Letter from the DAIS
Dear delegates,
Welcome to the fifth iteration of Yale Model United Nations Taiwan (YMUNT)! My name is Michael, and I am thrilled to serve as the Director of the Organization of American States. Coming from both a small suburban town in New Jersey and the vibrant metropolis of São Paulo in Brazil, I study Global Affairs and Ethics, Politics & Economics, with concentrations in international development and comparative political economy. I am also a Human Rights Scholar at Yale Law School's Schell Center for International Human Rights. The crux of my work has been centered around Latin America, specifically how and why policy-makers make the decisions they do.
As part of the Yale International Relations Association (YIRA), the umbrella organization for YMUNT, I have served as Director-General of Operations for our 40th college conference, the Security Council Simulation at Yale (SCSY); as Under-Secretary-General of Regional Bodies for our 44th flagship Yale Model United Nations conference; and as Under-Secretary-General of Delegations for Yale Model United Nations China.
Aside from conferences, I teach international relations theory and case studies for Hemispheres, edit for the Yale Review of International Studies, and serve on YIRA’s Executive Board as the YIRA Secretary to oversee all our programmes. Further, I am involved with the Executive Boards of the Yale Globalist (an international relations magazine), the Yale Economic Review, the Yale Undergraduate Legal Aid Association, and Dwight Hall at Yale (a public service organization). In my residential college, I manage our coffee shop called the Acorn, and my specialty drink is an iced dark chocolate mocha. My current obsessions include a television show called the Good Place, other Netflix programs, corgis, and trivia games.
Soon, we will all convene to discuss the pressing need of greater environmentalism in Latin America and the threat of unstable governance in Venezuela. This topic guide has been designed to help you learn about these two issues, but I encourage (and expect) you to do some outside research alongside what I have presented here. To provide a starting point, I have included some links and questions to consider. Of course, I am also happy to answer any questions and help you research more effectively.
I eagerly await meeting you all in and out of committee. In exchange for the insight I can provide into Yale, these important concerns facing Latin America, and what else that might interest you, I am excited to learn from you all as students, debaters, and global citizens. Should you have any questions, feel free to contact me at michael.borger@yale.edu.
Best wishes,
Michael Borger
Role of the Committee
This committee will be charged with presenting comprehensive proposals on how to best tackle the two issues presented in this guide. Since this is a regional organization rather than an international organization, this committee is better suited to addressing the situation more closely. Unlike international institutions such as the United Nations, a regional organization such as the Organization of American States can focus more on specifics. Regional organizations are less likely to get stuck in lackluster, stagnant debates of basic premises and consensus-building.
In these regional organizations, general agreements oftentimes already exist. This could be perhaps attributed to the greater homogeneity in member states. In other words, members have more in common governmentally, socioeconomically, and culturally than they do different. As a result, they many times share a foundation off of which they can build together.
In the case of environmentalism, the role of the committee will be to understand how to best protect the Earth, conserve the natural resources the Americas possess, shield citizens from the negative effects of pollution and greenhouse gas emissions, and more. The committee will want to look to past international and regional treaties and agreements, consider countries' economic motivations, discuss sustainable development practices, and other salient items.
With the Venezuelan Crisis, the specific issues are admittedly a bit more thorny. Because Venezuela is a sovereign state, the committee’s ability to coerce the current government into improving its treatment of citizens is limited. I would highly recommend reading over parts of the OAS Charter and listening to speeches by the OAS Secretary-General Luis Almagro to better understand the committee’s role in improving the situation in Venezuela. In particular, I suggest reading Part One, Chapters I (Nature and Purposes), II (Principles), III (Members), and IV (Fundamental Rights and Duties of States). I would be happy to clarify any questions you might have on the wording of this Charter, as part of the debate will, in fact, revolve around the permissibility of OAS coercion or intervention in a member state given the guidelines on sovereignty, which is a key point of tension in international affairs.
In short, I want you to treat this as the next Summit of the Americas. Although the 8th Summit will be held in Lima, Peru on April 13 and 14 this year, and its main discussion will center around "Democratic Governance Against Corruption," let us imagine that this is the real 8th Summit, and that the actual topic is: “Sustainable Human Impact,” examining our impact on one another (e.g. through politics in Venezuela) and the Earth.
HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE
In 1826, Simón Bolivar, a South American revolutionary leader, convened the Congress of Panama. From June 22 to July 15, Latin American leaders from the new republics that had gained their independence came together with the intention of creating a universal policy towards Spain, a former colonial motherland and the empire from which many of these republics had descended. Representatives of Gran Colombia, the United Provinces of Central America, and Mexico came together. Chile and the United Provinces of South America refused to participate, as did the Empire of Brazil, which was waging war against Argentina over the area that is modern-day Uruguay. Paraguay was not invited, while Great Britain attended with observer status. The United States, embroiled in its own debates about slavery, eventually conceded to send two delegates, but one died en route to Panama and the other only arrived after the conference had concluded.
Albeit this Congress was arguably the first step towards greater Latin American integration, many scholars point to the First International Conference of American States in Washington D.C. in October 1889 as the start of periodic meetings and conferences. At the United States government's request, countries from the Americas began reconvening to deliberate over inter-American business rules, universalize dispute settlement processes, and encourage more trade across countries in the hemisphere. Eighteen American states participated, and they comprised the "International Union of American Republics, for the Prompt Collection and Distribution of Commercial Information" which would be headquartered in Washington D.C. Understandably, they shortened the name to “Pan-American Union.” After revisions were introduced, the Union became the foundation for what would become the OAS Secretariat. Alongside the Pan-American Union, other institutions were established, including the Pan American Health Organization (1902), the Inter-American Children’s Institute (1927), and more.
The Congress’s first recommendations included provisions of government extradition across countries. Additionally, it announced that conquest did not create rights, and it outlined rules for arbitration before American states resorted to war with one another. Representatives of the system achieved greater commercial integration, strengthened interstate legal ties, and founded different specialized institutions.
In 1948, at the Ninth International Conference of American States in Bogotá, Colombia, 21 States had convened to adopt the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (the Pact of Bogotá), and the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man. Since 1948, the OAS Charter has been ratified on four occasions via Protocols of Amendment: in Buenos Aires (1967), Cartagena de Indias (1985), Washington D.Cc. (1992), and Managua (1993).
In the decades following the Charter’s ratification, these Conferences of American States continued to meet at different times. Notably, other side conferences took place, too, including special meetings such as the Meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Conference on Inter-American Problems of War and Peace in Mexico City, Mexico (1945); the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (1947); and more. The passing of the OAS charter also heralded the establishments of the Inter-American Development Bank (1959), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1979), and other institutions that intended to fortify cooperation in the region.
In 1970, after the 1948 OAS Charter had been ratified, the Conferences of American States were substituted by the Organization of American States General Assemblies. One iteration of the OAS General Assembly will be the committee you will find yourself in soon.
Topic History
Recognizing the catalysts and consequences of a political crisis in Venezuela
To understand the situation in Venezuela, it might be useful to break it down into several parts. We will want to consider the social, economic, and political dimensions of the country’s crisis. Though many problems the country has faced predate the recent scandals, Venezuela has dealt with severe economic crises, social issues such as crime and corruption, and problems with its democratic practices for decades.
Most notably, Venezuela’s current issues can be traced back to the rise of Hugo Chávez, a charismatic politician who depended on anti-United States speeches, strong nationalist sentiment, and appeals to the masses for popularity. As a former military officer, he had attempted to overthrow the Venezuelan government in 1992. Though this 1992 coup attempt failed, Chávez ran for public office six years later. In 1998, on a platform of fighting poverty and social inequality, he was elected president, much to the anger of the Venezuelan elite. For many years, members of the Venezuelan elite made money off of the country’s natural abundance of crude oil. Chávez promised the people that he would redistribute these profits to achieve better social and economic equality. Understandably, his message was well-received by those in poorer regions.
However, his presidency, which would be full of extreme measures, began with easily one of the most radical decisions an elected leader can make. Mere hours of being sworn into office, he announced a referendum to rewrite the country’s constitution. This is noteworthy because rewriting a constitution is not an easy task, nor should it be. After all, a country’s constitution is often the foundational document for its system of governance.
Yet, Chávez put it up to a vote, and on April 25, 1999, Venezuelans overwhelmingly voted in favor of his proposal to draft a new constitution. With 122 of 128 constitutional assembly seats occupied by Chávez’s allies during the summer of 1999, the body rewrote the country’s constitution and voted it into law on December 15, 1999. Amongst the new guidelines for how the country would now work, some were more consequential, including the elimination of the Senate, an extension of presidential terms from five years each to six years, and even an alteration to the country’s name, becoming the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
In 2000, the new millennium brought a new presidential election, where the people elected Chávez to a six-year term under the new Constitution. This six-year term started with even greater vigor as he adopted a series of measures many scholars consider to be extreme. Because of his polarizing tactics, such as name-calling opponents, and his close alliances with controversial figures like Fidel Castro, Chávez attracted immense opposition, including from past supporters. Using funds gained from high oil prices, he chased his goal of a Bolivarian Revolution in the country, redistributing land and wealth by passing 49 laws in 2001.
His sweeping actions drew much frustration, culminating in 2002 when labor unions, business interests, church groups, and political parties from all sides of the spectrum came together to protest. In April 2002, under a stalemate between the government and the workers of the Petroleos de Venezuela state-owned oil and natural gas company, members of the armed forces decided to intervene. They took Chávez into military custody and replaced him with an interim government, spearheaded by business federation leader Pedro Carmona. This coup d’état attempt, however, lasted only a few days, as support from those loyal to him in the military and lower classes demanded his return. Furthermore, Carmona had attempted to undo many of the reforms that Chávez had enacted, including the ratification of the 1999 Constitution— attempts that were met with anger from key sectors of the economy. After a protest from members of the lower class, Carmona resigned and Chávez was reinstated, though not without the nearly sixty casualties in 48 hours between April 11 and April 13. Later that year, high-ranking military officials criticized Chávez’s presidency, but their warnings were ignored, and Chávez maintained his grip on power.
In February 2003, members of the Venezuelan opposition started a petition with several demands, the most prominent being the removal of Chávez from office. During 2003, millions of signatures were collected to recall Chávez. Halfway through 2004, the Venezuelan National Electoral Council announced there were enough valid signatures needed to hold a referendum on Chávez’s presidency. To the dismay of opposition leaders, 58 percent of voters voted against the recall, or rather, in favor of Chávez’s stay in office. Some accused the recall of fraud, though election observers, including former United States president Jimmy Carter, denied any foul play. Chávez would go on to finish his presidential term, though his approval ratings dropped significantly. Part of this can be attributed to his subsequent actions, including a January 2005 decree on land reform that eliminated Venezuela’s large estates, which some saw as an attack on private property rights. Other moves included new media regulations, such as huge fines and prison sentences for insulting or criticizing public figures, the purchase of fighter jets and helicopters worth three billion dollars from Russia, and centralization of the Venezuelan National Assembly after opposition parties boycotted the election.
On December 3, 2006, he won re-election for his third presidential term, earning 63 percent of the vote. Over the course of 2007, he aimed to promote greater nationalization of key industries, including energy and telecommunication companies. After the Chávez administration refused to renew a broadcasting license for critical government channel, people began to protest the suppression of free speech, receiving support from international non-governmental organizations and governments who viewed this action as censorship. A month later, in June 2007, two large American oil companies, Exxon Mobil and ConocoPhilips, refused to give the government a majority share of operations in the region. In turn, Chávez’s government expropriated, or forcibly took over, the company’s work around the Orinoco. The effects of these authoritarian moves were felt across the country for months.
But, by the end of 2007, people had recognized the government’s attempts to consolidate power. In a December referendum that year,the people decided that the government would not be given further control over the country’s Central Bank. Furthermore, the country decided not to give the government increased power to take over property like it had leading up to the referendum. Still, the government decided in August 2008 to nationalize a huge private bank, the Spanish-owed Bank of Venezuela.
2007 and 2008 were critical years in Chávez’s centralization of power.Ultimately, they built up to the 2009 constitutional referendum, passed on February 15, that permitted Chávez to run for a third six-year term. It also abolished the cap on the number of terms in office that an elected official can complete. Moreover, in the midst of a global economic crisis, the oil economy in Venezuela struggled to maintain its ground. In 2010, opposition members managed to claim seats in the National Assembly, a feat that had seemed impossible.
In December 2010, after Parliament gave Chávez special powers to deal with enormous floods in the region, opposition leaders worried that this would give the president leeway to enact even more authoritarian decisions. After the United States placed sanctions against Petróleos de Venezuela (the state-owned oil company) in May 2011, the Venezuelan government continued to intervene further in the market economy, especially the oil sector and other basic goods sectors to combat rising price levels. Chávez even made threats to take over companies not adhering to the price controls (set non-fluctuating prices) that the government had established.
In 2012, after announcing in January that he had cancer, Chávez organized what he called the Council of State, a group of ten Venezuelans that would serve as his advisors on important political and economic matters. The Council President was to be the country’s Vice President, Elias Jaua; other members of the Council included journalist Jose Vincente Rangel, former Venezuelan Ambassador to the Organization of American States and foreign minister Roy Chadertone, and members of the armed forces, including Rafael Giacopini. Because of the Council’s emergence, many speculations arose surrounding the president’s health, including guesses that this presidential term would be his last. Nevertheless, Chávez was re-elected on October 7, 2012, with 54 percent of the vote and country turnout of around 81 percent.
On March 5, 2013, his fifth overall presidential term and fourth presidential term under the 1999 Constitution was cut short when he succumbed to cancer. At the age of 58, the poster-child of the twentieth-century Bolivarian Revolution, anti-United States sentiment in the Americas, and Venezuelan nationalism died.
Current Situation
Chávez’s Succession (2013-2014)
After Chávez’s death, it was not clear toward which direction the country was headed. Whether it would be more sympathetic to new leadership and ideas or if it would prefer maintaining the Chávez tradition was undecided. But, a month after Chávez’s death, his Vice President, Nicolás Maduro achieved 50.8 percent of the vote against opposition candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski, who managed to get 49 percent. Having served as Minister of Foreign Affairs between 2006 and 2013 and as Vice President between 2012 and 2013 under Chávez, Maduro certainly had accumulated a fair number of political achievements. Still, many claimed his presidency was illegitimate, protesting in the streets with banners, rallying cries, and even pots and pans. They demanded a recount of the election, an initiative that then-OAS Secretary-General, Jose Miguel Insulza, supported because of the divisive lead-up to the vote.
Instead of getting a recount, opposition supporters were met with violence in their protests. Not only were police officers and the National Guard troops ready with tear gas to unleash upon the protestors, but also Maduro had organized counter-protests from his support base to potentially outnumber those on the streets. During this month, he also reiterated his intention to further Chávez’s work through greater socialist efforts, even calling himself Chávez’s metaphorical son.
Responding to the United States’s questions into his power’s legitimacy, as well as what he considered attempts at government sabotage, Maduro announced on a state-owned television station that he would be expelling three US diplomats from the country. Besides blaming an electrical blackout earlier that month on the opposition, Maduro also accused US diplomats of conspiring with right-wing groups to destabilize his government. He made several accusations against the US government, even claiming that they were attempting to assassinate him.
Persecution of Political Opponents (2014-2016)
Half a year later, in early 2014, Maduro shifted his attention inward and ordered the imprisonment of Leopoldo López, an opposition leader, charging him with conspiracy and murder. López, a former mayor, professor of economics, and leader of an opposition political party, had already been banned from running for office under Chávez in 2011. Though the Inter-American Court of Human Rights had deemed that ban a violation of López’s rights, the Venezuelan Supreme Court rejected their ruling, leading López to support fellow opposition candidate Henrique Caprilles Radonski in the election after Chávez’s death. Therefore, Maduro’s decision to imprison López in 2014 came as little surprise to many. The start of López’s near-fourteen year imprisonment sparked outrage across the country and the international community.
Like López, Caracas’ mayorAntonio Ledzema, was arrested on the grounds of conspiring to throw a coup against the government. According to Maduro, Ledzema would be answering for crimes committed against the country’s peace, security, and constitution. In 2009, Ledzema had staged a hunger strike against Chávez’s attempts at consolidating power. In what many speculated was part of a grander scheme of persecution, the raid on Ledzema’s house came after the one year anniversary of López’s arrest. Both the actions against Ledzema and López represent the government’s concentration of power and repression of criticism and opposition.
Despite the Maduro’s administration’s attempts at subverting its opponents, the Venezuelan opposition coalition, the Democratic Unity Roundtable or the Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD), obtained 99 seats in the 2015 parliamentary election. This meant that they held a total of 112 seats out of 167 seats in the National Assembly. Thus, the country’s unicameral government (or one chamber parliament) was finally no longer under the control of Chávez and Maduro’s party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela). Voters in the country were clearly frustrated with Maduro and his administration, opening up the possibility of removing Maduro from power.
This motivation led to widespread petitions to hold a referendum on the Maduro presidency. The goal was to permanently remove him from office. However, in October 2016, the National Electoral Council halted the recall election, saying that federal courts had found several cases of voter identity fraud during the initial round of signature collection. As a result, the second round of signature collection, which was scheduled for October 26 to 28, was terminated. Opposition leader Henrique Capriles, who had run against Maduro for the presidency in 2013, called this a government-led coup d’état, saying that the fears of the Venezuelan people for their democracy were coming true in front of them.
Consolidation of Executive Power (2016-2017)
The comparison to a coup was not far off, as the Venezuelan Supreme Court decided to take away all the powers of the opposition-led National Assembly in March 29, 2017. Though the Supreme Court reversed its decision on April 2, this decision had taken its toll on public perception. It proved that the opposition was justified in its claims of authoritarian behavior, and consequently, the Venezuelan government, like it had done to Ledzema and López, hunted down former presidential candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski, banning him from any political work for fifteen years.
As expected, the country rioted. Between April and June, while anti-government protesters filled the streets of Caracas and cities around Venezuela, armed forces defended the government against demands for new presidential elections. During this time, Maduro had also proposed replacing the National Assembly with a new constituent assembly, which was heatedly rebuked by protesters in these months. Protests went so far that a police helicopter was allegedly stolen by Oscar Perez, an officer in the country’s investigative police force. The person behind the helicopter, believed to be Oscar Perez, dropped multiple grenades on government buildings, including the Venezuelan Supreme Court. By the summer of 2017, several people had died during the mass protests at the hands of the administration’s security forces.
On the anniversary of Venezuela’s independence (July 5), Maduro supporters stormed into the National Assembly and assaulted opposition lawmakers. These lawmakers were in the process of discussing an unofficial plebiscite, or a national vote, that could potentially lead to Maduro’s removal. The July 16 plebiscite would ask voters about their level of confidence in Maduro’s presidency (a confidence vote) and request feedback on the legitimacy of his constitutional rewrites. And, on the day of the plebiscite, around 7.2 million Venezuelans voted against Maduro’s plan to rewrite the country’s constitution. Over 98 percent, a clear majority, rejected the attempt at replacing the National Assembly with a constituent assembly. Voters also requested that the military defend the constitution and asked for new elections to be held before Maduro’s term ends in 2019. In response, Maduro’s administration condemned the referendum as illegal, calling for July 30 elections for the members of a special assembly to rewrite the 1999 Constitution. In this constituent assembly, there would be 545 seats to be filled. More broadly speaking, the July 30 elections marked what opponents called an erasure of the last remnants of Venezuelan democracy.
August 2017, a Month of Darkness (2017)
After the new constituent assembly being formed, the United States imposed sanctions against Venezuela after at least ten people were killed in protests. According to Maduro, these sanctions would do little to change his course of action. However, in spite of, or perhaps because of, the sanctions’ effectiveness, the Maduro regime responded aggressively to international sanctions. Most likely, the regime was infuriated by the accusations that Maduro’s supporters had committed voter fraud and inflated the actual voter turnout. Previously jailed opposition leaders in declining health (López and Ledzema), who had previously been released on house arrest, were newly detained and sent to jail less than 48 hours after the vote.
On August 5, Maduro swore in the new constituent assembly, who was charged with rewriting the constitution. The next day, the constituent assembly decided removed one of the last few remaining checks on the government’s power from office: the country’s attorney general, Luisa Ortega. A week later, United States President Donald Trump, mentioned the possibility of US military intervention in the country, though he later retracted his statement by saying that Congress would likely not authorize war with Venezuela. President Maduro, in response, said that a US attack on Venezuela would provoke a conflict that would make the Vietnam War seem small by comparison.
Although the constituent assembly had been created, the National Assembly continued meeting, refusing to acknowledge the constituent assembly as the legitimate legislature of the country. The constituent assembly had attempted to give itself the right to pass laws and bypass the National Assembly’s authority. But, the National Assembly persisted with its declaration of resistance, receiving supportive statements from several countries, including the United States.
Angering Maduro, the Colombian government decided to give Luisa Ortega, the former attorney general of Venezuela, six months refuge in Colombia because Maduro had threatened her with further political persecution. Maduro even demanded that the international community assist him in bringing Ortega back to Venezuela to supposedly stand trial.
August 2017 proved to be a decisive month in Venezuelan political affairs. The constituent assembly decided it would put up a referendum for a new national constitution, keeping the date and contents of the referendum unannounced. In response, the US created even more sanctions against Venezuelan financial institutions, the state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, and those complicit in the regime’s behavior. After US threats, Venezuela held military drills with over 200,000 troops and 700,000 reserve and civil militia members. Moreover, the constituent assembly passed a decree allowing for the prosecution of those responsible for supporting US sanctions.
Building Up to the 2018 Presidential Election
On September 11, 2017, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights said that Venezuela might have committed crimes against humanity. A day later, Maduro said that he would open up discussions with opposition leaders. Opposition leaders saw this as a cover-up for years of human rights violations. Peace talks, Maduro said, would happen in the Dominican Republic city of Santo Domingo because of the Dominican Republic President’s willingness to engage with the Maduro regime. However, the opposition declined the possibility of negotiation, calling it a waste of time.
A week after the accusation that the Venezuelan government had committed crimes against humanity, President Trump mentioned to a group of Latin American leaders, including Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, Brazilian President Michel Temer, Panamanian President Juan Carlos Varela, and Argentine Vice-President Gabriela Michetti, that Venezuela was on the brink of collapse. Paying little heed to these comments, President Maduro ensured that the ruling party was victorious in regional elections on October 15, 2017, securing 17 out of 23 seats. The opposition refused to recognize the results of the gubernatorial, or governor, elections, citing fraudulent results and government manipulation. As a consequence, the opposition leaders who had won governor seats in five states also refused to be sworn into the National Assembly.
In December 2017, the mayorship for 335 municipalities was being fought, but the opposition parties boycotted the elections because of government repression and control. In a move of convenience, Maduro banned opposition parties from competing in the 2018 presidential election, saying they were no longer part of the country’s political system. The constituent assembly unanimously voted that the next presidential election would be held by the end of April 2018, and Maduro said he would be prepared to run if asked by his party. Realistically, the chances that he will run and represent his party are high. Without opposition in sight, Maduro’s victory would be unsurprising.
Democratic institutions in Venezuela have essentially been eliminated, and the economy is in poor condition and suffers from high inflation rates, fluctuating oil prices, and massive debt. Rule of law has been replaced with state-driven violence, censorship, and repression. The country of Venezuela is in a dire state of emergency.
Questions to Consider
What is the role of the Venezuelan government, and is the Maduro regime fulfilling its duties as a government?
To what extent can a government consolidate its power? Should there be checks on the government’s ability to consolidate power, and if so, what are these checks? Who should ensure that they are properly enforced?
Should the international community, specifically other states in the America, respond to the events in Venezuela? If so, how can it? What are the possible mechanisms that countries and regional organizations could put to use to change the situation? Should countries be pressuring the Maduro regime, and if so, what types of pressure should they place (e.g. economic, humanitarian, etc.)?
How do we assess the Maduro regime’s treatment of the opposition? Should governments be allowed to jail opponents of the state, or should they be required to tolerate opposition? What about questions of when political opposition may potentially destabilize the state, for better or worse?
To what extent are human rights being violated in the Venezuela? Whose rights in particular are being violated, and how can the OAS prevent further violations?
Is there a threshold of violence that must be reached before intervention is considered? Is intervention off the table? Should we already have intervened?
Are there other factors that need to be considered in the Venezuelan crisis? What about the refugees entering neighboring countries, the worsening poverty in the region, the dependency on oil profit? What other factors are missing?
Should the OAS be recognizing Maduro’s administration as the legitimate government of Venezuela, should it be working with the opposition leaders instead, or should it be working with both? Does the international community’s response affect how the government can legitimize its decisions on political affairs?
Is Venezuela an authoritarian state (where the government does not conduct free or fair elections), a democracy (where the government conducts free or fair election), or a failed state (where the government has no legitimacy in conducting elections)? What are the consequences of defining the country’s governance according to one of these three labels?
Further Research
Latest Updates of the Venezuelan Crisis
The Washington Post Article on Luis Almagro (OAS Secretary-General)
OAS Ministers meeting on Venezuela in 2017
An Article for the Atlantic Written by Leopoldo López
“Tired of Regional Critics, Venezuela Looks to Russia and China”
An Article for the Atlantic on the 2013 Presidential Election
