ASEAN I: Island Disputes in the South China Sea  

Dear Delegates,

I would like to welcome you to ASEAN and YMUN Taiwan with great excitement! We hope that the discussions and debates you engage in through the course of these committee sessions will enhance your understanding of the bustling regions that is Southeast Asia and its growing importance in the international stage.

I am a junior in Silliman College originally from the beautiful island of Guam and South Korea. I am double majoring in East Asian Studies and Political Science with a focus on Japan Korea relations. Within YIRA, I have served on the secretariats of YMGE as its President, YMUN XLI as ASG and USG of Business and Conference, YMUN Korea as Director General of Administration, YMUN China as a chair, and Security Council Simulation at Yale as a chair. In my free time outside of YIRA, I enjoy studying at one of many different cafes on campus, catching up with friends, and eating at one of the many restaurants here in New Haven. I am honored to be able to serve as your committee chairs and can’t wait to meet you all for YMUN Taiwan this year!

ASEAN Vision 2020, adopted in 1997, outlined plans for merging the economies of ASEAN member states envisioning the following characteristics: a single market and production base, a highly competitive economic region, a region of equitable development, and a region fully integrated into the global economy. ASEAN plans to have this completed by the end of 2015, but is already experiencing delays caused by a combination of financing shortfalls, poor governance, corruption, and the inability of national governments to manage international and interdepartmental coordination. On top of this, ASEAN must also take a stand on issues such as human rights in Myanmar and land disputes between ASEAN nations and China.

This is a new delegate committee and I along with everyone involved with planning the conference is invested in your experience and I hope that you will leave this committee with a greater skillset and appreciation for the topics we will discuss. If you have any questions regarding the topic or preparation feel free to email me at mike.yoon@yale.edu! I am excited to meet all of you in May in Taiwan!

All My Best,

Mike Yoon

YMUN Taiwan Chair, ASEAN

The ASEAN Declaration, also known as the Bangkok Declaration, was signed by Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines on August 8, 1967. This joint declaration established the beginning of an association whose goal would be to bring about regional economic, social, and political unity in hopes of serving the needs of the people of Southeast Asia. Since its establishment, ASEAN was conscious that in order to succeed, a unified front in the face of an increasingly globalizing world would be crucial.

The Bangkok Declaration established the following seven aims and purposes for ASEAN

1. To accelerate economic, social, and cultural growth in the region through partnership in order to create a prosperous and peaceful community of nations within Southeast Asia.

2. To promote regional peace and stability through promoting rule of law and justice among the countries and with the goal to adhere to the United Nations Charter.

3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, scientific, racial, social, and administrative aspects of each nation.

4. To provide assistance in the form of research in the above mentioned fields of organization.

5. To collaborate effectively for the greater utilization of agriculture and industrial opportunities to: expand trade, meet problems of commodity trading, improve transportation and communications, and to raise the overall living standards of the people.

6. To promote South-East Asian studies

7. To maintain beneficial relations and cooperation with international and regional organizations with similar goals and to further develop cooperation between the institutions.

ASEAN has passed a number of legal binding treaties relevant to the issues of this committee. Perhaps the most important is the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia introduced the following principles:

1. Mutual acknowledgement of independence, territorial integrity, and national identity

2. The right for every State to operate free from external influence or control

3. Agreement of non-interference with the internal affairs of each other

4. Settlement of disputes in a peaceful manner

5. Refusing to threaten or use force upon one another

6. Agreeing to have effective cooperation between themselves

Membership of ASEAN

Southeast Asia is composed of 11 countries of which 10 are members of the organization. The member nations and the order in which they joined are:

1. Thailand (1967)

2. Indonesia (1967)

3. Malaysia (1967)

4. Philippines (1967)

5. Singapore (1967)

6. Brunei (1984)

7. Vietnam (1995)

8. Laos (1997)

9. Myanmar (1997)

10. Cambodia (1999)

ASEAN candidates/observers:

1. Papua New Guinea (1976)

2. East Timor (2002)

The South China Sea is an important global trade route and is scattered with islands and rocks. Each year, $5.3 trillion of trade passes through the South China Sea; U.S. trade accounts for $1.2 trillion of this total. These islands are modest, even diminutive, but they form the core of a fierce territorial dispute among six primary claimants: Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.

The stakes are so high in this region because:

l The South China Sea is one of the primary routes for international trade, and many claim that the Sea hides bountiful oil reserves in addition to its plentiful fishing stocks.

l The disputes are further entrenched by rampant nationalism, as each claimant attaches symbolic value to the South China Sea islands that far exceeds their objective material wealth

l The disputes are also tinged by great power politics as China and the United States begin to jostle each other for control of the international order.

Over the last year, disputes in the South China Sea have dominated headlines, and they seem sure to continue to generate fresh national security issues.

The islands of the South China Sea can largely be grouped into two island chains. The Paracel Islands are clustered in the northwest corner of the Sea, and the Spratly Islands in the southeast corner.

Countries are arguing bitterly over the “true” history of these island chains. Some have tried to ground their modern claims by proving a long and unbroken record of national control over claimed features. These states assert that, for example, their nationals fished around the islands of the Sea or used them for shelter from storms. In particular, Beijing has taken an active role in subsidizing archeological digs to find evidence of exclusive Chinese usage of the Sea’s many features since time immemorial.

It is hard to wade through these claims. No impartial tribunal has yet taken on that challenge. To the extent that it is possible to draw any conclusions from the morass, though, it seems fair to say that no claimant has conclusively demonstrated a pattern of exclusive historical control over the South China Sea, or even over isolated parts of it.

In any case, the issue was quiet for most of the region’s history. Through the first half of the twentieth century, the South China Sea remained quiet as neighboring states focused their attention on conflicts unfolding elsewhere.

In fact, at the end of World War II, no country made a claim on a single island in the entire South China Sea. Then, in 1946, China established itself on a few features in the Spratlys, and in early 1947, it also snapped up Woody Island, part of the Paracel Islands chain, only two weeks before the French and Vietnamese intended to make landfall.

But even at this stage, the South China Sea was not seen as a priority by any of the claimants.

However, the next half century saw accelerating interest in the South China Sea. In 1955 and 1956, China and Taiwan established permanent presences on several key islands.

Once again, this phase of frenetic island occupation was cooled off by a longer period of inertia. But by the early 1970s, the fight had ignited once again. This time, though, the scramble was spurred by indications that oil lurked beneath the waters of the South China Sea. The Philippines was the first to move

Spratly Island Disputes

The Spratly Islands of the South China Sea are a potential tinder box in the region. Approximately 44 of the 51 small islands and reefs are claimed or occupied by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei. The conflict is the result of overlapping sovereignty claims to various Spratly Islands thought to possess substantial natural resources --chiefly oil, natural gas, and lucrative fishing areas. Disputes have been propelled by an aggressive China, eager to meet growing energy demands that outstrip its supply capability.

Overlapping claims have resulted in several military incidents since 1974 and in several countries awarding foreign companies exploration rights in the same area of the South China Sea. Regional nation-states not directly involved in the Spratly disputes became concerned about regional stability and established a regional forum to discuss the peaceful resolution of the disputes. Sovereignty and exploration disputes were thought to be resolved with the drafting of ASEAN's 1992 declaration which committed members to resolve disputes peacefully and to consider joint exploration of the territory. Military aggression and exploration endeavors conducted by China since the declaration, however, have brought into question the validity of the agreement and raises the question of what long-term, peaceful solution could prevent the region from erupting into a continuum of military incidents over sovereignty rights to the natural resource-rich Spratly Islands.

Claims to various islands of the archipelago began in the 1930s. Since the 1950s, the involved claimants have developed 29 oil fields and 4 gas fields in the Spratly region. China's rising energy demands, decreasing ability to meet demand growth with domestic energy sources, and continued reliance on oil have propelled China to look to alternative energy sources -- in particular the relatively untapped South China Sea in general, and the Spratly Islands in particular. According to Kent Calder, China's energy balance of trade has dramatically deteriorated since the early 1990s, causing China to become a net importer of oil for the first time in over 25 years. Dependence on imported oil is likely to continue, given its low per capita energy consumption rate, 40% of the world average. Unless China can find a way of coping with the high start up costs, waste products and safety concerns affiliated with the implementation of nuclear energy, oil will remain one of China's leading energy sources for the mid-to-long term. There are currently five nations that have a claim to the Spratly islands:

● China: claims all islands in the Spratly region. According to Marcus Hall's "Trouble Brewing in the South China Sea" assessment, China entered the dispute in three phases. The first phase encompassed China's claim to the Spratly Islands in the 1950s. The second phase took place in 1974, when China seized the Spratly Islands from Vietnam. The third phase began on 14 March 1988, with China's military engagement with Vietnamese forces over the removal of China's flag from a newly claimed shoal. The military clash resulted in China gaining possession of 6 islands in the Spratly region. China's claim to all islands in the Spratly archipelago stems from its historical presence in the region, dating as far back as the Han dynasty of the 2nd century BC. China's historical claim is dubious and neglects similar historical claims by Taiwan, Vietnam and Malaysia.

● The Philippines: claim approximately 60 of islands in the Spratly region. Joint exploration with Royal Dutch Shell Group and Alcorn International near the Palawan Island will raise the Philippines annual oil production from the 3,000 barrels/day (b/d) produced in 1991 from 7 wells in the South China Sea.

● Vietnam: claims part of islands in the Spratly region. Vietnam's only oil well in production as of 1991 is the White Tiger field, 400 km west of the Crestone block. In 1992, however, Vietnam hastened leasing to foreign exploration.

● Taiwan: claims all islands in the Spratly region. The Spratly Islands are strategically important to Taiwan for two reasons. First, it important shipping lanes pass through waters surrounding the Spratly Islands. Second, the South China Sea, in general, is fish abundant. Thus, Taiwan feels compelled to protect its interests.

● Malaysia: is the earliest oil operator in the sea and claims 3 islands and 4 rock groups in the Spratly region. As of 1992, Malaysia was running 90 oil- producing wells, with $210 million planned for further development between 1992 and 1995. This number has since increased to over 120+

● Brunei: claims the Louisa Reef in the Spratly region, located adjacent to its coastline. Brunei became an active player in the Spratly disputes only within recent years. Production of its 9 oil fields in the South China Sea hovers around 143,000 b/d.

Other than countries directly involved in the land disputes there are countries such as the United States and Japan that act as indirect actors in this land dispute. Further, ASEAN members are concerned that the U.S. withdrawal of military troops from the region and the Soviet Union's disintegration will leave the region without a counterbalance to China. Although, many western analysts view China's military capabilities as obsolete, China's military might in the ASEAN region is still superior, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Flight Global 2016 puts overall Chinese strength at 2,942 aircraft, including the PLAAF PLA ground forces and the PLAN . U.S. overall strength, by contrast, sits at 13,717 aircraft across the four services.All are encouraged to compare these numbers with their respective countries military might and how this may seem intimidating to smaller countries in ASEAN. Delegates must try to find resolution for this land dispute and try to ease the worry of ASEAN member nations with a plausible solution to the apparent counterbalance of power developing in the region.

Sources Used/Suggestions for Further Research

Below is a list of sources, some of which were used as aids in writing this topic guide and all of which will provide further information and new insight with which to approach this committee. Delegates are encouraged to use this list and the sources they find as much as possible.

● ASEAN Declaration, Bangkok, 8 August 1967

● Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration, Kuala Lumpur, 27 November 1971

● Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Bali, 24 February 1976

● Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Bali, 24 February 1976

● ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, Manila, 22 July 1992

● Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, Bangkok, 15 December 1997

● ASEAN Vision 2020, Kuala Lumpur, 15 December 1997

● Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, 5 November 2001

● Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, Bali, 7 October 2003

● ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (ACCT), 11 January 2007

● Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015, 11 January 2007.