European Commission

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to Yale Model Government Europe 2017! My name is Alex Jang and I will be your Director for the European Commission. Chairing is always a fantastic experience for me and, at least I hope, for the delegates in my committee as well. We have the unique opportunity of being able to engage in debate in one of the most influential and powerful bodies in the European if not the world. Choices made by the European Commission will dictate policy for the entirety of the European Union and will have ripple effects across the rest of the world. Thus, I am very excited to tackle this challenging yet highly dynamic and stimulating committee with you.

To provide some background about myself, I am a junior in Jonathan Edwards College at Yale studying Economics and Math. My hometown is Orinda, California, just outside of San Francisco. At Yale, I am involved with a number of different Yale International Relations Association programs, including Yale Model United Nations Korea (a high school Model UN conference hosted in Seoul each year) and the Model United Nations Team at Yale (Yale’s traveling competition Model UN team). As a competitor, I primarily focus on Crisis committees and enjoy the fast-paced and intricate crises in committee. Outside of international relations programs, I am a captain for the Yale Club Wrestling Team, a coach for Urban Debate League, and involved with Yale’s Asian American community.

These topics will present us with a challenge; if they were easily solvable, they wouldn’t require the European Commission to handle. I think that it’s important to note that with what seems to be a generally rise of populist politicians, the world, and specifically Europe, is currently being presented a choice. The choices made by European citizens and the governing bodies contained within the EU will ultimately decide the fate and wellbeing of millions of people. As a result, it has become even more important for us as students, future leaders, and potentially even advocates on different sides of these issues to think critically about international relations and the effects that it has on people’s lives.

I am looking forward to meeting all of you in November. Please do not hesitate to reach out at any point with questions or comments regarding the topic. You can reach me at alexander.jang@yale.edu.

Best Regards,

Alex Jang

The European Commission is one of the most, if not the most, important institution for the administration and continuation of the European Union. The Commission’s first iteration was created in 1951 as the High Authority in the European Coal and Steel Community. At the beginning, the Community was only nine representatives. Later in the 1950s, two other communities, the Commission of the European Atomic Energy Community and the Commission of the European Economic Community were created in an effort to create solutions for specified Europe-wide problems. The three bodies were known as the European Executives and were consolidated on July 1, 1967 through the Merger Treaty. President Jean Rey was the first person to preside over the combination of all three of these bodies. For the next decade, various heads of the Commission worked to expand the Commission, adding Great Britain as the thirteenth member, and develop a more cohesive monetary system. Jacques Delors assumed his first term as the head of the Commission in 1985. Under the Delors Commission, the European community moved closer to a single-market and currency. Spurring the push and excitement for a single currency and market, Delors is often referred to as the founding father of the euro. In 2004, Jose Manuel Barroso assumed office. Having his Commission rejected by the European Parliament, Barroso had to shuffle his Commission to take office. Barroso’s Commission, however, was the first full Commission since a prior expansion, bringing the Commission to a 25 member body. In 2014, Jean Claude Juncker was appointed President of the Commission.

The European Commission is unique among other EU institutions including the European Parliament and Council. Though made up of 28 representatives from various countries, the European Commission is obligated to act entirely independently of individual nation’s interests. As such, representatives are barred from acting only in the interest of their home nation and rather swear an oath to the European Union as a whole. Acting as a Cabinet system, the President of the European Commission is proposed by the European Council and then approved by the European Parliament. The Council and the President then come up with the other nominees for the rest of the Commission and submit the entire list to the European Parliament for approval.

The Commission is responsible for day-to-day administration of the European Union, including, but not limited to, enforcing and negotiating treaties, proposing legislation for the European Union, and implementing legislative and judicial decisions. Essentially, the Commission serves as the Executive for the European Union. It’s powers as an executive, however, generally are less than that of a national executive. Specifically, the European Council has domain over regulating foreign policy and appoints the Commission with approval from Parliament. The Commission still, however, is the most involved with the execution and enforcement of legislation. Moreover, the Commission is the only body in the European Union that can propose legislation. Legislation is not allowed to originate in any of the legislative bodies and as such, the legislature relies on the Commission for legislation. Primarily, Commission legislation revolves around pseudo-economic regulation and the “precautionary principle”, some key examples being laws regarding genetically modified agriculture and climate change. Lastly, the Commission is responsible for enforcing its legislation by working with member states, public and private organizations, and using its representatives to establish committees to enforce law.

As such, the European Commission is one of the most powerful institutions in the European Union and your opinion as the delegate in the European Commission will be sought after. Remember that your mandate is to remain as neutral to your home nation’s interests and rather your duty is to the European Union as a whole.

On June 23, 2016, the citizens of the United Kingdom went to the polls amidst one of the most politically charged environments in recent European history. Despite polls even the day before the referendum pointing towards a victory for the “Remain” camp, the results of the referendum surprised everyone. The UK voted to leave the European Union 51.9% to 48.1% with 72.2% voter turnout. And despite the European Union’s dramatic efforts to keep its membership since its founding, the United Kingdom still decided to ultimately defect. To fully understand Britain’s position in relation to the European Union, however, it’s important to comprehend Britain’s history with the European Union and how its engagement, though important, has always remained more limited compared to that of other European nations.

To quote a BBC News article, “The United Kingdom's relationship with the EU — or, in political parlance, Europe — has long been one of the most divisive, emotive issues in British politics.” The article continues to point out that in 2014, the debate over In or Out was restarting, an ancestor of the movement that eventually led to the Brexit. Note that this article is from a decidedly British perspective and is certainly lacking in analysis that you might find in European sources. Some speculate that historical motifs such as Britain’s imperial expansion during the height of its empire or the constant conflicts that the British have had with mainland nations are the reason for Britain’s standoffishness. 

Another memory deep-seated in British history is its Darkest Hour when it stood alone against Nazi Germany during World World II. However, those arguments seem much too simplistic to fully encapsulate the tension between the continent and Britain. After WWII, Britain has experienced a complex history with Europe. Off of the bat, Prime Minister of Britain, Winston Churchill, was heavily in favor of a European international institution that would serve to buffer against the future possibility of war. Comparing his vision to a United States of Europe, Churchill emphasized the closeness that he envisioned European states having, preventing them from ever coming to the point of armed conflict again.

 In subsequent consolidations of EU power, however, Britain chose to sit out. Tying into this committee’s history, Britain refused to take part in the construction of the European Steel and Coal Commission in 1951. In 1957, the British refused to sign the Treaty of Rome, despite being invited by the six founding nations of the European Economic Community.

British Entrance into the EEC and the Thatcher Government

In 1961, Britain applied for membership in the European Economic Community. Seeing the economic growth of France and Germany, Britain thought that membership would allow it to tap into the growth that the EEC afforded others as well. However, at the time, French President Charles de Gaulle vetoed their application twice, citing “deep seated hostility” for the European project harbored by the UK. Eventually, the UK was admitted into the EEC in 1973 under Conservative leadership and after de Gaulle had left office. 

It is worth noting that in 1975, Britain voted in a referendum with 67% in favor of staying in the EEC. In the 1980s, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher took a number of actions that eventually worsened the relationship between the UK and Europe. 

To put it lightly, Thatcher was a champion of euroskeptics and disagreed fundamentally with many of the ideals of the European Union. Noting that nation-states should stand as the protectors of individual liberties rather than any sort of supranational organization, Thatcher opposed heavy EU involvement in domestic issues. The notable exception is when Thatcher signed the Single European Act in 1986 which eventually would become the largest free trade zone in the world. In her 1988 speech in Bruges, Thatcher unequivocally condemned “a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels.” Unfortunately for Thatcher, a number of her cabinet members were staunch Europhiles, only exacerbating the infighting in her cabinet and her party. In general, Thatcher opposed the political unionization of Europe and worked to fight against it. Though this was the general and outward stance, her actions regarding the European Union was more nuanced either due to personal belief or political realities. Thatcher firmly recognized the benefits that her country gained from the European Union and therefore was willing to be a part of the organization. The signing of the Single European Act in 1986 thus showed the UK’s desire to become more economically integrated with the rest of the European Union. However, this mentality damaged the relationship between Europe and the UK, making it seem polarizing and standoffish. As a result, despite its long standing membership in the European Union and the EEC, the Brexit vote and Leave movement were readily apparent vestiges of Britain’s rocky past with Europe.

Major Government (1990 to 1997)

After Thatcher was replaced by John Major in 1990, the conservative party stance towards Europe became more moderate, willing to cede to some Thatcherites while also responding to pro-European elements. To quote The Bruges Group, a think tank in London established to promote the idea of a less centralized European government, “John Major became the Conservative party leader in 1990 because he was the ideal compromise candidate; someone who could unite the party; a healer not a warrior; a pragmatist not an ideologue; a person who would appeal to the Thatcherites but equally who would co–operate with the Heseltinies; a man who could rally the party with a General Election less than two years away.” Essentially, the first two years of the Major administration saw a compromising position towards Europe. From April 1992 to September 1993, Major was decidedly pro-EU. From July 1992 to December 1992, Britain was the President of the European Council. Though the presidency is often seen as a neutral position and therefore cannot push its own agenda, Major claimed that for the first time, “for us, in Britain, Europe is part of our lives.” During this time, Major pushed for the acceptance of the pound into the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, a system intended to stabilize exchange rates among different European nations with the ultimate goal of creating the euro. Major acquiesced to the passing of the Maastricht Treaty and signed the document in 1992. 

Though Britain gained exemptions from some of the social protections and single currency, the Treaty moved much power to the new European Union government. Thus Major pushed Britain towards further political unionisation with Europe. The Bruges Group argues that from 1993 to 1997, when Major was defeated in the general election, he became more pragmatic again, though in general still voiced strong support for European integration. The article argues that in a few cases where MPs opposed pro-European pieces of legislation, the Conservative Party leadership severely punished. These MPs were instantly turned into martyrs for the Eurosceptics and worked to fuel anti-European sentiment in the Conservative party. Only a few months later, their punishments were revoked, a decision that demonstrates the pain that they were causing the Conservative party. Eventually even Major became more eurosceptic. There are numerous examples of his rebuking European programs, specifically the way that the economic integration and regulation of the UK was being handled. His speech in 1994 in Leiden stated the following: “The vision of the Founding Fathers of the European Community was proved right for its age. But it will not do now…Popular enthusiasm for the Union has waned…The Maastricht Treaty strained the limits of acceptability to Europe’s electors. Europe’s peoples in general retain their favour and confidence in the nation state. I believe that the nation state will remain the basic political unit for Europe… The European Parliament sees itself as the future democratic focus of the Union. But this is a flawed ambition, because the European Union is an association of States, deriving its basic democratic legitimacy through national parliaments.”

From its election to its defeat in 1997, Major’s government was riddled with scandals. Though this didn’t necessarily have a significant bearing on the UK’s relations with the EU, it did cause a number of potential leadership challenges in the Conservative Party. In 1995, Major grew tired of the numerous leadership challenges that never actually came to fruition and resigned the position as leader of the party though he maintained the Prime Ministership. Major was challenged by John Redwood for his position as prime minister and the Leader of the Conservative Party. Major defeated Redwood handily winning 218-89. Though Major won the election in his own party, faith in his position as the leader of the government had not been restored. The scandals that plagued the conservative party as well as internal struggles had taken their toll on the party and the Labour Party won the General Election of 1997 in the largest landslide victory over a ruling party in Britain since 1832.

Labour Government - Tony Blair (1997 to 2010)

In the election of 1997, Tony Blair and the Labour Party won the election. His election reaffirmed Britain’s movement towards more European integration. Blair had been giving speeches for the five to six previous years demonstrating his shift to more Euro-enthusiastic policies. During the Maastricht Treaty ratification process, the Labour Party had made it abundantly clear that they accepted the treaty. Blair had a number of initiatives that would lead Britain to be much more involved with Europe’s administration and the leadership of the continent. First, Blair wanted the quick acceptance of the Social Chapter. The Social Chapter, an annex to the Maastricht Treaty and more formally known as the Protocol on Social Policy and the Agreement on Social Policy, gives the Council of the European Union (oftentimes referred to as the Council of Ministers) the right to legislate on certain types of social policy issues, allowing less sensitive issues to be voted on by a majority vote and more sensitive issues such as social security to be legislated on by a unanimous vote. 

Some topics are explicitly excluded from the Chapter. Britain up until Blair’s administration had refused to sign the Social Chapter. Blair’s administration changed that, giving up some administrative power in Britain but also securing social protections created by the European Union especially in the areas of the workplace and paid leave. Second, Blair prioritized the quick completion of the single market while Britain was the Council President during 1998. Third, Blair pushed for the retention of the national veto in certain areas outside of the Social Chapter while pushing for the expansion of Qualified Majority Voting in the narrow realms where it would benefit Britain. Blair, however, chose not to accept the euro, a move supported by the majority of Britons. In general, Blair remained friendly to the European through the first two terms of his reign. However, at the start of his third term in 2005, Blair took an aggressive stance on the EU budget from 2007-2013 and successfully delayed the signing of the European Budget. Specifically, Blair held strong on the UK rebate, a financial mechanism that has reduced the UK’s budget contribution to the EU since 1985, claiming that he would only renegotiate the rebate if the EU agree to reform the Common Agricultural Policy and other areas of EU spending. Negotiations failed to come to a compromise and it was left to Britain’s presidency of the European Council to come to a working compromise on the topic. Britain unfortunately was unable to come to an agreement, being distracted by the 2005 terror attacks in London during the time of its presidency, and the budget was passed in later presidencies.

Labour Government - Gordon Brown (2007 to 2010)

Blair announced in 2007 that he would be resigning his position as the leader of the Labour Party and the Prime Minister of Britain. Blair was succeeded by Gordon Brown as the leader of the party and the Prime Minister of the UK. Brown was friendly to Europe as well, becoming a strong advocate for the Remain camp during the Brexit referendum. Brown most significantly signed and ratified the Treaty of Lisbon, a Treaty to created to amend the Treaty of the European Union that holds together the European Union and its government. Brown received significant political backlash after his government defeated a Conservative Party bill to hold a popular referendum on the ratification of the treaty. In 2005, the Labour Party had promised voters that it would hold a referendum on the possible European Constitution. Though the European Constitution movement eventually withered due to conflicts in the writing and negotiating process, many saw the Treaty of Lisbon as a similar piece of legislation that should also require a referendum vote. Brown and others thought differently. Thus the Lisbon Treaty was signed by Brown in 2008. Brown altogether demonstrated support for the EU but refused to make bombastic, trailblazing statements similar to Blair. As a result, Brown’s two to three year government was relatively inactive compared to Blair’s when it comes to international relations. In 2010, the Conservative Party won the largest number of seats in the House of Commons and proceeded to make a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. At this point, Brown resigned his position as Prime Minister and the next day, David Cameron, the leader of the Conservative Party was invited by the Queen to create a new government.

David Cameron (2010-2016) - Conservative Party

The last British Prime Minister to control Parliament prior to the Brexit referendum was David Cameron, the leader of the Conservative Party that was elected in 2010 and formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democratic party to secure their parliamentary majority. At the outset, Cameron demanded a few things of the European Union. He wanted to opt out of the Social Chapter, the annex to the Maastricht Treaty that had only been signed during Blair’s government. As early as 2007, Cameron was making speeches slamming the social chapter and generally calling for the rollback of European legislative and administrative power over its member states. Moreover, Cameron wanted to fully opt out of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, a document that consolidated the rights of EU citizens and arguably created new legal powers for European Courts. A legally binding document since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, Cameron proclaimed that the UK needs to fully opt out of the document. A more indepth profile of what the document specifically says is here. Cameron’s last goal was the general rollback of EU power over the UK and other member states. Though hard to quantify, the UK’s willingness to unilaterally opt out of amendments to the Treaty of the European Union and withdraw from the Social Chapter demonstrates the Conservative government’s general disdain towards the organization.

Cameron also worked to renegotiate a new “deal” with the European Union that would secure a number of concessions for the British from the European Union. Cameron and the Conservative made a number of pledges throughout their the election process and in their 2015 Conservative Manifesto that they published. Most importantly, Cameron secured guarantees regarding whether EU migrants can secure work benefits and tax credits. Cameron’s deal allows migrant workers to start claiming partial benefits once they complete a full year of work in Britain and that would slowly increase with each year worked until they achieve full benefits at the end of their fourth year of work. Cameron was also successful in negotiating or at least getting draft text written of deals on Britain’s ability to stay out of European bailouts for failing Eurozone economies, Britain’s recognition as a non-Euro nation and a part of the Union, increased security measures regarding terrorist suspects and other individuals identified by British national security, and specific wording within current EU treaties. Ultimately, however, Cameron’s efforts to secure more concessions from the European Union were overshadowed by the Brexit referendum.

In 2013, Cameron promised Britain that if the Conservatives were to win in the next general election, the party would hold a referendum on EU membership. In 2015, the Conservatives won an outright majority and therefore guaranteed that the referendum would occur. Cameron led the Remain campaign arguing with the support of many former political leaders that a Brexit would damage the UK in ways that they could not even fathom. Cameron event went as far as to say that if the UK left the Union, they would be at increased risk of going to war with nations on the continent. The Leave camp was headed by Boris Johnson, a Conservative, and Nigel Farage, the leader of the UK Independence Party, a starkly anti-Europe political party. During the time leading up to the referendum, polls forecasted a slim but comfortable Remain win. The election turned out dramatically different with Leave winning with 52% majority. The Cameron government made a few important moves that color the topic that we’re discussing. First, Cameron tried to renegotiate a number of agreements with the European Union, specifically ones that related to language tying Britain further into an increasingly close European Union and denying migrant workers benefits. Second, the Cameron government ineffectively led the Remain camp, demonstrating the strength of the Leave camp despite the Conservative’s strong victory in 2015. Third, the Cameron government, while never very close to the Continent, certainly did not foresee a UK that existed outside of the European Union. And for that matter, neither did the European Union. As a result, Britain and the EU are ill-prepared politically and pragmatically for the split.

On July 11, 2016, David Cameron announced that he would resign on July 13, 2016 as the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Claiming that Britain needed new leadership following the Brexit vote, Cameron placed his faith in Theresa May, then Home Secretary, to be the next leader of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister. May experienced a slight challenge from then Energy Minister Andrea Leadsom but Leadsom eventually dropped out of the race. May became the leader of the Conservative Party. May’s first address to the nation was a reassurance that her government would work for everybody within the UK, not just privileged or significantly underprivileged groups. She promised to lead a well measured and positive withdrawal from the European Union, reasserting that the referendum had been final and the government has promised that it will leave the EU, a promise that it cannot renege on. May, generally considered a Eurosceptic though she campaigned for the Remain side of the vote, promised that her government was going to focus on an effective and as painless Brexit as possible. Thus far, her government seems to have tried to make good on that promise.

The May government pursued a number of options and started to discuss various ways for the UK to withdraw from the EU. However, until the UK officially triggered Article 50, nothing else was set in stone. On March 29, 2017, the UK’s government served the EU with papers notifying the EU that it was officially triggering Article 50.

Conclusion

The relationship between Britain and the European Union has been a love-hate relationship. Different administrations have treated the European Union differently while the European Union has, in general, argued for the increased integration of Britain into its various systems from the Euro to the Social Chapter to larger legislative abilities for the Union. The decision by Britons to leave the Union was shocking to say the least and leaves the Union and Britain in an uncertain predicament. Cameron transitioned leadership to Theresa May in July of 2016. May’s desire has been to continue progress on Brexit and officially notified the European Union of the UK’s withdrawal on March 29, 2017.

Summary of Topic History

• Britain’s relationship with Europe as a continent has been rocky through the end of World War II

• Post-WWII, Britain was interested in creating a stable Europe and European institutions

• Britain lagged behind other nations in the acceptance of the European Economic Community but eventually was accepted in 1973

• The Thatcher Government saw a general disdain for European centralization, though that stance led to internal divisions within the Conservative party

• The Major Government saw a general reconciliation with the European Government and the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the Treaty of the European Union, which created a number of important EU organs. Major’s favor for the EU eventually slightly soured.

• The Blair Government again was more enthusiastic towards the EU than Major. Blair’s government set a number of priorities related to accepting EU policies while simultaneously pushing for British interests. Blair notably signed the Social Chapter but played hardball when it came to negotiating a 2007-2013 EU budget.

• The Brown Government signed the Lisbon Treaty, defeating a bill that asked for a referendum, and generally stood for EU policies. His government was too short and too moderated to affect the UK’s relationship with the EU dramatically. He was replaced in 2010 by the Conservative Party Leader, David Cameron.

• Cameron’s Government promised a renewed relationship with the European Union, one characterized by Cameron’s renegotiations with the Union for certain concessions related to wording in the Treaty of the European Union and migrant workers. Campaign promises in 2013 led to the referendum being held in 2016. Remain’s ineffective campaign and the British people’s rally against immigrants and perceived influence from the EU eventually led to the vote to Leave the Union.

Key Terms

Maastricht Treaty (Treaty of the European Union)

A Treaty signed by 11 nations of the European Community prior to the UK’s signing of the document that established the three pillars of the European Union, set up the European Government and European Union as an entity, and set Europe on a course towards the euro. The UK eventually signed the Maastricht Treaty under the Major Government. The Treaty was signed in February of 1992 and went into effect on November 1, 1993.

Social Chapter

An annex to the Maastricht Treaty that the UK refused to sign at the time of signing the rest of the treaty. The Social Chapter would give the European Council or the Council of Ministers, a Council made up of members of the heads of state of the European Union, the ability to legislate on certain social policy topics using either Qualified Majority Voting or unanimity, depending on the topic, to legislate over the entire of the European Union. The Social Chapter was eventually signed under the Blair government.

2007-2013 Budget

The topic of debate in 2005 negotiations between Blair and other European leaders. The Budget was not decided upon in 2005 negotiations and the succeeding British Presidency failed to achieve a budget as well. The budget was significant as Blair demonstrated his willingness to stand against European leaders to preserve British interests.

UK Rebate

A financial mechanism and exemption for the UK negotiated by Margaret Thatcher in 1984 that reduced the UK’s financial contribution to the European Union. Britain had to pay approximately 66% of the regular national contribution. The rebate is calculated with a complicated formula but essentially the rebate reduces the UK contribution to 65% of the normal national contribution for other EU members.

The next part of this topic guide is intended to give you a firm grasp on what the current situation is between the EU and Britain. Though the last section focused heavily on Britain’s history with the EU and how it has been affected by the EU, this section will explore the pros and cons that both sides gain from British membership in the European Union and possible points for the either side to negotiate for during committee. This section is broken down into the following parts:

Britain’s Snap Election and Its Ramifications

How Brexit Negotiations Will Begin and Who Will Be Involved

Transparency

Procedure

Interests of Both Parties and Issues to Be Debated

In the procedure section, I will cover how we will implement the real world system of negotiations into our committee given the time and facility constraints of our committee.

Britain’s Snap Election and Its Ramifications

Shortly after notifying the European Union of the UK’s desire to leave the Union on March 29, 2017, Theresa May called for a snap election on April 18, 2017 to secure her mandate in negotiating the best Brexit possible. It’s important to note that the EU Treaty mandates that negotiations for severing the relationship between the EU and the UK. The decision widely shocked Westminster insiders. Just a month prior, May had pledged not to hold a snap election, claiming that an election would create further disarray and would be self-serving. Many were confused by May’s decision, however she reasoned that her slim majority of 17 seats in Parliament was insufficient to secure the leverage necessary to negotiate the Brexit deal properly. May has publicly been supporting a “Hard Brexit”, meaning that she wants to pursue a deal that will gain the UK concessions from the EU in the form of different political, labor, and economic rights. Specifically, she wanted to obtain an “ambitious and comprehensive free-trade agreement” from the European Union but simultaneously remove the UK’s population from the European single market to reduce immigration. The EU has pledged to not allow UK access to the single market if it won’t allow freedom of movement, therefore it is clear that realistically, May will have to force her party to accept some compromises and a larger majority in Parliament would have made that much easier. At the time, it seemed clear that the Conservative Party would win by a large margin, some people predicting as much as a 100 seat majority over the other parties. The British Pound surged in value as the markets predicted a wide Conservative victory and therefore more certain road to Brexit. Jeremy Corbyn, the honest, fight-the-good-fight leftist leader of the Labour Party elected in September of 2015, had seemed to lead the Labour Party to even further disarray, unable to manage the internal divides between its anti-Brexit city dwellers and its pro-Brexit countrymen. Corbyn has also aligned himself with the May in one important part of Britain’s Brexit strategy: the leave vote means Britain must leave the EU. Thus far, Labour has refused to say that they would call for a new referendum if elected to power. As a result, May thought that the Conservatives would win a massive victory over Labour, giving her the personal mandate, not one inherited from David Cameron, to carry out her vision for an independent Britain.

In addition, the Fixed Parliament Act would mandate that May call an election in 2020, a year in which the Brexit will have started to take effect but a full transition deal may not have yet been worked out. A snap election in 2017 places the next mandatory election in 2022 and allows May more time to be able to negotiate a subsequent transition deal with the EU before having to deal with a potentially damaging campaign.

May, however, blundered in a number of significant ways during the campaign. In an interview with George Parker, the Financial Times political editor, NPR tried to tease out May’s mistakes and essentially boils it down to two points. First, May made a blunder in significantly changing the Conservative Manifesto on the point of social care, saying that her government would certainly introduce a cap on the amount of social care that a person can obtain. Though May had originally been making inroads to traditional labour voters, this strong, Conservative ideology influenced idea seemed to be the turning point for the election. Second, Jeremy Corbyn led an effective campaign, bringing young people out to vote and energizing the Labour Party. The result was that the Conservatives lost 13 seats during the election and Labour picked up another 30. The Conservatives have a total of 318 seats out of 650, putting them 8 seats shy of a majority. Though May called the election to clarify the British position on Brexit, May introduced nothing but uncertainty to the equation. May still lacks a clear mandate from the British people and was forced to make a deal with the DUP, the Democratic Unionist Party. The DUP, the predominant party in Northern Ireland, demanded a number of concessions from May, including two billion pounds of more spending in Northern Ireland and dropping a few previously desired policies. The DUP offered a confidence and supply agreement to the Conservatives in response. May agreed to the deal and the government was formed.

Prior to the election, EU leaders concurred with the May government, stating that a strong Conservative showing would help the possibility of a deal. However, as Guntram Wolff, the director of Bruegel, a Brussels based think tank, stated, "It may be impossible to compromise due to domestic political pressures in the U.K. So a no-deal scenario may become more likely." Most importantly, it will be much more difficult for May to pass whatever compromises she needs to make through Parliament. As a result, Britain’s position has become even more uncertain and it seems as if a deal is even more unlikely now. Britain will have to pay close attention to its domestic political situation if it wants to have a chance of its people accepting the Brexit deal.

How Brexit Negotiations Will Begin and Who Will Be Involved

The Treaty of the European Union, specifically Article 50, guides the process for how a country would leave the European Union and how the negotiations will take place. The European Union has allowed published a statement regarding its priorities in these negotiations. This statement is a general understanding of the EU’s position on Brexit and the subsequent negotiations. The British perspective, in a number of the procedural issues, is fairly similar. To preserve the integrity of negotiations made by the European Union, no individual member states are allowed, at least thus far, to start negotiations with Britain pertaining to Britain’s separation from the EU.

The EU side is being led by Michael Barnier, a former French minister and EU Commissioner. Barnier was identified by the European Commission as being uniquely prepared to handle the Brexit negotiations, specifically possessing the technical knowledge to address the single market issue and other pertinent separation issues. In general, the British response to Barnier’s appointment has been hostile, citing the regulations he tried to enforce on Britain’s financial system when he was Internal Market Commissioner.

The British side is being led by David Davis, a long time MP and former Minister and Chairman of the Conservative Party. Davis’s bio can be found here. An MP that supported the Leave side, Davis has been appointed the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, the so-called “Minister for Brexit”.

Both men have built strong teams around themselves and have been hard at work preparing and executing some portions of the negotiations. You can read Britain’s position papers and other official documents published about the Brexit here. You can read the EU’s position papers and other relevant official documents here.

Barnier and Davis started by meeting to work out the initial framework for negotiation. Barnier and Davis agreed that the first day of negotiations would be Monday June 19, 2017. The first day would be one day long and would attempt to start to address immediate separation issues including citizens’ rights, the financial settlement, the Northern Irish border, among other issues. Throughout the day they also discussed the sequenced approach to talks and have seemed to maintain that they will continue to sequence the talks. I will discuss in the next section how we will implement the specific format of talks.

Transparency

The major problem associated with negotiations is the inevitable uncertainty caused by the split. If negotiations go poorly, there will be a host of problems for EU and British citizens that rely on the other body for some part of their lives. If negotiations go poorly, businesses and the economies of both the EU and Britain will suffer. As such, lifting any sort of uncertainty from the process will be a priority for both sides. The Commission and the UK will have a strong transparency policy and will consistently review this policy to make sure that the general public is aware of all the steps of the ongoing negotiations. Both sides have promised to publish all documents pertaining to negotiations including position papers, official statements, agenda, and other official documents. As a result, proposals from both sides and statements of position will be readily available to the public and both sides will experience pressure from their constituencies when they seem to be failing to representent their people.

Procedure

As I am sure it is clear to everyone, the time frame of the conference is woefully short to attempt to try and negotiate the entirety of the Brexit deal. However, it is my goal to do my best to replicate the real process of Brexit negotiations. Moreover, it probably is clear by now that Brexit negotiations are not being handled directly by the European Commission. Originally, the Treaty of Europe vests the power to negotiate the exit in the European Council which placed the negotiations in the hands of the Commission which then appointed Michael Barnier as the chief negotiator. The people currently on Barnier’s team are not currently serving as Commissioners. On the British side, Daniel Davis has been appointed a cabinet position to negotiate Brexit. Both sides, therefore, are extensions of their government’s authority and are not in and of themselves, the decision making body for the final passage of the deal. In Britain, the Parliament will more or less have to ratify any enforceable and actionable deal and in the European Union, it will most likely be the Parliament and European Council that have to agree to the final deal.

Our committee will also be structured into rounds. For the sake of our committee, we will assume a few pieces of progress that both sides have made thus far. First, we will assume that Britain has signalled to the European Union that it wishes to trigger Article 50. That will have taken place on March 29, 2017. Second, we will assume that the British snap election has happened and Tory government made a deal with the DUP to secure its victory. Third, we will assume that both Britain and the EU have agreed to the general outline of how to start and manage negotiations, primarily in that they have agreed to break the negotiations up, generally speaking, into various rounds. We will start our committee right after the end of the second round of negotiations, July 21st. During that time, delegates will have a short amount of time to confer with their side (British or European) about their particular stances are various issues and come up with a cohesive position on a few issues. Positions stated by either side through this point should be assumed to be the current position of either side and will only be changed as delegates on either side opt to change them. Before the start of the next round of negotiations, delegates who wish to change their group’s position on a certain topic need to write up a summary of the substantive changes to their position. I know that this incorporates more writing into the committee, but it will be important that stated positions are written to keep track of bloc positions. At least for the beginning of the committee, I will set the agendas for each round of negotiations. I will also set the timing of the rounds of negotiations and keep delegates posted about the times of rounds.

Negotiation rounds will have a number of different parts, the order of which will be determined by the agenda that is set by me. Each round will open with a plenary opening session with representatives from both sides stating significant policy changes since the previous rounds and what they hope to gain out of this round of negotiations. After the opening session, there can be a number of different types of sessions:

Further plenary sessions of moderated discussion between the two sides (most similar procedurally to a moderated caucus but will allow for introductions of written clauses)

Negotiating group meetings where the representatives from each side for a given issue will meet, present their positions to each other, and negotiate clauses in their particular silo of the committee. If agreements are reached on issues, these negotiators can start drafting clauses into a “Working Paper” on their part of the issue.

Bloc coordination meetings where each side will report back to their bloc with what was discussed and what was offered/proposed

Closing session with more moderated discussion. Delegates will formally present written clauses to the body during this part of the round if they have not done so in a previous plenary session. After the closing session, the negotiating round will officially end.

For the British Team

The British team will be in a unique situation. It’s team will consist of five ministers of the UK government that are not representative of the actual composition of the UK negotiating team. Rather, we are assuming that the negotiating team consists of ministers from the UK. The UK team will have the overall goal of providing the “best deal” for the UK, though individual ministers may also have differing perspectives on what that exactly means. The roles of each of the ministers are guidelines rather than strict boundaries on what ministers are allowed to talk about. They are meant to give the UK team an idea of what issues are important at the outset and particular knowledge that will allow them to effectively draft clauses.

The UK team will have to work more efficiently than the EU side to draft papers and argue for their positions. As a result, the UK team should emphasize teamwork and the effective division of labor to produce the best results.

Tiered Topics

The topics that are available for discussion in each round will also be tiered. Check the next section about the Topics to see which issues specifically, but during the first few rounds of negotiation, only the first tier of topics will be available for discussion. Those are topics that both sides have deemed as critically important to any sort of deal and moving forward without a framework for those topics in place would be impossible for both sides. Once adequate progress has been made on those topics, I will allow for debate and positions to be declared on the next set of topics. I will only tier the topics into two tiers.

Submitting Working Papers

Working papers written during negotiating groups will be presented by the representatives that wrote them. To be submitted, working papers must have the support of two thirds of each party of the negotiating group. For example, if there are 3 British negotiators and 6 European negotiators, the working paper would require 2 British signatures and 4 European ones to be submitted. Once submitted and then introduced in a plenary session, working papers can be approved to be placed into the Draft Agreement once they are approved by a majority from each of the two sides. Working Papers can be agreed upon by sides out of negotiating sessions and will immediately be added to the Draft Agreement at the beginning of the next negotiation round.

Both sides will be allowed to author amendments to the Draft Agreement at any time and submit them to the Dais, though amendments will require a majority from each side to pass as well. I may make the threshold for signatories stricker on amendments to eliminate superfluous amendments.

Draft Agreement

Once all the issues have been discussed and clauses are agreed upon in the Draft Agreement to address the various issues, the Draft Agreement will be submitted to the Dais. From there, both sides will need a majority from their respective sides to submit the agreement to their ruling bodies.

How This Committee Addresses Post Assignments

For this committee, the British side will be constructed much like the actual British negotiating team, with a head negotiator or negotiators and delegates as the individual negotiators for different departments. We obviously can’t field a 90 person team for the British side, so we will reduce the number of negotiators in the team but in general it will be similarly structured to the existing team.

For the European side, we will have each a Commissioner from each EU member country minus Britain. I or another Chair will act as the President of the European Commission and Chief Negotiator for the purposes of the European negotiating team. The Commissioners will be required to organize themselves into different teams to address the different issues. This is slightly different from the actual structure of the negotiations. In the actual negotiations, Barnier was appointed by the Commission to manage the negotiations and no current commissioners are actually on his team. However, in this case, we’re going to assume that the European Commission is handling the negotiations themselves and have taken on the policies that the negotiating team has already put forward. The Commission is being closely monitored by the European Council via the Working Party to evaluate its progress and ensure that it is operating within the guidelines set out by the European Council.

Topics

The Brexit forces both sides of the negotiations to think of a host of issues. Both parties have a mutual interest in preserving some of the former privileges that the Union afforded to the UK and vice versa, but as both sides acknowledge, the UK would have to be a full member of the Union to truly gain access to all its benefits. As such, it is important to parse the various issues that the two sides will have to negotiate over and potential points where they can work together and points where concessions will have to be made by either side. If no deal can be reached by March 30, 2019, two years after the initial notification of withdrawal from the Union, the UK will immediately cease to be subject to any treaties and rights given to EU member states. This is the worst case scenario for both sides. An technical and immediate withdrawal with no framework to deal with the resulting situation would cause huge damages in terms of trade and throw the legal status of a number of Europeans living in Britain as well as Britons living in the EU into question. As such, both sides have an interest in passing a deal. Below are the various topics that both sides have interests in. The statements below about the issues are far from exhaustive, rather they are intended to give you necessary background on each topic before you conduct your own research. For this committee in particular, I hope delegates will have an in-depth understanding of at least two to three of these topics and a general understanding of all of them. Moreover, the topics are divided into two tiers. Tier 1 topics will be debated and negotiated upon first until I believe that adequate progress has been made, then the committee will progress to Tier 2 topics.

Tier 1 Topics

Citizens' rights

Citizens’ rights are perhaps the most visibly important part of the Brexit. For the years that Britain has been a member of the EU, EU and British citizens have been allowed the four freedoms of the European Union. The four freedoms encompass the freedom of movement of goods, people, services, and capital. These freedoms are the bedrock of the European Union, allowing people and their interests to be more European rather than tied to an individual nation. The European Single Market is an implication of the four freedoms. The removal of trade barriers and barriers to labor movement have made the European Single Market the single largest economic zone in the world. The four freedoms relate directly to rights that EU citizens have, namely being able to freely move within the EU and work anywhere that they would please. Moreover, many EU citizens live and work in nations that are different than their home nation. If Brexit were to occur without settling the status of British nationals in the EU or EU citizens in Britain, these people would be left in a legal lurch with a lack of clarity of what their rights are. As such, settling differences on the four freedoms are an essential part of the Brexit agreement.

For the British, in an ideal world they would be able to control who comes into their country but also gain access to the European Single Market and allow their workers to work and move freely through Europe as they choose. Realistically though, this is a nearly non-negotiable point for the European Union: you either take all of the four freedoms or you take none. Time and time again, leaders of the European bloc including Prime Minister Angela Merkel of Germany have scoffed at the idea of the UK gaining access to the EU Single Market without also offering free movement of EU citizens. For the British, controlling their borders is of an utmost priority.

In this issue, the two sides need to sort out a few issues related to the rights of citizens of the EU and of Britons. As a note, this chart here will be helpful in seeing visually where the EU and Britain disagreed after the second round of negotiations.

EU Nationals Lawfully Resident Before the Cutoff Date

Britain and the EU are unclear on when their citizens will stop being lawfully resident within the other’s borders. The UK wants it to be sometime between their triggering of Article 50 (March 29, 2017) and when the actual exit occurs. The EU wants the status of existing residents to change when the agreement comes into place.

Britain and the EU are both willing to accept lawfully residing residents under terms laid out in Directive 2004/38 and EU Treaty articles.

The UK wants to specify the implementation of rules regarding existing EU citizens residing in Britain. Britain wishes to apply its standard of “genuine and effective work” to the current residents for them to access benefits. A more indepth description is here.

Frontier Workers

Frontier workers are workers that reside on one state but then work in another.

The issue currently is unclarified but the EU wishes to write the agreement such that frontier workers who are still considered frontier workers by the cutoff date will fall under the agreement. The EU most likely would like to give frontier workers the ability to move across the EU border to work in the UK. The UK’s stance thus far is unclear but if the UK chooses to be consistent with its stances on immigration, it may choose to close off borders to frontier workers or make the process unrealistically difficult for frontier workers to go to work on a regular basis. The UK has also said, however, that it is considering reciprocal procedures to allow EU workers into Britain and UK workers into the EU.

Current Family Members

Largely the two sides agree on this issue. Both sides agree that those with family members who have achieved lawful residence in either the EU or the UK and currently will be allowed family member status. These people will be granted full movement rights as granted in Directive 2004/38.

The only discrepancy that exists here, and it seems to be more semantic than substantive, is whether the UK would consider these people to be “independent rights holders” or use the EU’s term of “family member” status.

Future Family Members

This issue is more substantive. There are a number of disagreements between the EU and the UK about whether family members of existing lawful residents should be allowed to come into the UK or the EU. Ultimately this issue pertains to Britain’s ability to monitor and control its borders, a priority behind the Brexit and Prime Minister May’s agenda.

The EU wants to guarantee that family members of existing residents in Britain will be able to enter with all the rights with regards to entry that they currently have under Directive 2004/38 even past the exit date. Essentially, the EU wants Britain to willingly let all family members of existing lawful residents into the UK as if they were going to other EU nations.

Britain disagrees. Its current stance is that it will allow family members to come to Britain as general foreigners, treated under the same rules as non-EU citizens, or under special rules determined in the Brexit Agreement.

The second issue is what status children born after the exit to lawfully residing EU parents will obtain. Britain proposes allowing the children to gain immediate settled or citizenship status in Britain if they were born in the UK. The EU says that it would like to see children be able to join their parents as a family member but not necessarily rights holder.

Individual Enforcement of Rights - covered under “Governance of the Article 50 Agreement Section”

Permanent Residence

Both sides agree that UK Nationals living in the EU or EU citizens living in the UK are currently eligible for permanent residence after 5 years of being a student, worker/self-employed person, or family member of such in their settled country. Again, these clauses refer to the UK’s ability to keep EU residents out of the UK and only grant permanent resident status after the UK’s standards have been met. Both sides agree that permanent residence status can be lost after permanent residents live abroad continuously for two years.

The EU wants to implement the standards with usual discretion in implementation.

The UK wishes to specify other specific standards for permanent residence including standards such as the lack of CSI and “genuine and effective work”. The UK has yet to specify what these terms would look like in the actual agreement.

The financial settlement

The single financial settlement is perhaps the most visibly strenuous part of this agreement and has both sides in a position where they may look to simply walk out of negotiations. Both the UK and the EU have agreed that a single financial settlement rather than independent negotiations over outstanding balances for relevant part of the agreement will be more reasonable. The single financial settlement refers to money owed by the UK to the EU for a host of different issues. The EU claims that Britain owes a certain amount of money for basically three areas of expenses: commitments that the UK made to the EU or EU members while a member that have not yet been pain; pensions to EU officials; and contingent liabilities. Early estimates have ranged from around 40 billion euros to 100 billion euros. That being said, Barnier himself and the EU’s official stance is that Britain just needs to cover the costs that are outstanding and he has not attached himself to a specific number yet. The official UK stance is that the UK acknowledges that it will have to pay something, but it has remained unclear on how much it will be willing to pay. Within the UK, there is significant infighting over how much the UK should be willing to pay to the EU, some within May’s government even demanding that the UK pay next to nothing. The EU has stated that this issue along with issues related to Ireland’s border and citizens’ rights need to be resolved prior to moving onto other issues. The financial settlement encompasses a number of different liabilities on the part of the UK. The UK has yet to publish a position paper on this topic so that will be one of the priorities of the UK side once we get into committee. Below are the different areas where the UK is potentially liable to the EU. This is the EU’s position paper. The UK has yet to publish one.

General Principles

The EU has stated that it believes the financial settlement should cover all outstanding expenses that the UK is responsible to contained within:

• the Union budget,

• the termination of the membership of the United Kingdom of all bodies or institutions established by the Treaties,

• the participation of the United Kingdom in specific funds and facilities related to the Union policies.

The Good Friday Agreement and the Common Travel Area

The Good Friday Agreement was a peace agreement brokered between a number of different parties in April of 1998 to quell the violence known as “The Troubles” in Ireland between different parties either supporting or opposing UK rule over Northern Ireland. The final agreement was a hard fought agreement and had a hard fought campaign to keep it alive. However, the agreement refers to the EU in a number of different places and upon the UK’s exit from the European Union, it is unclear to whom that those specific responsibilities that the EU had to Ireland and Northern Ireland will fall to. The UK’s proposed repeal bill would simply replace the wording “EU” with “UK”, essentially taking back a host of powers given to devolved governments and the EU. Moreover, since Northern Ireland and Scotland overwhelming voted to stay in the European Union, this type of seizure of power from Northern Ireland would put political strain on Westminster’s already tenuous relationship with the Northern Ireland Assembly. A number of legal challenges to the Triggering of Article 50 were swatted down by the UK Supreme Court, holding that there was no language in the Good Friday Agreement that would preclude the UK from withdrawing from the European Union. However, the UK still has a vested interest in smoothing over the potential problems caused by its exit from the EU. This document here compiled by the European Parliament is a good primer on the particular issues and history of the Good Friday Agreement.

The Common Travel Area and Customs on the Irish Border

The clearest problem that the Brexit may pose for the Irish is the legal closing of the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. Since both Ireland and the UK are in the EU, people are currently able to move across the border between the two nations. Hardening the border with security checks or other forms of immigration control would harken back to the days of the Troubles and is strongly opposed by the local communities near the border. There are over 30,000 workers in Northern Ireland and Ireland that cross the border for work on a regular basis. 7% of workers in Northern Ireland are citizens of the united European Economic Area. However, a soft border with no controls between Ireland and Northern Ireland would allow other EU citizens to move directly across the border from the EU into the UK, harming the UK’s immigration program.

The UK has thus far been unclear on what its exact policy will be regarding Ireland. The UK does not seem interested in, however, provoking the Northern Irish and Irish by leaving the issue unaddressed. There are a few options that the UK can attempt to pursue. First, it can pull back its customs and security checkpoints to the island of Britain itself and allow for free travel between Ireland and Northern Ireland. It is unlikely though that the UK would devolve the power to the Northern Irish to make this decision themselves and it is further unclear whether the EU would be amenable to this idea. As a result, the Brexit negotiations are a prime place for the UK and EU to sort out this issue. Second, the British could implement a soft border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, inconveniencing some but on the whole making the process of crossing the Irish border not incredibly difficult. Realistically though, this would harm the British project of securing its borders. Third, the UK could negotiate with the EU to allow for movement of Irish and Northern Irish across the border and gain a special exception for Ireland to allow movement across the border. The political situation for the UK may develop further as the DUP now has an agreement with the Conservative government. The DUP has thus far demanded that the Tory government work to preserve the Good Friday agreement.

The EU has thus far not published a comprehensive policy on the question of the Good Friday agreement. The EU does want a resolution to the situation but may be unwilling to offer specific policies that would compromise the sanctity of its Single Market without receiving reciprocal guarantees of freedom of movement from the UK.

Strand 2 of the Good Friday Agreement

Strands 1, 2, and 3 can be read here. Strand 2 is the part of the agreement most directly affected by the Brexit. The second strand mentions the EU in a few key areas, specifically in the co-implementation of programs that the EU provides to Ireland and Northern Ireland, another clause that guarantees both Irish and Northern Irish interests will be represented at EU meetings and policies from the EU adequately implemented by the relevant Irish and Northern Irish authorities.

These clauses, except for the clause about implementation of EU programs, don’t necessarily affect Ireland and Northern Ireland that significantly. The particular clause about the co-implementation of EU programs is probably the most troubling since it will be impossible for the EU to maintain funding those programs in Northern Ireland. However, I will address those programs more in depth later in this section. Realistically the other clauses don’t overtly rely on the EU, however the Repeal Bill’s policy of removing the term EU and replacing it with UK will undoubtedly cause an overstep of power by the UK. As such, the UK will probably wish to seek a few clauses in this agreement that will maintain the current distribution of powers between Ireland and the UK.

Trade and Tariffs Over the Irish Border

The Northern Irish and Irish economies depend heavily upon each other. Trade between the two nations has become so integrated and well-understood that attempts to harden the border will surely be met with resistance from the Irish. For the Irish, maintaining some semblance of free trade between the North and the South is incredibly important. Ireland and Northern Ireland rely heavily on exports to Britain and the EU. 34% of Northern Ireland’s exports go to Ireland and 57% go to the EU. Thus, the Good Friday Agreement worked to establish free trade between the two nations and has thus far been effective in providing economic gains for both sides. There appear to be a few options for the EU and the UK:

The UK and EU can agree to allow Northern Ireland to remain in the European Customs Union, allowing goods to freely move between Northern Ireland and the Ireland. Note that the UK has noted tariff-free trade or the UK remaining in the European Customs Union as one of its priorities despite that being fairly unlikely if it does not concede freedom of movement as well. If this indeed does become the case and the UK remains in the Customs Union, this problem becomes a moot point. Insofar as it doesn’t, however, the EU and UK need to find suitable measures to address across the border. The above stated solution, however, seems to be fairly infeasible. The EU can rightly argue that goods transferred to Northern Ireland would then be able to transferred on to Britain. Britain would run into problems of forcing itself to devolve powers of trade agreements to Northern Ireland. Though an Ireland-in-the-Customs-Union and a UK-out remains a solution, it will require bending on both sides in order for it to become a reality.

The EU and UK can refuse to make special accommodation for Ireland and Northern Ireland, placing the UK broadly under Most Favored Nation tariffs of approximately 3.2% or whatever number the EU and UK are able to decide upon. Specific implementation of the border and customs, however, will strain political factions within the UK, especially because the DUP will resist any bills that are overtly harmful to Northern Ireland. As such, having a plan of implementing the border with adequate DUP support, should it come to that, should be a priority of the UK side.

EU Programs in Progress in Ireland

Potentially the most important part of the severance deal between the UK and the EU is how both sides expect to maintain the ongoing EU programs between Northern Ireland and Ireland. Strand 2 of the agreement states that the EU will carry out certain programs to help bring about Irish and Northern Irish peace. Most importantly, the Special European Programmes Body (SEUPB) has created programs to develop Irish peace. The Northern Ireland PEACE Programme has had a number of iterations since the signing of the Belfast agreement, but ultimately the agreement has helped to devote EU money to fixing relations between Northern Ireland and Ireland. Goals of the PEACE programs (currently we are on the fourth PEACE Program) include shared education between the North and the rest of Ireland, helping children and young people, and developing positive relations at local levels. The previous three PEACE programs totalled 1.3 billion euros in total value. This current PEACE program is valued at 270 million euros. According to the European Parliament’s fact sheet about the program, “94% of the PEACE IV programme resources will support social inclusion, combating poverty and labour mobility (the remaining resources will be allocated to technical assistance).” Under the authority of the European Commission, the Northern Ireland Task Force is responsible for helping local Northern Irish governments develop their economies, markets, competition policy, education, and other critical parts of Northern Irish Society.

Ultimately the UK and the EU will have to develop a plan on how they can maintain the current EU programs through a special deal allowing cooperation, develop a set of new programs that are jointly run by the two sides or by the UK alone for Northern Ireland and the EU alone for the rest of Ireland, or let the programs become defunct upon exit. Once the exit occurs, without a specific set of clauses to preserve these programs, the legal basis for continuing the programs will become unclear and operations most likely we cease. For the UK, a deal that does not address how the two sides can work together to either keep running these programs or how the UK can underpin this process alone will most likely not be approved by the UK Parliament. The DUP, the party that the Conservatives have arranged a deal with to form their government, are wary of what an agreement that ignores Ireland’s needs will do to their constituency. As a result, the DUP will most likely not support a Conservative deal that does not find a way to address these programs. For the EU, realistically there will be very few political consequences if the agreement fails to address the PEACE programs in Ireland, however the EU’s commitment to Irish peace and British willingness to find a solution should lead it to be able to find a solution. The primary question will be how to fund the existing programs or whether to keep them in their current state at all. The EU most likely will not want to let Britain take advantage of EU funds to further fund the PEACE programs and with the legal basis for the PEACE programs being thrown into jeopardy, the payment system of the programs also need to be renegotiated.

Nuclear materials and safeguard equipment (EURATOM)

The EU has co-managed the UK’s obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a host of different nuclear energy and weapons related materials within the EU. The EU has provided for necessary safeguards for materials and information and as the UK withdraws, it will need to reestablish these safeguards. The UK and EU both have large amounts of material, machinery, and technology that belong to citizens of the other body in their body. How those materials will be moved and ownership of them will be part of the negotiations. The British position paper from July 13, 2017 can be found here. The European paper from the same round can be found here. If you are confused by any terms, this is a glossary of terms related to nuclear topics.

UK IAEA Compliance

Thus far, the UK has been under the umbrella of the European Atomic Energy Community, a party of the Treaty of the European Union. However, when the UK leaves the EU, it will have to guarantee its compliance on its own.

The EU has asked that the UK ensure safeguards are in place to safeguard nuclear materials, specifically “to ensure that ores, source materials and special fissile materials present on United Kingdom territory are not diverted from their intended uses as declared by the users, and under agreements concluded by the Community with third States or international organisations, relating to any material, equipment, installation or property present on United Kingdom territory.” The EU position paper above has more specific details on how the IAEA regulations need to be met.

In response, the UK has offered the following policies:

• It will agree to sign a Voluntary Offer Agreement with the IAEA to bind it legally to IAEA jurisdiction and ensure its implementation of adequate safeguards for its nuclear materials or related technology and materials. This is the easiest outcome for everyone - the IAEA uses Voluntary Offer Agreements as the bedrock of their legal jurisdiction.

• The UK has agreed to abide by all IAEA regulations and safeguard requirements.

Legal Status and Certainty of Nuclear Materials Located in the UK and EURATOM

Currently a sizable amount of nuclear material and technology that is owned by the European Union is located in Britain and vice versa. As a result, the legal status of those nuclear materials will be called into question when Britain officially leaves the EU. Thus, Britain and the EU need to determine what the legal status of said materials will be and who owns them.

The EU and Britain have differing opinions on who should eventually own the nuclear materials present in their respective territory. Britain says that it will guarantee the compliance of safeguards for EURATOM materials in the UK insofar as there is the possibility of those materials being turned over to the UK in exchange for monetary compensation or the so-called financial settlement. The EU wishes for the nuclear material and technology to be returned to it and agrees to do so for British materials. The EU states that when the agreement goes into effect, it will transfer the necessary safeguard materials over to the UK so the UK can safeguard its nuclear materials. The UK in turn will then have to pay the EU for the transfer. A possible point of contention is how much the UK should pay for this material, an assessment that needs to be made by the UK and the EU.

Both the EU and Britain agree that special fissile material, certain isotopes of uranium and plutonium, should be transferred back to the nation of their respective owners. Both sides need to provide for the safe transfer of these materials back to adequate territories.

Radioactive and Nuclear Waste

Both the EU and the UK have nuclear and radioactive waste created from their nuclear energy programs. They both agree that the party responsible for the creation of such waste should remain responsible for the waste.

Tier 2 Issues

Governance of the Article 50 agreement

Ultimately there need to be adequate enforcement and oversight mechanisms for both sides in this agreement. Therefore, this treaty needs to specify those mechanisms for the treaty to be successful.

Source of Authority of This Agreement

Both sides agree that this agreement should be binding as an International Treaty as it pertains to international law.

Oversight

Oversight of implementation is key to the agreement being honored by both sides and handing out adequate punishments and responses if the agreement is not. The UK and EU disagree strongly on this point as well, neither seemingly ready to concede control of the oversight process to the other party.

The EU wants the European Commission to oversee the implementation of the agreement for both parties.

The UK obviously sees an error in the EU’s approach, claiming that it would give an interested party too much leeway in their own actions but allow them to be unnecessarily strict towards the UK. The UK has proposed another plan of having a body created by the EU27 monitor the progress of the EU implementation and another independent body located in London monitor British progress.

Individual Enforcement of Rights

One of the most pertinent questions for the EU and the UK is if a citizen of either side thinks they are denied their rights as enshrined in this agreement or applicable law, how are they supposed to remedy that offence? The EU and UK vehemently disagree on this portion of the agreement with the UK wanting more autonomy to determine cases with less regard to this agreement and the EU wanting to force the EU to integrate more of the agreement into their legal system.

The EU wants for this agreement to be enforceable through both EU and UK courts. Specifically, the EU wants the effective provisions of this agreement to override implementing legislation on both sides when it is in conflict with the agreement. In the case of an abuse of a citizen’s rights, that citizen can rely on the agreements clauses to win a case against a law that violates clauses of the treaty.

The UK wants for the effective rights of citizens to stem from its own law and implementation. Specifically, the rights enshrined in this agreement will be implemented by the UK’s judicial system and legislature and provisions of the agreement will only have an effect when the implementation of clauses that pertain to the given issue is unclear. In other words, unless the British bureaucracy and judiciary lack absolutely any other guidance, the agreement itself will not be used in British courts. May stated in October 2016, “We will not have truly left the European Union if we are not in control of our own laws.”

As a side note, the British side has hinted an using the International Court of Justice as an arbitration ground for individual disputes, though this policy was not proposed in the second round of discussions. May has also conceded that potentially, the European Court of Justice could have jurisdiction for a certain amount of time, a blatant shift in one of her original “red lines”.

Status of the European Court of Justice in the UK

The EU and UK disagree vehemently over this particular issue. May as well as other British ministers have condemned the European Court of Justice, the highest judicial body within the European Union, that is the highest power that can ultimately determines suits brought within the European Union regarding citizens rights, as an overstep of European power. Barnier, on the other hand, has asked in his position papers for the UK to accept the court’s power to hand down fines or other disciplinary measures if the EU or the UK is found to be breaking parts of their agreement.

This part of the agreement inherently relates to the enforcement mechanisms for this agreement. The sides can choose to debate whether the Court of Justice should still have the power to determine whether the UK or EU has violated the terms of their agreement. However, ultimately, this issue is primarily relevant only if the sides agree to recognize the European Court of Justice as a future arbiter.

Trade restrictions and the status of goods placed in the European Market prior to cutoff

Stances from both sides are unclear. On one hand, the EU would be making good on its promise to the EU to prevent Britain from maintaining access to the European market as a non-member. On the other hand, the EU wants to preserve the notion that Britain is a member state until it isn’t a member state. As such, the EU and UK sides will need to determine what position they want to take.

The UK will most likely want to preserve EU trade relations until the actual break is made.

This agreement may stem from the agreement on post-cutoff trade that the committee makes.

Trade restrictions between the UK and the EU after the cutoff

This is perhaps the most visible issue between the EU and the UK. The idea of getting a “good” trade deal has been critical to the messaging by the UK. There are two overarching tensions between the UK and the EU. First, Britain benefits from interaction with the EU’s open markets. As such it wants to be able to continue to access those markets. But on the other hand, the EU views open markets as a critical point in its understanding of itself. Namely, the EU views the idea of open markets as generally inseparable from the idea of freedom of movement and EU membership. To give some guidance on how to think about this problem, I would suggest looking at the following:

• What is the current status of UK-EU trade?

• What will be the economic effects of an “unfavorable” trade deal between the UK and the EU?

• What does an unfavorable trade deal really mean?

• Are there other issues that tie into trade? If so, then how will agreements on those parts affect trade?

Judicial, police, and administrative cooperation in civil, commercial, and criminal manners

Again, published materials on these methods of cooperation are fairly thin. That being said, the UK has contributed positively to EU enforcement organizations and most likely will still want to keep some type of cooperation in the future. For the sake of clarity, we will separate the enforcement of citizens’ rights into another category (above) and limit this section to disputes only containing issues not pertaining to citizens’ rights.

You can access the UK’s position paper here. Keep in mind that though this is the way that Britain has decided to go as of now, we are starting this committee prior to the publishing of this position paper. You can access the EU’s position paper here.

Delegates should consider how physical placement of EU organizations in Britain and vice versa would be affected by the separation of the UK from the EU.

The main disputes will be over whether the EU or the UK has jurisdiction to try certain criminals or adjudicate particular civil cases if both sides worked cooperatively in the investigation.

The second main dispute will be information sharing. With Britain and the EU thinking about security more than in the past decade or so, it has become important that British and European police forces work together to fight terrorism. That being said, both sides will need to determine what level of interaction there needs to be between their two forces. For example, how often will Scotland Yard or the National Crime Agency share information with Europol? What role does Europol play in helping the UK prevent crime and terror?

You should be actively interested in seeing how the real life negotiations are playing out. Though we will not be following the real-life negotiations step by step, the logic contained within each of the position papers is important for you to know. Moreover, they will provide you with a firmer grasp on what substantive policy between the EC and the UK might actually look like. Here is the link for the UK’s position papers and documents. Here is the link for the EC’s position papers and documents.

You also should do more extensive into one or two of the topic areas above. For the EC side, there are a number of commissioners that cover a wide range of expertise. Research the particular parts of the Brexit deal that will be important to those commissioners and be prepared to write substantive material on those issues. That being said, among resources I would recommend using are the Economist (British), Foreign Affairs magazine (American), Der Spiegel (German), European Council on Foreign Relations, Centre for European Reform, among other sources. Try and have a varied viewpoint and understand how your perspective as a commissioners or minister on a particular side might affect your views.