mission assisting Libya with criminal justice, migration, border security, and counterterrorism at the request of Libyan authorities.

Another challenge lies in the un-ideal situation of local and international cooperation in counter-terrorism efforts. After increased armed civil conflict in July 2014, nearly all diplomatic missions in Libya, (including the UN Support Mission in Libya) withdrew from the country. There are few foreign diplomats permanently stationed and present in Tripoli, although several European diplomats began to visit more frequently after the GNA’s March 2016 seating in the capital. Most bilateral programs that originally sought to increase the capacity of Libya’s law enforcement and defense institutions have been on hold since 2014.

Ultimately, Libya has failed to adopt a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, and the fight against terrorism is very clearly ongoing. After news of ISIS re-emerging amidst Libya power vacuum, President Trump ordered airstrikes near Sirte in September 2017 [7]. The U.S. military has reported that "ISIS and al Qaeda have taken advantage of ungoverned spaces in Libya to establish sanctuaries for plotting, inspiring and directing terror attacks, recruiting and facilitating the movement of foreign terrorist fighters, and raising and moving funds to support their operations. These terrorists have sought safe haven and freedom of movement in Libya to launch external terror attacks in neighboring countries, and their operatives in Libya have also been connected to multiple attacks across Europe."

Case Study: Algeria

Algeria is another notable case of a North African state fighting the imminent threat of terrorism. Different from Libya, the Algerian government has pursued a relatively aggressive counterterrorism campaign against all terrorist activity within its borders. In Algeria, several active terrorist organizations such as QIM, AQIM-allied groups, and ISIS related groups (including the Algerian branch known as Jund al-Khilafah-Algeria (JAK-A, Soldiers of the Caliphate)) exist in hopes of establishing their interpretations of Islamic law in the region [8]. They have regularly staged attacks on Algerian state security services, local governments, and structures supposedly aligned with Western interests.

A significant part of Algeria’s success countering terrorism is derived from its commitment to fighting terrorism through legislative measures. The Algerian penal code has expanded criminal liability to foreign terrorist fighters and those who finance terrorist organizations, use information technology to recruit terrorists, or fail to oblige by internet security measures. All of these pieces of legislation were designed to complement UN Security Council resolutions 2178 and 2199 and the ISIL and Al-Qaeda sanctions regime [9].

Algeria’s military, law enforcement, intelligence, and security services also all focus on counterterrorism, counter-intelligence, investigations, border security, and crisis response [10]. Military forces and security services regularly issue operations against terrorists, especially in the eastern and southern regions of the country. Border security is valued as a top priority to prevent infiltration by terrorists from neighboring states. Media outlets are also utilized to report on measures to increase border security, including closed military border areas, new observer posts, aerial‑based surveillance, and improved communication infrastructure. The government also established a database of foreign terrorist fighters, which is deployed at all border posts and diplomatic missions overseas. At airports, security carefully analyzes travel documents, using computerized fingertrip identification and special training to identifying fraud documents. To achieve these means, Algeria has participated in several trainings hosted by third party countries such as the United States.

Algeria’s relative success in counter-terrorism can also be attributed to less orthodox techniques such as state-sponsored religious education emphasizing counter-extremism, a national taskforce on cybercrime, and special focus on combating terrorist financing. Furthermore, it is immensely involved in regional and international counter-terrorism measures. As a member the African Union (AU), the GCTF, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Arab League, it has participated in UNODC’s Terrorism Prevention Branch and sits on the UN Counter-Terrorism Center’s Advisory Board. Strong diplomatic relations with neighboring countries such as Mali and Tunisia have also led to reduced terrorism along many of its borders as well.

1) What motivates terrorist organization activity? What factors allow terrorist organizations to find purpose and success specifically in North Africa?

2) What factors account for the difference in recent counter-terrorism measures by Libya and Algeria?

3) What should the role of the international community and outside states be in countering terrorism in the region? What role should the United Nations take in particular?

4) How are other countries in the North African region (besides the ones examined in the case study) affected by terrorism? What measures have they taken? What trends are correlated with relative success and failure?

ENDNOTES

[1] "Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC)," Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/salafist-group-preaching-and-fighting-gspc-al-qaeda-lands-islamic-maghreb-see-separate-entry

[2] Nossiter, Adam, "France Battling Islamists in Mali," New York Times, January 11, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/12/world/africa/mali-islamist-rebels-france.html

[3] "The Battle for Sirte: An Analysis," Libya Herald, November 7, 2016, https://www.libyaherald.com/2016/11/08/the-battle-for-sirte-an-analysis/

[4] "AQIM in Libya: An Enduring, Latent Threat to the Sahel," Consortium Against Terrorist Finance, October 3, 2016, https://stopterrorfinance.org/stories/511014796-aqim-in-libya-an-enduring-latent-threat-to-the-sahel

[5] "OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism," African Union, July 1, 1999, https://au.int/en/treaties/oau-convention-prevention-and-combating-terrorism

[6] "Civilian CSDP Missions: Supporting Libya on its border security and management reform," European Union, May 2, 2017, https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eubam-libya_en

[7] Smith, Alexander, "ISIS in Libya: Trump Orders First Airstrikes Near Sirte," NBC News, September 25, 2017, https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-libya-trump-orders-first-airstrikes-near-sirte-n804461

[8] "SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE PURSUANT TO RESOLUTIONS 1267 (1999) 1989 (2011) AND 2253 (2015) CONCERNING ISIL (DA'ESH) AL-QAIDA AND ASSOCIATED INDIVIDUALS GROUPS UNDERTAKINGS AND ENTITIES," United Nations.

[9] "UN DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS," United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, September 28, 2015.

[10] Seddiki, Abdallah, "Algeria's Counter-Terrorism Strategy to Protect the State from New Threats," March, 2013.