EU II: Brexit Negotiations

LETTER FROM THE DAIS

Dear Delegates,

It is my great pleasure to welcome you to the 5th annual Yale Model United Nations Taiwan. My name is Hanah Lee, and I am greatly looking forward to serving as your director for the European Union committee this year. Over the course of the next few weeks and during our conference itself, I hope that the mission of YMUNT to "Empower, Enrich, and Excel" truly shines in both your individual research and the productive, energetic conversation we will have in committee as we tackle the complex problems presented in this topic guide.

Just as I would like to get to know you better during the conference, let me share a bit more about myself here. Originally from Arcadia, California, I decided to make the big move to the East Coast for college, where I am a sophomore at Yale in Silliman College double majoring in Global Affairs and Ethics, Politics, and Economics. A die-hard fan of the Yale International Relations Association, I joined the YIRA community without model United Nations experience, but I cannot imagine a more formative college experience. Besides serving as your Director-General of Committees for YMUNT V, I have also worked on the secretariats of Yale Model United Nations (YMUN), Security Council Simulation at Yale (SCSY), and International Relations Symposium at Yale (IRSY). Outside of YIRA, you can also find me working with the Asian American Students Alliance, Korean American Students at Yale, Yale Undergraduate Diversified Investments, and Design at Yale. In my spare time, you can usually catch me binge watching rom-coms (Clueless!) and napping!

It is such an exciting time to be discussing the European Union. An unparalleled experiment in integrating nations of vastly different backgrounds and cultural values, the European Union has been tested time and again by various crises. Especially in light of the rise of eurosceptic parties in recent European elections and the tough negotiations currently taking place regarding Brexit, which you will learn are tied to a multitude of other factors relating to this institution, the question of complete European integration still remains relevant. As we discuss international cooperation both within and outside of the European Union, and the capacity and duties of different member states in this body, I look forward to seeing how cooperation within our committee can facilitate our progress towards addressing these difficult challenges.

Again, I cannot wait for the discussions and thoughts that lie ahead in the upcoming months. I highly encourage you to take advantage of the information laid out in this topic guide and to do research of your own to bring new and interesting thoughts to the table. If you have any questions at all, please feel free to contact me at hanah.lee@yale.edu. See you in March!

Best,

Hanah Lee

The founding goal of the European Union was to help the continent of Europe adjust after the devastation created by World War II, which had ended 5 years earlier, and to create lasting peace and democracy amongst members states. Before the European Union, there was the European Coal and Steel Community, formed in 1951 by France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. With the goal to make war "not merely thinkable, but materially impossible," the ECSC pooled coal and steel production amongst the member states.[1] That is, by integrating coal and steel production and markets amongst members, each state had a vested economic interest in cooperating peacefully with the others. In 1957, the Treaty of Rome created the European Economic Community (EEC) which was more formal than the European Coal and Steel Community.[2] The EEC members states wanted to remove trade barriers in order to create a shared free market.

The 1960s saw a better period of economic growth for the EEC member states, which had stopped imposing customs tariffs on inter-EEC trade.[3] In 1967, the EEC joined with two other European communities—the ECSC and the European Atomic Energy Community— to create a single commission, council of ministers, and parliament called the European Community.[4]

This was followed by the joining of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom in 1973, the first of many enlargements of the European Community. In 1979, the first direct elections for the European parliament were held by universal suffrage.[5] Throughout the 1970s, the European community led a charge against pollution and climate change, introducing the idea of "polluter pays" laws for the first time.[6]

After the addition of more member states (Greece, Spain, and Portugal), the Single European Act was signed in 1986 to address the problems with free trade flow across member state borders and codify foreign policy provisions between members to ensure “European security.”[7] The 1980s also held a pivotal moment in European history when the Berlin Wall was pulled down, leading to the eventual reunification of West Germany and East Germany in 1990.

Finally, on November 1, 1993, with the passage of the Maastricht Treaty (led by Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand), the European Union was formally established. The Schengen Agreement paved the way for open borders in the EU by allowing citizens of member states to travel across EU borders without a passport.[8] However, in light of recent terrorist attacks and the current refugee crisis, the EU has temporarily implemented passport controls across certain member states.

In 2002, the euro became the single currency of the union in 12 out of 15 nations of the EU.[9] However, following the global financial crisis of 2008, the European Union has had many economic troubles in the past decade. The EU responded to debt crises in some member states of the Eurozone with austerity measures but has struggled to effectively manage debt and respond to labor unrest. Furthermore, religious extremism in the Middle East and other parts of the world has left the EU faced with the dilemma of how to respond to terrorist attacks upon member nations and the increasing number of refugees, particularly how to balance the ideals of “European security” with free and open borders. Euroscepticism, or criticism of the main principles behind the European Union and European integration, has grown in the past few years—most clearly evident in the recent decision by the United Kingdom in June of 2016 to leave the European Union.

Note: Scholars differ in the spelling of this concept, sometimes using "Euroscepticism" and other times using “Euroskepticism.” Both spellings will be used in this topic guide and will be accepted in committee. It remains to be seen how the EU will manage Brexit, refugees, austerity, and other pressing issues in the 21st century.

Seeking to reap the benefits of free trade while retaining its sovereignty to dictate commercial trade policy, the UK spearheaded the founding of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960. While the UK convinced six other European countries to join the EFTA, forming a strong western European trade bloc known as the “Outer Seven”, the EFTA was never as dominant as the “Inner Six” which founded the EEC.[2] At this same time, the economy had begun to stagnate and the British empire had begun to decolonize and decline. The realization that its presence as a world power was faltering factored into the UK’s applications to join the EEC in both 1961 and 1967. Both times, General Charles de Gaulle, then-President of France, emphatically vetoed the UK’s membership application. Accusing Britain of a “deep-seated hostility” towards European integration and a “lack of interest” in the Common Market, de Gaulle argued that “the present Common Market is incompatible with the economy...of Britain” and that UK membership would severely threaten the future of the EEC.[3]It was in the early 1970s, when Britain’s post-war economic boom collapsed with a crippling recession, when the idea of joining the EEC become even more appealing and feasible. Faced with economic troubles and a waning empire, the UK—now the new “sick man of Europe”—could not fail to notice that between the EEC’s conception in 1958 to the UK’s eventual entry in 1973, GDP per capita had risen 95% in France, West Germany, and Italy compared to only 50% in Britain.[4] De Gaulle resigned as president of France in 1969, removing a large barrier to the UK’s membership to the EEC. In 1971, the UK applied again for membership to the European Economic Community and was approved . Through the Treaty of Rome in 1973, the United Kingdom formally entered the European Economic Community alongside Ireland and Denmark.Post-1973, the British economy rebounded; over the next 40 years, Britain would grow to be more prosperous than France, Germany, or Italy—with GDP per capita in the UK growing faster than GDP per capita in the other three countries.[5] While it is difficult to definitively claim that UK membership in a greater European economic partnership caused the UK’s post-1973 prosperity, the two seem to be correlated.On March 28, 2017, UK Prime Minister Theresa May signed a letter to European Council President Donald Tusk, triggering Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. Note: The European Council is the European Union institution composed of all the heads of state (or head of government if the head of state is a figurehead) of all the member states. With one signature, May gave formal notification of the United Kingdom’s intent to begin divorce proceedings with the European Union. How had UK-EU relations deteriorated so much? Was the British exit from the EU, or Brexit as it is commonly termed, a long time coming? What does Brexit mean for the future of European integration? These are a few of the many questions we will seek to answer as this committee models the negotiations, taking place in real time, surrounding Brexit.

The morning after June 23, 2016, when all the tallied votes in the Brexit referendum signaled a “Leave” win, waves of shock rippled throughout the world. Yet in the context of the United Kingdom’s long-standing ambivalence about the idea of one Europe, the results are not all that surprising. In 1952, when France, Germany, Benelux, and Italy created the EU’s predecessor, the European Coal and Steel Community, the United Kingdom declined to join. And in 1958, when the ECSC evolved to become the European Economic Community, removing barriers to the movement of goods, services, capital, and labor, the United Kingdom again declined to join. Unlike countries like France, devastated from German occupation and the aftermath of World War II, and Germany, which desperately wished to rebuild world respectability, the UK boasted of a victor’s reputation, a more robust post-war economy, and an entire empire at its fingertips.[1] Thus, the UK did not feel the same political and economic pressure to give up its sovereignty and move toward European integration.

Seeking to reap the benefits of free trade while retaining its sovereignty to dictate commercial trade policy, the UK spearheaded the founding of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960. While the UK convinced six other European countries to join the EFTA, forming a strong western European trade bloc known as the “Outer Seven”, the EFTA was never as dominant as the “Inner Six” which founded the EEC.[2] At this same time, the economy had begun to stagnate and the British empire had begun to decolonize and decline. The realization that its presence as a world power was faltering factored into the UK’s applications to join the EEC in both 1961 and 1967. Both times, General Charles de Gaulle, then-President of France, emphatically vetoed the UK’s membership application. Accusing Britain of a “deep-seated hostility” towards European integration and a “lack of interest” in the Common Market, de Gaulle argued that “the present Common Market is incompatible with the economy...of Britain” and that UK membership would severely threaten the future of the EEC.[3]

It was in the early 1970s, when Britain’s post-war economic boom collapsed with a crippling recession, when the idea of joining the EEC become even more appealing and feasible. Faced with economic troubles and a waning empire, the UK—now the new “sick man of Europe”—could not fail to notice that between the EEC’s conception in 1958 to the UK’s eventual entry in 1973, GDP per capita had risen 95% in France, West Germany, and Italy compared to only 50% in Britain.[4] De Gaulle resigned as president of France in 1969, removing a large barrier to the UK’s membership to the EEC. In 1971, the UK applied again for membership to the European Economic Community and was approved . Through the Treaty of Rome in 1973, the United Kingdom formally entered the European Economic Community alongside Ireland and Denmark.

Post-1973, the British economy rebounded; over the next 40 years, Britain would grow to be more prosperous than France, Germany, or Italy—with GDP per capita in the UK growing faster than GDP per capita in the other three countries.[5] While it is difficult to definitively claim that UK membership in a greater European economic partnership caused the UK’s post-1973 prosperity, the two seem to be correlated.

Still, doubts in the United Kingdom surrounding a deeper partnership with the rest of Europe survived. Responding to political pressure from both within and outside the Labour Party, the Labour government under Prime Minister Harold Wilson held Britain’s first national referendum in 1975; British voters were asked to decide whether or not the UK should remain in the Common Market on renegotiated terms or completely leave it. They decidedly chose to stay, with 67.2% voting “yes” to stay in the European Community.[6] Then-Home Secretary Roy Jenkins stated, “It puts the uncertainty behind us. It commits Britain to Europe; it commits us to playing an active, constructive and enthusiastic role in it.”[7]

Despite the results of the 1975 referendum, British suspicion regarding the direction of the European Community remained. Integration deepened in the 1980s and 1990s, moving the European Union beyond a mere economic, intergovernmental partnership and toward a more supranational entity; that is, an entity governed by an authority higher than any of the individual members (think of: the whole is more than the sum of its parts). Unsurprisingly, the United Kingdom made its qualms clear with its refusal to entertain several of the European Union’s new features.

In 1979, the UK opted out of the European Monetary System (EMS), a mechanism designed to stabilize exchange rates and coordinate monetary policy to lay the foundations for a single market; it was the only EEC member state to do so.[8] In 1984, under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the UK demanded and received a rebate for a portion of its net contribution, arguing that they were unfairly serving as the EEC’s largest contributor without receiving proportional benefits. In 1985, the UK also refused to join the Schengen Agreement, opposing the removal of border controls and the free movement of people between Schengen-countries. When it came to widening trade benefits, however, the UK presented less difficulties; the Thatcher government signed on to the Single European Act, creating the world’s largest free trade area.[9]Despite briefly joining the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (designed to reduce exchange rate fluctuations and achieve monetary stability) of the EMS in 1990, the UK quickly dropped out in 1992 after a currency crisis.

EEC member states signed the Treaty on the European Union in 1992, formally creating the European Union, committing member states to the third and final stage of the European Monetary Union (EMU) by 1999, and initiating a common foreign and security policy. Though the UK signed on to be a member of the full-fledged European Union, it negotiated an opt-out from the third stage of the EMU—it would not adopt the euro.

In the past few years, wariness towards greater European integration has not eroded, but rather grown stronger. Though the United Kingdom was not a euro member, the Eurozone crisis still had significant fallouts for the UK. Exposed to risky foreign assets held by British banks during the global financial crisis, the recovering UK bristled at suggestions of a EU “fiscal compact” to coordinate fiscal policy after the eurocrisis. Unprecedented migration into European borders, a significant portion of which was driven by asylum seekers, also triggered discord regarding the free movement of people within EU borders. UK Prime Minister David Cameron deemed the situation unsustainable, saying that, “It was never envisaged that free movement would trigger quite such vast numbers of people moving across [the] continent.”[10]

As such, the relationship between the UK and the EU has always been delicate and fraught with tension. In the next section, we will delve deeper into the details of Britain’s 2016 referendum on EU membership, its aftermath, and the core aspects of negotiating the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union.

Security and the Irish BorderRights of EU CitizensThe European Union has made clear that their “first priority in the Brexit negotiations” is to give EU citizens “certainty” about their legal situation and to guarantee their rights in the long term.[29] This issue ties intimately to the uncertainty regarding post-Brexit migration policy, especially regarding the legal recognition of the status of EU nationals living in the UK on Brexit Day in 2019. Among the rights that the European Union has vowed to defend for its citizens include the right to continue living in the UK, work in the UK without discrimination, have access to healthcare, and be covered under the same rights and obligations of citizens in the country whose legislation covers the individual.[30]The idea of further European integration has never sat quite well with British conservatives, especially hard right-wingers within the Conservative (or Tory) Party. In the lead-up to the 2010 UK general election, then-leader of the Tory Party David Cameron put a promise to hold a nationwide referendum on the Lisbon Treaty (an update to the Treaty on the European Union) on the party platform. Yet the Tory Party’s failure to secure a definitive majority in this election forced it to form a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats in order to overcome the hung parliament. Partnering with the pro-Europe Liberal Democrats meant that the EU referendum would be tabled—Cameron and Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg agreed that European policy would be determined between the two of them and that there would be no referendum on whether the UK would be “in” or “out” on the EU.[11]

As the European migration crisis deepened and the EU’s slow response toward the eurozone crisis created further uncertainty regarding the future of Europe, eurosceptic movements within the United Kingdom grew. Most notably, the growing popularity of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) provided a potential electoral threat to Conservative seats for the next general election. In 2013, under an increasingly eurosceptic political climate, Cameron again promised a in/out referendum on the European Union question, stating that he’d give the British people a “simple choice” on the UK’s “destiny.”[12] Pledging to add the referendum to the Conservative manifesto for the 2015 general elections, Cameron said he would renegotiate the terms of the UK’s membership in the EU prior to a irreversible referendum. It would be the people’s decision if they wished to accept a redefined UK-EU relationship or exit the EU entirely.

In 2015, the Conservative Party unexpectedly secured an outright majority, capturing 36.9% of the vote. As such, Cameron was held to fulfill his campaign manifesto. On November 10, 2015, in his speech on Europe, Cameron promised to renegotiate the UK-EU relationship in four key areas—national sovereignty and democratic accountability, immigration policy, financial and economic regulation, and European competitiveness.[13] After key negotiations with European Council President Donald Tusk and other EU leaders, Cameron secured a EU reform deal in February 2016. Among these promised changes were added protections for non-euro currencies within the EU, new limits on migrants’ social benefits, a concrete commitment towards “better” EU financial regulation (leaving regulation for non-euro countries to those states), and an official acknowledgment that the EU’s stated goal of “an ever closer union” does not apply to the UK. [14]

Despite the EU reform deal, Cameron was still expected to hold a referendum. Even after a referendum was announced for June of 2016, Cameron stood firmly behind his renegotiated EU membership terms, hoping it would be sufficient to appease the Eurosceptics within and outside his party. Though pre-referendum polls showed relatively close results, most polling conducted gave the “Remain” camp an edge. However, as is clearly evident, polls can be wrong. On June 23, 2016, 51.9% of the United Kingdom voted for “Leave,” compared to 48.1% voting for “Remain,” in response to the question: Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?[15] After staunchly defending the United Kingdom’s continued membership in the European Union on the renegotiated terms, Cameron resigned as Prime Minister the following day. “I was absolutely clear about my belief that that Britain is stronger, safer and better off inside the EU...But the British people made a different decision,” Cameron stated.[16] Soon after, current Prime Minister Theresa May, a more eurosceptic Tory, took over the Government and the helm of Brexit negotiations.

Despite rumors and calls for a second referendum on Brexit, May made her intentions to leave the EU for good very clear. As she plainly stated, “Brexit means Brexit.”[17] So what happens now? The challenge facing both the United Kingdom and the European Union is unprecedented. A full member state of the EU has never left the union, and especially one as large and powerful as the UK. In fact, the United Kingdom is the fifth largest economy in the world and the second largest in the European Union, having contributed almost 8.5 billion euros to the EU budget in 2015.[18] As the third most populous member of the 28 EU member states, the UK also holds significant clout in negotiations of the Council of the EU and the European Parliament.

With the invocation of Article 50—the provision of the Treaty on the European Union that describes how a member state leaves the EU—on March 29, 2017, the EU and UK have two years (that is, until March 29, 2019) to negotiate the specific terms of UK withdrawal.[19] Notable political scientist and EU expert Simon Hix has pinpointed two crucial dimensions of exit negotiations for the EU: economic and political interests. Namely, after Brexit, the UK would become the EU’s largest third country export market with 16% of current EU good exports to the UK (note: “third country” in the context of the EU refers to a non-EU member state). Envisioning the future trade relationship between the EU and UK is necessary to ensure a smooth transition out of the single market. Furthermore, Brexit represents one of the more extreme cases of a growing tide of euroscepticism that has swept across Europe. The EU must be careful about the concessions it provides to the United Kingdom, especially since a lenient and privileged departure from a single Europe could greatly encourage other countries to leave (believing that they can leave the EU without losing much).

With the beginning of negotiations, frequently thrown-around terms include a “hard Brexit,” where the United Kingdom would completely sever its ties (both economic and political) with the European Union and a “soft Brexit,” where the UK would maintain an intimate relationship with EU in both preferential trade agreements and the agreements’ accompanying stipulations.

The final form of the negotiated relationship between a post-Brexit UK and EU is difficult to determine at this early stage in diplomatic talks. Non-EU member states may provide some guidance in the trajectory of future European relationships. Norway, for example, is part of the European Economic Area (EEA) and receives access to the Single Market through free movement of goods and services; however, it also must accept the free movement of EU citizens through its borders and lacks a seat at the table in shaping EU decisions. Switzerland is a non-EEA and non-EU member state, but also has partial access through several bilateral agreements that permit the movement of goods, but not services (a significant portion of Europe’s market economy). It, too, must accept the free migration of EU citizens through its borders—a key complaint from Brexit hardliners (those who want to take Brexit to the most literal sense and severe all obligations to the EU).[20]

In order to get a better picture of the high stakes of these negotiations, and the multiple fronts from which countries sit on these issues, we will briefly go through some core aspects that must be addressed in a comprehensive exit deal.

Trade

Perhaps the most important and contentious dimension of Brexit negotiations surrounds the nature of the post-Brexit trade relationship between the United Kingdom, as a third country, and the European Union. Potential forms of future UK-EU trade relations can be simplified into three main options: remain in the Single Market, negotiate multiple bilateral trade agreements with the EU, or completely concede privileged access to the Single Market and operate under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules.

As previously mentioned, Norway, as an EEA member state, receives access to the Single Market. Members of the EEA permit the four freedoms within their borders; that is, the free movement of goods, services, capital, and people. Accordingly, EEA members must follow the rules and regulations of the Single Market, adopting and duly enforcing the EU’s stipulations regarding areas like employment, environmental, and competition policy. Unlike EU members, however, EEA member states are not obligated to adopt the EU’s common foreign and security, justice and home affairs, agriculture policies or the customs union. In this sense, EEA member retain sovereignty over setting external tariffs and forming individual trade partnerships with other third countries. Still, they do not have a voice in determining the regulations that do apply to them in the fields where the EU and the Single Market hold sway. To be an EEA member, states must contribute to EU funds; however, these membership costs are still significantly less than what the UK currently pays. Furthermore, EEA members do not necessarily have to adopt the euro. Remaining in the Single Market would take the closest form to the current relationship that the UK has with the European Union at the moment.[21]

Alternatively, the UK could choose to opt out of the Single Market and negotiate its own bilateral trade agreements with the European Union instead. Effectively, the UK and EU would have to design a version of a free trade agreement (FTA) with a mutually agreed-upon level of economic integration. Some FTAs merely remove tariffs as an economic barrier to trade; others, such as that between the EU and Canada, provide for more preferential treatment towards the partner nation in terms of access to service trading and non-tariff barriers to trade. Switzerland, as mentioned previously, is another example; however, it is unique in its third country bilateral agreement because Switzerland must also accept the free movement of people. While the UK could opt to stay in the EU customs union, eliminating multiple barriers to trade (tariffs, customs procedures, rules of origin), it would also be obligated to fulfill the EU’s common trade/commercial policy and would be unable to forge economic partnerships with other non-EU member states.[22] 

Note: A customs union, as implemented in the EU, is one in which no internal customs tariffs are imposed between member states. Rather, a common external tariff between member and non-member states is imposed.

Finally, the UK could choose to break completely from ties to the Single Market and the EU customs union, operating instead under the WTO’s “most favored nation” (MFN) principle. That is, as a WTO member, the UK would be treated in a non-discriminatory fashion by the European Union in conducting trade (treated in the same way by the EU as the EU would treat other third countries). This option is the costliest in terms of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, as well as access to service markets in Europe. However, the WTO does not dictate regulations for the movement of labor for its member states.[23] As such, the United Kingdom would be able to retain sovereignty over its migration policies and restrict the competition posed from foreign workers in the domestic labor market.

Ultimately, the UK must choose how much it is willing to trade-off between economic integration (opening up trade to maximize production and reduce costs) and national sovereignty and autonomy over its commercial policies. Regarding economic and trade relations, PM Theresa May and Britain’s chief Brexit negotiator David Davis have called for a “deep and comprehensive” EU-UK FTA, covering goods and as many service sectors as possible while remaining separate from the Single Market and customs union. For the UK in particular, looking at a more comprehensive and deeper FTA than the EU-Canada FTA, ensuring relatively free access to the EU service market is crucial—78% of the UK economy is the service sector.[24] Yet the future of such a tailored trade deal remains ambiguous on the part of the EU.

Migration

A recent study conducted by the London School of Economics found that among Leave voters, control over immigration policy was a key concern for future negotiations and motivation behind their vote.[25] PM Theresa May stated, “I know some people ask about the ‘trade-off’ between controlling immigration and trading with Europe. But that is the wrong way of looking at things...we will decide for ourselves how we control immigration.”[26] Yet most forms of access to the Single Market often involve the free movement of people within partner borders, a crucial component of the four freedoms upheld by the Single Market’s core principles. In large part, negative sentiment towards the EU’s principle of the free movement of people was domestic antagonism towards the free movement of workers, particularly labor that threatened vulnerable industries and low-skilled labor at home.

However, more restrictive migration policies between the UK and EU member states would not solely affect migrant workers, but also EU nationals who currently live in the UK and UK nationals who live in other EU member states. For example, EU nationals may attend universities or boarding schools in the United Kingdom, while UK nationals may have family living in other EU states. Furthermore, stringent immigration policies could discourage the immigration of workers who would fill key sector workforces, including those in healthcare and construction. Some ideas that have been considered include mutual rights to work and settle in each other’s countries, a joint permanent residence scheme, and a benefits scheme where longer residency accumulates more social benefits.[27]

As such, the UK will have to negotiate carefully when considering its policies for migration concerning work-related reasons, family unification, study abroad, and its nationals abroad (and EU nationals in the UK).[28]

Rights of EU Citizens

The European Union has made clear that their “first priority in the Brexit negotiations” is to give EU citizens “certainty” about their legal situation and to guarantee their rights in the long term.[29] This issue ties intimately to the uncertainty regarding post-Brexit migration policy, especially regarding the legal recognition of the status of EU nationals living in the UK on Brexit Day in 2019. Among the rights that the European Union has vowed to defend for its citizens include the right to continue living in the UK, work in the UK without discrimination, have access to healthcare, and be covered under the same rights and obligations of citizens in the country whose legislation covers the individual.[30]

Of course, it is not as simple as merely agreeing upon the rights to be mutually recognized between citizens of the EU and citizens of the UK. Another core aspect that must be addressed is who will be the legal arbiter of any rights disputes. The European Union has argued that while disputes should be settled in national courts “as far as possible,” the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the highest court in the EU’s justice system, should be able to decide on these issues if necessary.[31] On the other hand, May has stated that independence from the rulings of the ECJ concerning EU nationals in Britain as a “red line.”[32] In a recent breakthrough deal, however, the UK has appeared to concede somewhat, acknowledging the ECJ’s competency surrounding the rights of EU citizens in the UK. European Council President Donald Tusk seems to want to take that a step further, arguing that the UK should also be held to EU law—existing and new—during the transition period following Brexit Day.[33]

Brexit Divorce Bill

Negotiations have also swirled around the possibility of a “divorce bill” that the UK might have to pay. That is, the United Kingdom might be required to make certain payments to the EU budget after it leaves, particularly for those programs and loans that it had committed to prior to triggering Article 50. Of course, the line for when the cut-off date will be and the amount the UK owes the European Union remains to be definitively drawn. Who exactly shall decide this final bill and the evidence to be entered into contention are questions that remain to be answered. Independent analyses for how much a potential Brexit divorce bill would cost the UK range from 25 billion to 60 billion euros.[34] Most recent talks have placed the final bill to be around 45 billion euros.[35] Beyond a mere financial obligation, the UK’s could potentially continue to support EU programs, which would serve as a signal of the degree of commitment the UK will provide towards sustaining the “personal, social, and cultural relations” between the UK and the rest of Europe.[36]

Security and the Irish Border

In the wake of multiple terrorist and extremist attacks in Europe, calls for cooperation and a unified front in matters of security are stronger than ever. However, a close relationship between the UK and EU security institutions, such as Europol and the European Defence Agency, also bring into question the degree to which the UK would be responsible to comply with EU laws in this jurisdiction. While the UK seems keen to converge its security and defence resources with the EU, EU leaders are less accepting of sharing intelligence with British defense officials. Guy Verhofstadt, the European Parliament’s Brexit commissioner, warned that British military and intelligence strength would not be a viable bargaining chip at the negotiation table. 

Note: The European Parliament is the legislative body of the European Union that is directly elected by European Union citizens.

The border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, the latter of which belongs to the United Kingdom, remains another issue of contention. While the UK has asked for a hard border to be drawn between the two, this request is complicated by the UK’s firm commitment towards leaving the Single Market and customs union (and thus restricting the movement of people). Ireland is heavily dependent on trade with the UK, and instituting economic barriers after Brexit would raise costs for the movement of goods and services if a hard border is recognized. This is because a “hard border,” viewing Northern Ireland as an inseparable part of the UK and independent from the separate sovereign that is Ireland, would mean that Ireland and the UK (via Northern Ireland) would have to follow non-preferential trade laws and impose tariffs on each other. An alternative, championed by Ireland and the EU, would be to allow Northern Ireland to remain aligned with key EU laws and regulations dictated by the Single Market and customs union, preserving the 1998 Good Friday Agreement that brought peace to Northern Ireland in the past. Talks over the future of the Irish border remain in hot dispute; though it may seem like the UK may yield to the European Union’s demands, a definitive answer remains to be found.

Concluding Thoughts

Initially, May presented a robust front in securing a highly preferential deal for the United Kingdom. Confirming that the UK would withdraw from the Single Market and the customs union post-Brexit in January 2017, May seemed confident in her ability to secure a new EU trade agreement along the lines of a “hard” Brexit without harming the UK economy.[37] Yet in the months since, the Tory Party has been wracked with difficulty to present a unified vision for what an EU-UK post-exit relationship would look like, while Donald Tusk and other EU leaders (i.e. Angela Merkel) are highly reluctant to give the UK an easy time. The chief Brexit negotiator for the EU, Michel Barnier, has made it clear that the UK cannot “cherry-pick” what it likes amongst elements of the Single Market and customs union, while discarding free movements, EU regulations, and ECJ jurisdiction.

A June 2017 snap election called by May resulted in a closer margin than expected between the controlling Conservative Party and the more pro-EU Labour Party led by Jeremy Corbyn, weakening May’s political clout as she pushes forward with Brexit negotiations. Ultimately, the final withdrawal agreement will have to be approved by a supermajority of the EU member states and a majority of the European Parliament.[38] Even after then, May has put forth the idea of an additional 2-year transition period between the UK’s official exit from the EU in March 2019 and the implementation of a new UK-EU trade agreement. As talks continue to evolve, delegates should consider the multiple dynamics at play and how member states would feel about the nature of post-Brexit UK-EU relations.

One index proposed by the Economist breaks down the EU27 into three main groups based on their overall stance regarding leniency towards the UK’s exit terms: hard-core, hard, and soft.[39] This section briefly describes the characteristics of each group and which countries tend to fall in each categories. This index is based upon member states’ stances on four core issues: the divorce bill, the four EU freedoms, trade arrangements and tariffs, and defence ties. It is important to remember, however, that these blocs are suggestive and that individual countries may differ within blocs on their stances for different issues. One hard-core country may be softer on, say, citizens’ rights than a country that has been classified as “hard.” Furthermore, there are many more dimensions at stake in negotiations than those included in this index. Moreover, the information provided here is only a brief sketch of the bloc positions—read the report from the Economist in detail and look for other indices that may or may not better serve the political dynamics of the situation.

Hard-Core

Hard-core countries include France, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia. This group includes states that have historically been wary about the British, France and Belgium, as well as some of the EU’s poorer member states, like Bulgaria and Romania, who are worried about the future of free movement of workers and the EU Budget. Germany, as a dominant figure in the EU and one of the drivers of further European integration, also falls among the hard-core countries. Within these seven nations, France is the sternest regarding future treatment of the UK post-Brexit. Overall, the hard-core group will not make the exit from the EU easy for the UK. Most likely, a hard-core-dominated Brexit agreement would require a high divorce bill and several concessions from the UK to respect core aspects of European Union principles (i.e. the free movement of people) if the UK wants any bit of a preferential trade deal with the EU.

Hard

A plurality of countries fall within this middle category, including Croatia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. These member states share the view that “the UK’s withdrawal must be costly,” and a trade agreement should be created that is “inferior to membership.”[40] Thus, these states are less willing to compromise with the UK on issues such as the divorce bill or concessions towards the four free movements in any potential trade agreements. Finland, for example, is concerned that a low Brexit divorce bill could spur domestic euroscepticism; it also had to shoulder a greater deal of budget contribution following the EU’s third Greek bailout—an occurrence that other member states wish to prevent as well. Spain, and other member states with ethnic enclaves within their borders, are also concerned about what leniency towards UK independence could spur. For example, the results of UK independence could shape the Catalan independence movement and boost pro-independence voices.

Soft

Member states that have the most to lose from looser trade, financial, and security ties with the UK are more likely to take a softer stance towards negotiation. These states include Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Poland, Lithuania, and Sweden. For example, Sweden and Denmark have historically been political allies of the UK in Northern Europe; Brexit could mean a shift of power towards more southern, protectionist states like France and Italy. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland have also voiced concerns surrounding future security partnerships with the UK; much of the NATO military presence in the Baltic states and the surrounding area is composed of UK forces.

1. What does your country have to gain from the UK leaving the EU? Why would your country want the UK to stay?

2. What advantages does your country bring to the negotiation table?

3. What should happen to Scotland? Scotland voted overwhelmingly (62% to 38%) to remain in the European Union. Should there be a second Scottish independence referendum? Should the UK accept any results?

4. How harsh should the EU be on the UK in constructing an exit deal? What could be the political and economic fallout of a “hard” or “soft” Brexit?

5. What does Brexit mean for the future of European integration? Has the UK historically been an integral member of the EU? Can the EU survive without the UK?

6. What red lines, or issues that are non-negotiable, should the EU draw? What about the UK?

7. How has the UK benefited from membership, and what does it risk to lose?

8. Where does your country find room for compromise between the UK and EU?

The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index for the EU27                                          http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1865298170&Country=United%20Kingdom&topic=Politics&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=International+relations 

Politico’s Breakdown of What Each EU27 Nation Priorities                                  https://www.politico.eu/article/what-the-eu27-wants-from-brexit/  

CFR Backgrounder on Brexit                                                                                  https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-brexit-means       

Official EU Publications Database on Brexit                                                          https://publications.europa.eu/en/web/general-publications/brexit 

Georgetown Law Research Database on Brexit                                                        http://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=365741&p=3807586#Overview 

Pre-Brexit Pew Research Center Statistics on Euroscepticism and Brexit                  http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/07/euroskepticism-beyond-brexit/brexit-lede-graphic-web-version/ 

The Economist’s Infographic Breakdown to Brexit                                                https://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/02/graphics-britain-s-referendum-eu-membership  

Official EU Newsroom - A great way to stay updated with official statements regarding EU-UK Negotiations                                                                              https://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/brexit_en 

KEY TERMS

Ambiguous: has more than one meaning, open to interpretation

Ambivalence: having mixed feelings or opposing things, making it hard to decide

Antagonism: hostility or opposition

Arbiter: person who has the authority to settle disputes

Asylum: protection granted by a nation to someone who has left their native country as a political refugee

Autonomy: right to self-government, independence

Bilateral: affecting both sides

Clout: influence or power

Compact: a formal agreement or contract between parties

Competency: ability to do something successfully or efficiently

Concede: admit to something, usually in defeat

Contentious: controversial, something that can be argued

Decolonize: withdrawing from a colonized country, granting it independence

Dictate: lay down authority, control/determine

Envisaged: imagine future event

Fraught: filled with or destined to result in

Helm: position of leadership

Jurisdiction: official power to make legal decisions and judgments

Mandate: official order to do something

Manifesto: public declaration of policy or aims, usually before an election

Preferential: giving favor or privilege to one side

Primitive: early stage

Qualms: feeling of doubts, worry, or fear

Rebate: partial refund to someone (give them some of their money back)

Referendum: general vote by the electorate, usually on a single question

Robust: strong

Sovereignty: supreme power or authority

Stagnate: not developing, stuck in one place

Staunchly: in loyal and committed manner

Stipulations: condition or requirement as part of an agreement

Stringent: strict

Tabled: to set aside for later

Trajectory: path, direction to be followed

Waning: become weaker or smaller

Yield: give way to other arguments, demands, or pressure

Endnotes

[1] James McBride, “What Brexit Means,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 9, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-brexit-means.

[2] “European Free Trade Association,” European University Institute, May 30, 1960, https://archives.eui.eu/en/isaar/631.

[3] “1967: De Gaulle Says ‘Non’ to Britain - Again,” BBC News: On This Day, November 27, 1967, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/27/newsid_4187000/4187714.stm.

[4] Chris Giles, “What has the EU done for the UK?,” Financial Times, March 31, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/202a60c0-cfd8-11e5-831d-09f7778e7377.

[5] James McBride, “What Brexit Means.”

[6] “The EEC and the Single European Act.” Living Heritage: Parliament and Europe, http://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/evolutionofparliament/legislativescrutiny/parliament-and-europe/overview/britain-and-eec-to-single-european-act/.

[7] “1975: UK Embraces Europe in Referendum,” BBC News: On This Day, June 6, 1975, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/6/newsid_2499000/2499297.stm.

[8] “The EEC and the Single European Act.”

[9] Mark Jones and Chris Parker, “A Short History of Britain and the European Union,” World Economic Forum, June 24, 2016, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/06/a-short-history-of-britain-and-the-european-union/.

[10] James McBride, “What Brexit Means.”

[11] Martin Kettle, “The Downfall of David Cameron: A European Tragedy,” The Guardian, June 24, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/david-cameron-downfall-european-tragedy.

[12] “David Cameron Promises In/Out Referendum on EU,” BBC News, January 23, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-21148282.

[13] The Rt Hon. David Cameron, “Prime Minister’s Speech on Europe,” GOV.UK, November 10, 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-speech-on-europe.

[14] Kate Day, et al. “David Cameron’s EU Reform Deal Scorecard.” Politico, February 20, 2016, https://www.politico.eu/article/david-cameron-eu-reform-deal-scorecard-brexit-eu-referendum-agreement/.

[15] “EU Referendum Results,” BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_referendum/results.

[16] Heather Stewart, Rowena Mason, and Rajeev Syal, “David Cameron Resigns After UK Votes to Leave the European Union,” The Guardian, June 24, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/david-cameron-resigns-after-uk-votes-to-leave-european-union.

[17] Nicholas Hirst, “EU on UK: Brexit Means Brexit,” Politico, June 9, 2017, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-on-uk-brexit-means-brexit/.

[18] Oliver Patel and Christine Reh, “Brexit: The Consequences for the EU’s Political System,” The Constitution Unit, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/ei-publications/cu-briefing-two.pdf.

[19] James McBride, “What Brexit Means.”

[20] James McBride, “What Brexit Means.”

[21] Swati Dhingra, Gianmarco Ottaviano, and Thomas Sampson. “A Hitch-Hiker’s Guide to Post-Brexit Trade Negotiations: Options and Principles,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 33 (2017): pp. 22-30.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Simon Hix, “What Would a Pro-European Hard Brexit Look Like?” London School of Economics, 2015, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/72883/1/blogs.lse.ac.uk-What%20would%20a%20pro-European%20hard%20Brexit%20look%20like.pdf.

[25] Sara Hobolt, Thomas Leeper, and James Tilley, “How Brits View Brexit: Indifferent on Many Aspects, But Divided on Others,” London School of Economics, August 14, 2017, https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/tjl-sharing/assets/Brexit_Means_Brexit_Technical_Report.pdf.

[26] “Highlights: British PM May on Brexit, Article 50 and Trade,” Reuters, October 2, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-may-speech/highlights-british-pm-may-on-brexit-article-50-and-trade-idUSKCN1220LM.

[27] Simon Hix, “What Would a Pro-European Hard Brexit Look Like?”

[28] Carlos Vargas-Silva, “EU Migration To and From the UK After Brexit,” ZBW-Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/IEForum52016_2.pdf.

[29] “The EU’s Position on the Rights of EU Citizens in the UK After Brexit,” European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/services/your-rights/uk-after-Brexit_en.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Simon Hix, “What Would a Pro-European Hard Brexit Look Like?”

[33] Rob Merrick, “Brexit: Theresa May Agrees On Breakthrough Irish Border Deal with EU Leaders,” Independent.co.uk, December 8, 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-latest-theresa-may-northern-ireland-border-talks-brussels-eu-jean-claude-michel-barnier-a8098396.html.

[34] Simon Hix, “What Would a Pro-European Hard Brexit Look Like?”

[35] Rob Merrick, “Brexit: Theresa May Agrees On Breakthrough Irish Border Deal with EU Leaders.”

[36] Ibid.

[37] James McBride, “What Brexit Means.”

[38] Ibid.

[39] The Economist Intelligence Unit, The EU27 and Brexit Negotiations, April 5, 2017, http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1865298170&Country=United%20Kingdom&topic=Politics&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=International+relations.

[40] Ibid.