Terrorism in Africa

Letter from the Dais

Dear Delegates,

My name is Mbella Beseka, and I am a sophomore in Ezra Stiles College here at Yale. I currently live in the south suburbs of Chicago, IL. It is my utmost pleasure to welcome all of you to the Security Council Simulation at Yale XL. I find the topic of this committee, Terrorism in Africa, intriguing because I believe that it is a problem that lies at a unique intersection of social, cultural, religious, historical, and political elements. My parents immigrated to the United States from Cameroon in the 1980s. This has, for all intents and purposes, shaped the way that I perceive any issue related to the African continent. Having this personal connection has given me insight into the importance of considering the role that individual’s way of life plays when examining the roots of larger societal issues. Unfortunately, this is something that I see lacking in the way that such issues as terrorism or corruption are being discussed in Western media. Therefore, I am eager to delve deeper with you all into such an all-encompassing topic such as terrorism and learn more of the specific issues that form its roots.

Another reason I wanted to chair SCSY this year was that I enjoyed vice-chairing SCSY 2016 so much. It was one of my first experiences working in a crisis committee, nevertheless leading one. Nevertheless, I enjoyed it immensely and that experience motivated me to chair a committee for SCSY this year. This coming January, I will be chairing the African Union for YMUN XLIV. I am also a member of the Model United Nations Team at Yale.

Outside of YIRA, I am the Contracts Assistant at the Yale University Press and am involved with the Yale Undergraduate Legal Aid Association, an organization that works with the city and state administration to provide legal resources to youth or formerly incarcerated individuals in New Haven. I am also a member of the Yale Gospel Choir and am the captain of the Muay Thai Kickboxing Club.

I look forward to hearing all of the creative ideas that I know all of you will bring to the committee. If you have any questions concerning the committee, please feel free to email me at mbella.beseka@yale.edu. I wish you the best of luck in your preparation and see you soon!

All best,

Mbella Beseka ES ’20

Topic History

The 2014 kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok, Borno State, Nigeria amassed international attention with the world coming together to fight against a common enemy: Boko Haram. However, Nigeria and surrounding countries have suffered many atrocities at the hands of this terrorist organization both before and after this event. For almost two decades, Boko Haram has controlled territory around the Lake Chad Basin near Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon, committed violent human rights atrocities against women and children, and has escaped many previous military operations. President Muhammadu Buhari has called this committee to meet in Lagos, Nigeria to analyze the specifics of the situation and find ways effectively combat terrorist groups. The committee has invited several West African dignitaries, military officials, NGOs currently working in the Lake Chad Basin area, and terrorism experts among others. In the end, members of this committee must find means to counter the financing of terrorism, develop a rule of law framework for countering Boko Haram’s violence, and reduce the appeal of radicalization and recruitment to extremism. All this while rampant corruption, widespread distrust of the West, and widespread poverty amongst a growing number of Nigerians hinder the nation’s ability to mount a formidable response. With the 2019 national election on the horizon, the success of this committee’s mission is imperative to avoid West Africa’s complete destabilization of by Boko Haram.

Current Situation

Much of Sub-Saharan Africa is currently plagued with rampant violence caused by several extremist groups. Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is a fundamentalist Christian militia that seeks to establish a Ugandan regime that lives by Joseph Kony’s interpretation of the Ten Commandments. It had approximately 200 militants as of 2012. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) comprises one of these groups and is confirmed to have been responsible for attacks in Mali. With less than 1,000 members, it hopes to establish an Islamic caliphate across northern Africa. Al-Shabaab possesses a relatively high membership count, with estimations ranging from the hundreds to a few thousand. They wish to destabilize and potentially overthrow the current Somali government. The latter two groups have been affiliated with the core al-Qaeda group in the Middle East and have historically received support from it. A myriad of other violent militant groups exists throughout Central Africa, such as anti-Balaka, ex-Séléka, Mayi Mayi, and the Allied Democratic Forces.

BRIEF NOTE ON NIGERIA

Nigeria is divided into thirty-six states and one Federal Capital Territory. Each state has their own governor and lower governmental administration (LGA) in order to oversee the distribution of public services. Although Kanem-Borno was one of the most extensive kingdoms in sub-Saharan Africa during the 13th century, northeastern Borno State is currently ranked as one of the poorest states in Nigeria. It is also currently occupied by the deadliest terrorist organization that the continent of Africa has ever seen: Boko Haram.

BOKO HARAM

The full Arabic name of the group is Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad which translates to the “Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad”. Its popular name, Boko Haram is a Hausa nickname which, in English, means “Western education is forbidden”. From its inception, Boko Haram has centered in the Kanuri ethnic group. The group is accused of committing a multitude of atrocities, including but not limited to, forcing minors to learn how to become messengers, combatants, and suicide bombers. They have yet to attack many Western facilities, so experts believe that their focus lies wholly on the destruction of the Nigerian government. Their end goal is to build a pan-African caliphate atop the ashes of the Nigerian government.

Although the group’s roots in the rural northeastern regions of the country can be traced back to 2002, Boko Haram’s more recent wave of terror began in the first half of this decade. In 2011, as the group was still regrouping in Borno State after the death of its founder in 2009, desperate northern politicians in Borno, Yobe, and Kano States attempted to use members of the relatively small organization to rig elections that year. After the politicians reneged on their end of the deal, the militants used the funds they had already received to target government officials and start their brutal war on the state.

The group managed to collect most of their early followers by appealing to those who had believed that the Nigerian government had failed to deliver basic public services to those living in rural parts of the northeast. With the use of deadly bombing campaigns between 2011-2014, Boko Haram evolved from “the tattered remains of a radical sect” to a terrorist group the likes of which the world had not seen.

At its peak in January 2015, Boko Haram controlled more than 20,000 square miles, an area roughly the size of the state of Belgium. Boko Haram has killed more than 20,000 people and displaced more than two million people around the Lake Chad Basin. Studies have shown that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Boko Haram together are responsible for 51% of the deaths related to militant groups in the world in 2014. This year alone, the terrorist group has perpetrated at least 48 attacks so far in Nigeria.

Since current president Muhammadu Buhari assumed power in May 2015, Boko Haram has been pushed back by the Nigerian government and allied forces into the Sambisa Forest in Borno State. Although the group’s hold over the country has declined, it continues to have deep connections with local civilians in northeast Nigeria.

CREATION

Mohammed Yusuf is credited as the founder of what is modernly known as Boko Haram. He grew up as an almajiri child, a religious student of Islam who begs on the streets for a living. In the later years of his life, he became the leader of the youth wing for the Alhaji Muhammadu Ndimi mosque where he taught that the source of state corruption was the education system put in place during and after colonial rule by Christian Britain. In 2009, Yusuf was killed by Nigerian police during a crackdown of Ibn Taymiyyah mosque. By this time, however, he had already planted the seeds of the rebellion throughout the surrounding region and died a martyr to his growing number of followers. He was replaced by Abubakar Shekau who took the group underground for a year and returned, making revenge for Yusuf’s death a top priority.

RECRUITMENT

Boko Haram’s members include people from all walks of life: “from street kids and traders to disaffected students and wealthy businessmen”. Experts struggled to find a primary demographic for the group’s members but to no avail. The original members were mostly students from the University of Maiduguri, a prestigious institution where children of the elite attended in the 1990s. Wild practices, such as competing to throw the most expensive parties and spraying money at girls to attract their attention, exposed immorality and inequality at the heart of Borno State, and there were students in the early 2000s who were disillusioned by this ‘spiritual corruption’. Notable first recruits included the nephew of the governor of Yobe state, the son of the state secretary of Borno, and all five sons of a prominent businessman who had made his money through state contracts. In these young, privileged radicals, Mohammed Yusuf saw potential for something greater.

These young men and women wanted bloodshed; they believed that the destruction of the state, killing of civilians, overthrow of the Muslim establishment, and elimination of any who they declared to be “unbelievers” were the only ways to create a land ruled by sharia. Later, bands of armed robbers joined to take advantage of the opportunity the chaos left in its wake. Others joined to settle scores over land with rival ethnic religious groups. Many, however, were simply uprooted from their lives and forced into service. For example, when Boko Haram liberated a prison filled with militants, those not already affiliated with the group had the choice to live and fight for their liberators, or die due to a lack of resources. Amnesty International discovered the mass grave of 645 people who had made the latter choice and were summarily executed.

Today, many, especially children, are coerced to join due to the economic opportunity the midst of impoverishment. Approximately 80% of rural Nigerians live on less than 400 naira a day, which converts to $1.10. This is below the international poverty line, $1.25. Desperation drives many youths to see Boko Haram’s aid as an opportunity to escape the cycle of poverty and ignore the possible dangers. Boko Haram members provide business support for their small, informal businesses. Their financial services also come with protection and are seen as more accessible by poorer individuals. Boko Haram has used this assistance to broaden their popular support since struggling villagers now see them as coming to the aid of the people. Unfortunately, the conditions of this support are often fluid and unpredictable. Boko Haram militants can collect payment whenever and in whatever form they please.

FUNDING

Boko Haram has gotten the majority of their financial support from drugs, cattle, and fish smugglers since these people have a similarly contentious relationship with the Nigerian government. Sadly, the illicit trades of these items are so closely related to the legitimate cattle and fish traders that the government recently made a mandate to completely block trade routes in northeast Nigeria. Boko Haram also receives money from international supporters: groups and individuals in Dubai, London, and Senegal to name a few locations.

After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States introduced the “know your customer” policies to ensure that organizations like Boko Haram could not use internationally recognized banks in order to deposit or withdraw money. Now, it is widely suspected that an underground banking system known as hawala might be helping to fund terrorist organizations in Nigeria. A reported $400 billion exchange hands in hawala every year and keeps users anonymous, making it difficult for authorities to track potentially dangerous transfers of money. The gross income of the group between 2006-2011, has been reported to be $70 million. In 2014, Boko Haram’s net worth was estimated to be $25 million.

EFFECTS OF BOKO HARAM

Nigeria and surrounding countries in the region have sustained extensive damage from Boko Haram’s violence. It was estimated that $9 billion is needed to rehabilitate the damaged infrastructure in northeastern Nigeria. The heightened panic led former President Jonathan Goodman to impose a state of emergency in the northeast in early 2013. As of April 2016, Boko Haram’s violent attacks have killed 20,000 Nigerians and have displaced more than 1.8 million people. A study by the Council of Foreign Relations showed that almost 30,000 deaths were attributed to Boko Haram attacks in Borno State alone since May 2011. The highest number of recorded deaths per month was 3,456 in March 2014. The violence has since slightly abated, but is still concerning. During the first two weeks of February 2016, more than 260 Nigerians died from militant activity.

There are further economic ramifications of the rampant violence. The government decided to indefinitely discontinue oil exploration near the Niger delta because of security concerns after Boko Haram kidnapped four oil workers in mid-2017. This is especially damaging since oil revenue makes up 70% of government income and 90% of the country’s foreign exchange.

HUMANITARIAN CRISES

Violence from Boko Haram attacks have led to various humanitarian concerns that threaten to destabilize the region even if the group is somehow defeated. Food shortage, displacement, and the violation of human rights for vulnerable populations are but a few of the serious issues that plague civilians in this crisis.

Particularly in the northeastern states such as Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, civilians are experiencing food shortage, to some extent. 400,000 children under the age of five suffered from severe acute malnutrition in 2016 while 65,000 people, including women and children, are living in famine-like conditions in Borno state, where Boko Haram’s presence is greatest. Much of this might have been caused by fear and a subsequent decrease in agriculture in these areas. The threat of unexploded or improvised mine devices prevents farmers from planting for the third year in a row, so the United Nations predicts that 5.1 million people will face serious food shortages. Even with the efforts of aid workers and several organizations for the past two years, five million people in the Lake Chad Basin are under threat of starvation. Some see that the lack of results can be ascribed to the lack of international attention the situation receives. There is, however, humanity in the face of this violence. Communities have opened up their homes and lands to refugees displaced by the violence or lack of food. These hosts have recently revealed that they fear they themselves are experiencing a food shortage due to the immense increase in the number of mouths they must feed.

Boko Haram’s violence has also created large-scale displacement in the territories it has occupied. As of March 2017, the group has left 1.3 million children displaced. Even the official camps for internally displaced people (IDPs) are run by an often-confusing conglomerate of groups: the Nigerian military, police, civilian vigilantes, government humanitarian agencies, and international NGOs. Because of this, medicine and other much needed supplies cannot be distributed efficiently to residents of the camps. These camps are also susceptible to attacks from Boko Haram and even the Nigerian Security Forces (NSF). On 17 January 2017, the Nigerian Air Forces accidentally bombed a camp of IDPs in Rann, Borno State. 236 civilians were killed in the attack with 120 left wounded. In addition, six Nigerian Red Cross aid workers were killed in the incident.

Throughout Boko Haram’s campaign of terror, they have used vulnerable populations without hesitation in order to further their goals. Young women who joined the group willingly were near the forefront of the movement, burning books and immediately adopting the conservative garb. These young women are denied access to any further education after joining the militant group. Various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have also denounced Boko Haram’s use of child suicide bombers to attack markets and other public spaces. Additionally, children make up one in five suicide bombers in Nigeria with 75% of them being girls. Besides using them for violent purpose, Boko Haram also rapes and kills young women who they have kidnapped or forced into captivity. Girls as young as thirteen are married off and become pregnant during their time in the group’s hold. Unfortunately, the struggle for young girls and women follow them even if they manage to escape Boko Haram’s hold. Girls and women who have been taken into captivity by Boko Haram face being ostracized once they’ve escaped, taunted as “Boko Haram wives” and often face mistrust, stigma, and rejection.

EFFECTS ON NIGERIA

Nigeria’s domestic has suffered greatly from the violence plaguing the country. In 2014 alone, there were 6,644 casualties from Boko Haram attacks. The insurgents have also spilled into other countries of the Lake Chad Basin, such as Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. On the night of 14-15 April 2014, 276 female students were kidnapped from Chibok, Borno State. This atrocity garnered international outrage and started the #BringBackOurGirls movement.

Nigeria’s recent attempt to starve out Boko Haram by completely closing trade routes has placed an even greater burden on those attempting to rebuild their lives after losing their previous livelihoods due to the violence. Many farmers and traders must turn to smuggling and illegal means of getting resources. The government itself also faced economic challenges with the “incipient insurrection in its oil patches”. As a result, government revenue has fallen with the decrease in oil prices.

In order to combat Boko Haram, the Nigerian administration has taken several steps. In 2015, President Buhari moved the base of military operations from Abuja, the capital of the country, to Maiduguri, the largest city in Borno State. Many approved of the government taking the fight directly to the terrorist group. After Boko Haram retreated into the Sambisa Forest later that year, many called for the Buhari administration to negotiate with low- and mid-level militants in order to avoid more casualties from the bombs and traps they left in their wake. The government has also implemented the Niger Delta Amnesty Program. This program has helped disarm and transition nearly 30,000 former militants since its inception in 2009. In May 2015, however, the government cut 70% of funding for a guns-for-cash-and-jobs training exchange for former militants.

By June 2016, the majority of the population in Borno State had fled to Maiduguri since it was the only safe haven left in the region. Today, it is filled past its capacity to hold the displaced, does not have enough food to sustain such a large population, and has become more vulnerable to attacks from Boko Haram. This past June, the Nigerian government took back a large swath of territory from Boko Haram in the northeast including Chibok and northern Adamawa state.

Nigerian citizens have been taking action without the aid of the government as well under the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). The CJTF is a body of vigilantes assembled by local and state governments that assists Nigerian security forces against Boko Haram. The first CJTF was reported to have been formed in Adamawa state in early 2013, as Boko Haram’s attacks began to increase in frequency and death. Each group is composed of community guards and hunters guilds. They can accost any strange or suspicious person that enters their community, mount roadblocks, conduct area patrols, mount guards at entry points, and monitor the borderlines of their communities. They often reinforce and complement the efforts of Nigeria’s Armed Forces, particularly in the area of grassroots reconnaissance and intelligence networking. Borno local and state government officials view them as essential to the fight against Boko Haram. Concerns, however, are rising from others about members of the CJTF who engage in “personal score-settling” and a variety of human rights abuses in order to root out Boko Haram members. Now that they are armed, people are worried that the neither the army nor the national security forces will be able to control them after the war with Boko Haram ends. Buhari responded to this by saying that since the members of the CJTF are locally known due to recruitment from local administration, dealing with them should they turn rogue would not be a problem. Not long after, the president announced that he was thinking about integrating them into the formal army if and when the struggle against Boko Haram. The CJTF also raises worries due to reprisal attacks by Boko Haram.

INTERNATIONAL ACTION

Countries that border Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin are also affected by Boko Haram’s presence. For example, Cameroon combats potential radicalization within its borders with the Council of Imams and Religious Dignitaries of Cameroon (CIDIMUC) program. The CIDIMUC is a partnership formed between local religious, spiritual, and community leaders in order to monitor preaching and give warnings to people of the dangers of radicalization. The council regularly hosts round-table discussions between individuals of different religious backgrounds to foster a deeper sense of community across the religious and ethnic divides in the region. Countries bordering Nigeria also agreed to form a Multinational Joint Task Force to combat Boko Haram in late 2014.

There has also been an increase in recent years of international involvement as the threat Boko Haram posed to regional stability became clearer and the infamous kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014. One of the earliest partnerships formed between Nigeria and a Western power was the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) established in 2005. It is funded and implemented by the United States to “build [the] capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement, and civilian actors across North and West Africa”. The program has taken important steps in countering terrorist organizations such as training prosecutors to adjudicate cases of terrorism. This relation has not always been amiable, however. The United States has blocked the purchase of fighter jets by Nigeria from Brazil due to U.S. concerns of human rights abuse happening in Nigeria.

During Operation Turus, the Royal Air Force from the United Kingdom conducted air reconnaissance and had found the location of the schoolgirls kidnapped from Chibok, but then President Jonathan Goodman refused their aid. This is a recurring pattern in international aid in Nigeria’s fight against Boko Haram. The Nigerian administration welcomed an aid package and assistance, but viewed action from the United States, United Kingdom, and France as encroaching on a “national issue”. There is a good number of Nigerians who believe that taking help from Western imperial powers might end up being counterproductive, referencing the examples of Libya, the Ivory Coast, Somalia, and Mali to name a few. They argue that Nigeria must build the capacity to solve its own problems and, in this way, western interference has historically been a significant part of the problem since it denied the country that ability.

Western powers are not the only international states who have a stake in this conflict. China controls 60% of the world’s cobalt production and obtains 99% of this mineral from the former region of Katanga in the Democratic Republic of Congo, cementing its place in Central and West Africa. On 16 May 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped ten Chinese engineers in the northern region of Cameroon. The group took the hostages to Nigeria before releasing them in October.

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Similar to their attitude towards international assistance from other states, many Nigerians view NGO’s as advancing foreign interests with their programs; they believe that NGOs forge a personal connection between locals and foreign ideologies to further large-scale movements. Some have a significant distrust towards these aid programs. NGOs stationed in the Lake Chad Basin suffer from several logistical issues including incredibly high staff turnover. There are no permanent positions, only rotating staff. Much of this turnover takes place in administrational positions. Therefore, staff are often only able to complete assessments before they leave, only to be replaced by another who must conduct new reports to assess the situation and the cycle repeats itself. This has led to a massive decrease in NGO camps’ ability to provide food, medicine, shelter, and other basic necessities to the residents who desperately need them. Even at official camps, residents complain of “chronic food shortages, inadequate medical services, and a lack of any livelihood programs”. 66% of children at Bama internal refugee camp were emaciated, and there were more than 1,200 recently dug graves. There has also been no access to health care since January 2015 for the 150,000 people who live in Monguno, despite the presence of NGO in the region.

NGOs, such as Amnesty International, have managed to call attention to systemic abuse of human rights in the region. In June 2015, Amnesty International condemned the Nigerian government, specifically senior military officers, for the murder, starvation, suffocation, and torture to death of almost 8,000 individuals. In July 2017, Amnesty International accused the Cameroon government of torturing hundreds of Cameroonians suspected of aiding Boko Haram. The official report stated that Cameroon Security Forces arbitrarily arrested and detained individuals, violated their right to humane detention conditions, tortured them, and many died in custody. These ordinary men and women are often arrested without any evidence and forced to endure unimaginable pain. The organization considers these offenses as war crimes. Alioune Tine has called for the U.S. government to investigate whether U.S. soldiers were aware of the torture since prisoners stated that they saw “white, English-speaking men there”, some in uniform.

PRESENT SITUATION

On 7 March 2015, Abubakar Shekau declared allegiance to ISIS, and Boko Haram donned the name Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA). Almost a year and a half later in August 2016, ISIS released a publication declaring Abu Musab al-Barnawi as the new leader of Boko Haram. ISIS designated Barnawi as the Wali, or governor, of the Islamic State West Africa Province in Al-Naba, a magazine associated with ISIS. Boko Haram split between Shekau, the group’s leader since 2009, and the faction led by Barnawi. One main difference between the two groups is that Barnawi’s faction does not attack indiscriminately like Shekau’s; his prefers to plant booby traps and target Nigeria’s Christian population rather than Muslim civilians or places of worship. Now, experts believe that the split may have been caused by Shekau ignoring ISIS’s call to stop using children as suicide bombers. In fact, since January 2017, there has been an increase in Boko Haram’s use of children for suicide bombings, especially with girls. More recently, in May 2017, Boko Haram freed 82 Chibok girls they had kidnapped in 2014.

HOLISTIC SOLUTIONS TO COMBAT TERRORISM

Any action Nigeria or the rest of the international community takes to mitigate Boko Haram’s effects in West Africa must recognize the roots of the crisis and how Boko Haram was able to gain so much power in such a short period of time. Fundamental problems such as economic distress, ethnic and religious fissures, fragile governance, weak democracy, and rampant human rights abuses must be considered if a true change is to come about.

As Boko Haram was still gathering followers, reports have shown entire communities welcomed the group since, to them, it symbolized change. Many had grievances with the government due to inadequacies and insecurities. Weak governance and marginalized population groups only serve to help terrorist organizations. Any solutions must address humanitarian concerns as well as sociopolitical and economic challenges. These include widespread youth unemployment in areas where Boko Haram focuses its recruitment. Nigeria has a 23.6% unemployment rate, northeastern regions having disproportionately higher rates. Adamawa State’s unemployment rate is 33.8%, Yobe’s 35.6%, Bauchi’s 41.4%. These states all border Borno State, the center of Boko Haram’s presence in Nigeria. Poor transportation infrastructure, insufficient public service delivery, endemic corruption, and political marginalization are all issues solutions must respond to.

Desertification and the shrinking of the Chad Basin are also issues that have affected the livelihood of millions of residents. Agriculture and subsistence farming comprise a large portion of civilians’ livelihoods in West Africa. Global warming and the subsequent loss of arable land has contributed to the rate of unemployment among youths who then turn to terrorist groups. The decrease in agriculture has in turn worsened the scarcity of food already present in the region.

CONCLUSION

From the outset, Boko Haram has constituted a larger danger to African stability than any terrorist group ever before. Boko Haram challenges the unity and stability of Africa’s most populous country and biggest economy.

Many fear that this conflict will link together with those in Libya, Somali, and Mali to create a much larger, pan-African war on terror, if it has not begun to do so already. Porous borders and a free-flowing arms trade in Africa will allow the conflict to easily spill over into other countries. Countries must strengthen regional cooperation and border security to counter this possibility.

Others fear that Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance to ISIS in 2015 points to a greater objective than simply overthrowing the Nigerian government and gaining its territory. They fear that the group’s current objective is to create a regional caliphate that will encompass the entirety of West and Central Africa.

Portfolio Powers

Oluyemi Osinbanjo

Role: Acting President of Nigeria

Description: Oluyemi Osinbajo was the former Vice President of Nigeria. After President Muhammadu Buhari’s health began to decline in early May 2017, he gave power to “Yemi” Osinbajo in order to carry out the functions of the presidency in his stead. As a lawyer and legal expert, many expect that he will be a major force for the reform of the national judicial system. Specifically, citizens believe he will take action against the rampant extrajudicial killings committed by both Boko Haram and the Nigerian Armed Forces while also making it easier, and more effective, to adjudicate cases of terrorism in Nigeria. He has been focused on managing the affairs of state in place of the President and therefore has not announced any plans to run in the next election; that, however, does not mean he will not be a candidate.

Portfolio Powers: The President of Nigeria has all the powers conferred to them by the Constitution. Osinbajo has the power to assent to and sign into existence bills from the National Assembly. The president can also pardon criminals from any fine, penalty, or forfeiture. He also has access to any confidential documents pertaining to national security and is the Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces. If he were to decide to run in the election, he will have an already large following amongst voters as he is the acting president.

Bolaji Akpan Anani

Role: President of the Nigerian Red Cross Society

Description: Bolaji Akpan Anani is the current President of the Nigerian Red Cross Society. Anani recognizes that humanitarian need in Nigeria is on the rise due to the insurgence in the northeast. Since his appointment to his post, he has increased the Red Cross’s response to the crisis, but has also sent out several appeals for aid from other organizations since the needs of those affected by the Boko Haram insurgency are enormous.

Portfolio Powers: As the head of the governance arm of the Nigerian Red Cross Society, Anani has the power to formulate new policies for the non-governmental humanitarian agency (NGHA). He also manages the over 350,000 well-trained volunteers to respond to emergencies across the country.

Mahamadou Issafou

Role: President of Niger

Description: Mahamadou Issafou is the current President of Niger. Described by his people as cruel and corrupt, the majority of Niger’s population resents him. They believe that the rich make a lot of money while the larger mass of people feel as though they have been abandoned. This discontent makes the country fertile ground for Boko Haram’s insurgency and has suffered several attacks. The insurgency has also sharpened local conflicts over resources around the Lake Chad Basin.

Portfolio Powers: Issafou is seen as a staunch supporter of the West. Niger retains a special relationship with France. Issafou uses this to receive financial support or can even use this to call upon further military or diplomatic support from the French government. As the Commander-in-Chief of Niger’s military forces, he can also send troops himself to aid in the fight against the insurgency. He can also arrest, detain, and exile those he suspects of associating with Boko Haram. He is a powerful figure whose endorsement might sway Nigerian voters in the upcoming election.

Fulan Nasrullah

Role: Informant

Description: Fulan Nasrullah is a former Boko Haram leader. He was a member from 2004-2008, but he decided to leave due to a lack of strategic planning amongst the higher-ups of the group. Although he has left, he still supports the use of jihad as a means of securing goals.

Portfolio Powers: As a former insurgent, Nasrullah still has contacts with many members of Boko Haram. He can also receive information directly from the terrorist group with little threat. More importantly, he can contact many of the group’s current leaders.

Idriss Déby

Role: President of Chad

Description: Idriss Déby is the current President of Chad. He has survived numerous rebellions for the past 20 years in order to remain in power. From January 2016 to January 2017, he was the chairman of the African Union. His first priority was increasing the fight against Boko Haram. To this end, he pushed for the creation of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of 10,000 troops. Because of Chad’s strategic position in West Africa, Déby has always sent troops or played a mediating role in conflicts in the region.

Portfolio Powers: As Commander-in-Chief of Chad’s military power, he can send troops at will to the conflict or can even increase his contribution to the MNJTF. Additionally, due to his former position as the chairman of the AU, he is a trusted mediator throughout the continent and often arranges meetings between two opposing parties to come to fair agreements. As two countries that share the burden of combatting Boko Haram, many Nigerians would pay attention to any endorsement he gives for a candidate in the national presidential election.

Abayomi Olonisakin

Role: Chief of Defence Staff

Description: General Abayomi Gabriel Olonisakin is the current Chief of Defence Staff appointed by President Muhammadu Buhari in 2015. The position is occupied by the most senior commissioned officer appointed the President. The Chiefs of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces assist him in formulating and executing military policies.

Portfolio Powers: The Chief of Defence Staff is the highest ranking military officer of the Nigerian Armed Forces. As such, he has the highest access, besides the Commander-in-Chief to national security information and logistics of the army. He is empowered to take any actions necessary towards the highest attainment of national security and the operational competence of the Armed Forces. Although he is the highest ranked member of the military, he has limited control over the actions of the individual sectors of the Armed Forces (Army, Navy, and Air Forces). Olonisakin can give general instructions to the other Service Chiefs, but he cannot directly control the specifics of how the chiefs carry them out.

Sir Stephen Hillier

Role: Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Air Force

Description: Sir Stephen Hillier is the professional head of the Royal Air Force of the United Kingdom. Since the kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls, the RAF has worked closely with the Nigerian federal government in order to find the girls, even if their help was not always accepted. A major point of controversy arose when it was discovered that the RAF had discovered the location of the schoolgirls a short time after their abduction and were willing to retrieve them, but the Nigerian government under President Jonathan Goodluck refused their aid. More recently, the RAF has sent 66 members on 22 June 2017 in order to help train members of the NAF.

Portfolio Powers: Stephen Hillier can make ready use of the 66 highly trained RAF personnel that were sent to Nigeria in late June 2017 to help train the Nigerian Air Force. He may also call for more reinforcements to come to Nigeria should the situation require it, but that will take more time.

Kashim Shettima

Role: Governor of Borno State

Description: Borno State Governor Kashim Shettima firmly believes in the sentiment behind Borno State’s nickname, “Land of Peace”. Although much of his attention is geared towards military efforts against Boko Haram’s devastating insurgency within his domain, he is also passionate about other aspects of his people’s life such as education, agriculture, and health care. He has signed bills to rehabilitate secondary schools and the public school system across the state, and he has also advocated for the reform of the current hand-to-mouth subsistence farming system many residents currently use.

Portfolio Powers: Shettima’s political party has the majority in Borno’s House of Assembly. As such, he can exert a larger influence for bills to be introduced for him to sign and pass into existence. Although his jurisdiction only consists of Borno State, laws that he passes are more quickly and easily implemented than those passed by the national government. As governor, Shettima also has the power to grant pardons or reprieves for criminals within Borno State as he pleases. He is well-respected for his actions since the start of the Boko Haram insurgency across the nation and therefore can attract many voters in the coming election.

Tukur Buratai

Role: Chief of Army Staff

Description: Lieutenant General Tukur Yusuf Buratai is the Chief of Army Staff. He serves under the Chief of Defence Staff. The Nigerian Army makes up the largest component of the Nigerian Armed Forces and currently bears the brunt of the fight against Boko Haram. Once regarded as one of the strongest regional peacekeeping forces, widespread corruption and poor governance have tarnished the army’s reputation.

Portfolio Powers: The Army is the branch of the armed forces that the government depends on to take the fight directly to Boko Haram. Buratai supervises the more than 100,000 troops and can send them to locations throughout the country. Unfortunately, due to poor leadership within its officer ranks, orders given by the chief might be ineffectively carried out, if at all.

Ibok-Ete Ekwe Ibas

Role: Chief of the Naval Staff

Description: Vice Admiral Ibok-Ete Ekwe Ibas is the Chief of the Naval Staff and serves under the Chief of Defence Staff. The Chief of the Naval Staff is the highest ranking military officer in the Nigerian Navy. The Nigerian Navy has large fleets of ship available to them with headquarters at different cities around the country, Calabar and Lagos to name two.

Portfolio Powers: Vice Admiral Ibas is responsible for several thousand personnel and can deploy them to specific locations within or outside the country. Due to the landlocked nature of the Lake Chad Basin, the Navy cannot use their large fleets in the area. They can, however, use their helicopters to gather intelligence or perform rescue operations within the area.

Sadique Abubakar

Role: Chief of the Air Staff

Description: Sadique Abubakar is the Chief of the Air Staff and currently serves under the Chief of Defense Staff. He is the professional head of the Nigerian Air Force. The Nigerian Air Force also includes the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) Regiment which protects air force bases and the Quick Response Force (QRF) which is a group of elite military units who specialize in speedy deployments and swift action against presumed threats.

Portfolio Powers: The Chief of the Air Staff has discretion over the deployment of the Nigerian Air Force’s approximately 10,000 personnel and aircrafts. Abubakar has access to combat aircrafts to offer fire support to the army. He can also order the use of drones to gather reconnaissance. The Nigerian Air Force also has several air crafts that can be used for secure transport of materials. The Chief of the Air Staff can readily deploy the QRF and defend his forces with the NAF Regiment.

Osai Ojigho

Role: Country Director in the Nigerian office of Amnesty International

Description: Osai Ojigho is a human rights lawyer who was recently appointed as the Country Director for Amnesty International. Amnesty International reports on human rights abuses by governments, non-governmental bodies, and private individuals.

Portfolio Powers: Amnesty International can file reports concerning instances of human rights abuse and use campaigns to publicize information and mobilize public opinion across the world. The group boasts a large membership that they can call upon as human resources for projects or campaigns. Ojigho herself has prior experience with campaigning and human development in other African countries.

Abubakar Mallum

Role: Head of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF)

Description: The Civilian Joint Task Force is a group of militants formed by civilians in Maiduguri, Nigeria to help oust Boko Haram from the city. The CJTF is mostly comprised by volunteers with only 7% being paid a salary. They currently have a mixed reputation as although they have won ground back from Boko Haram, they are accused of various human rights abuses that leave many wondering if the cost is worth the gain.

Portfolio Powers: CJTF members each have invaluable local knowledge of the region, landscape, and community politics. Although they only possess basic weapons, they have successfully pushed back the militant group from the city in the past. As the head of the CJTF, Mallum can use the force’s approximately 30,000 members mount roadblocks, conduct area patrols, and create town guards.

Japheth Omojuwa

Role: Political Commentator

Description: Japheth Omojuwa is an internationally renowned political commentator and social media activist. He is an award-winning blogger and recurring columnist for several major publications in Nigeria. He was a guest lecturer at Free University Berlin Germany.

Portfolio Powers: Using his media and network connections, it is very easy for Omojuwa to call attention to issues and political topics in Nigeria. As a famed journalist in Nigeria, he has a strong sway on public opinion.

Thomas Waldhauser

Role: Head of the United States Military Command Center for Africa (AFRICOM)

Description: General Thomas Waldhauser is the recently appointed commander of the U.S. Africa Command. AFRICOM is responsible for U.S. military operations and relations with 53 African nations. It comprises of an army, naval, air, and marine force and includes U.S. Special Operations Command, Africa which works with U.S. embassies and African partner nations to combat violent extremist groups and build partner nations’ capacity to govern.

Portfolio Powers: Waldhauser is not the U.S.’s primary diplomatic representative as that responsibility lies with the U.S. ambassador. He is, however, encouraged by the Secretary of Defense to use the over 2,000 personnel at his disposal to analyze the best methods of strengthening democratic institutions and boosting broad-based economic growth. These methods are sometimes military-related, and he is granted full use of U.S. military forces in Africa.

Bukola Saraki

Role: President of the Senate

Description: Olubukola Abubakar Saraki is the current President of the Senate. The President of the Senate is the presiding officer of the Senate to Nigeria and his chief duty is to guide and regulate the proceedings of the Senate. Saraki is the former Governor of Kwara State. He also led the first expedition to Maiduguri in Borno State in 2015 to assess the damage done by Boko Haram, the first since the insurgency began. Many expect that he, along with the Speaker of the House, will be serious contenders for the upcoming election in 2019.

Portfolio Powers: As his political party is the majority party, Saraki carries influence over the direction of the Senate’s and can therefore prompt orders of impeachment of judges or executive officials. The President must sign off on these orders before they are enacted. After the Vice President, Saraki would be the next in the line of succession to the Nigerian presidency. If President Buhari should veto a bill, the Senate and the House of Representatives may overrule the executive with a two-thirds majority in both houses.

Yakubu Dogara

Role: Speaker of the House of Representatives

Description: Yakubu Dogara is the current Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Federal House of Representatives of Nigeria. One of his main missions as Speaker of the House is to update Nigeria’s laws in order to attract investment and in order to provide jobs to the growing unemployed population. He sees unemployment as one of the main reasons Boko Haram has been so successful in the rural regions of Nigeria. As a result of this, he passed a record 130 bills in one sitting. He has personally visited and donated relief materials to IDP camps across the northeast region. He is a main proponent for receiving international support in the rehabilitation of Borno and surrounding states. Many believe that Dogara, along with Saraki, will run for candidacy in the 2019 presidential election.

Portfolio Powers: The Nigerian constitution states that any bills pertaining to money must be drafted in the House of Representatives before moving towards the Senate. As Speaker of the House and a member of the majority party, he has significant clout in the House and use that to introduce bills during proceedings. If the President Buhari should veto a bill, the Senate and the House of Representatives may overrule the executive with a two-thirds majority in both houses. He is also third in the line of succession after the President of the Senate.

Paul Biya

Role: President of Cameroon

Description: Cameroon has a very hard stance against militant groups such as Boko Haram. The state confers the death penalty for those found guilty of abetting, sponsoring, or carrying out acts of terrorism. Presently, President Biya is also dealing with a large influx of refugees from the Central African Republic due to the ongoing sectarian violence happening there.

Portfolio Powers: As Cameroon’s head of state, he is also the Commander-in-Chief of all military operations in the country and can therefore supply troops to the Nigerian government in their fight against Boko Haram. He also possesses the power to order the arrest and detainment of those suspected of being associated with the terrorist group. Biya can also send a powerful endorsement for any candidate that wishes to run in the 2019 presidential election since Nigeria and Cameroon are neighbors who share the burden of Boko Haram.

Osagie Okunbor

Role: Managing Director of the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd. (SPDC)

Description: Osagi Okunbor is the Managing Director of SPDC and the Country Chair of all Shell Companies in Nigeria. Nigeria has the most oil out of all countries in Africa. Although all oil is owned by the state, the state works with private companies such as shell to mine and sell oil reserves to other countries. Recently, impoverished Niger Delta residents have stormed petroleum facilities demanding jobs, infrastructure development, and an end to the oil pollution that has damaged their lands.

Portfolio Powers: Being the Managing Director, Okunbor has almost complete control over operations for the large oil company. The company alone accounts for half of Nigeria’s total oil production, so it has unrivaled control of the domestic oil industry and, as a result, the global oil production. Additionally, because of its place in the Nigerian government revenue and profits, the company holds substantial sway over the domestic economy. As a member of the joint venture, however, Okunbor must abide by all Nigerian government operational rules.

Folorunsho Alakija

Role: Philanthropist

Description: Folorunsho Alakija is the richest woman in Nigeria and one of the richest black women in the world. She is a business tycoon who is involved in the fashion, oil, and printing industries. Alakija has an estimated net worth of more than $2 billion. Alakija is deeply invested in philanthropic endeavors. She created the Rose of Sharon Foundation to empower widows and orphans, usually through scholarships and business grants. With the recent humanitarian crisis happening in northeastern Nigeria, she has chosen to open up her funds to aiding efforts for those who have suffered from Boko Haram’s violence.

Portfolio Powers: As the Group Managing Director of the Rose of Sharon Foundation, Alakija has an immense source of money to fund projects that are related to humanitarian issues. She is also an ardent support of education, and she was appointed the first female Chancellor of Osun State University. Outside of her philanthropic activities, she also owns a majority share of an oil company called Famfa Limited.

Sa’adu Abubakar

Role: Sultan of Sokoto

Description: Sultan Muhammadu Sa’ad Abubakar III is the acclaimed spiritual leader of Nigeria’s over 80 million Muslims. Before succeeding his brother after a fatal plane crash, he had joined the Nigerian Armed Forces. He has also led a battalion of African peacekeepers in Chad and was a military liaison officer for the Economic Community of West African States. At one point, he was ranked the 16th most important Muslim in the world. The Sultan has also started many initiatives to combat Boko Haram’s radical message such as inviting an international joint Muslim-Christian delegation to visit Nigeria. He does, however, share the group’s sentiment that Nigerian elites are to blame for the country’s widespread impoverishment and subsequent violence.

Portfolio Powers: Due to the respect his father earned during his long reign, Abubakar’s title carries significant social capital and popularity with ordinary Nigerian Muslims. Because Abubakar is also the head of the Nigerian National Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, he is the only figure that can legitimately claim to speak on behalf of all Nigerian Muslims.

Supo Ayokunle

Role: President of the Christian Association of Nigeria

Description: Dr. Supo Ayokunle is the President of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN). He has a Baptist background. The organization is a conglomerate of Roman Catholic, Protestant, Pentecostal, and other Christian denominations. In Borno State, Christianity makes up a small minority that is no larger than 5%. In 2001, CAN threatened to sue Borno State over the official implementation of sharia as the rule of law. CAN is known to endorse certain programs from time to time, and has a loyal following among Nigeria’s mostly Christian population.

Portfolio Powers: As the President of CAN, Ayokunle has the ability to call upon the relatively large Christian population to protest ideologies, bills, or other government actions. On the other hand, he can also endorse a certain official or action, making it much more popular and appealing to the public. Needless to say, Dr. Ayokunle has much sway over the country’s large Christian population.

Ibrahim Kpotun Idris

Role: Inspector General of Police

Description: Ibrahim Kpotun Idris is the Inspector General of Police, the agency executive for the Nigeria Police Force. The NPF is the primary federal law enforcement agency and also incorporates local civilian police into its ranks. The national force, including Idris, answers to the Ministry of Interior and the Police Service Commission, the civilian oversight on the police. Idris also holds a degree in Law from the University of Maiduguri.

Portfolio Powers: As the Inspector General of Police, Idris has the ability to arrest, detain, and question anyone suspected of aiding or abetting Boko Haram. He also directs the almost 375,000 sworn members of the Nigerian police force. Idris also controls the Police Mobile Force which is a 40,000-strong team that protects strategic economic sites, which are oil installations, and protect government officials, and the diplomatic community. As such, he can provide security details to important dignitaries, investigate attacks, and set anti-crime patrols in high-risk cities such as Maiduguri in Borno State.

Questions to Consider

How will other African countries, apart from Nigeria, help in the act to fight Boko Haram and other such terrorist groups?

What influence will the United States or other European nations play in helping the continent of Africa with counterterrorism strategies?

Will Boko Haram’s membership continue to increase and expand beyond the numbers of ISIS? How can the Nigerian government stop Boko Haram from becoming an even bigger threat?

What can Nigeria do to garner the financial and physical support of the United Nations, other African nations, and the rest of the world?

If Boko Haram engages in a large terrorist attack, how will the Nigerian armed forces act? What different counterterrorism strategies can stop this threat?

How can Boko Haram’s funding be stopped? Is there a way to stop the smuggling process?

Is there a way to fund the impoverished children and families of Nigeria so that they are not tempted into being recruited into the ranks of the Boko Haram?

There is much discussion on whether Boko Haram’s violence is heightened sectarian violence or a symptom of a failing federal government and widespread economic disparity. How can solutions answer both the religious and economic divide?

In the short term, how will the federal government, the international community, and humanitarian organizations respond to the issue of IDPs? In the long term?

How can internal refugees effectively receive needed support and resources? What is a productive system of distributing these services?

Further Research

References

“‘Alarming’ Rise in Boko Haram Child Suicide Bombers.” Al Jazeera, April 12, 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/rise-boko-haram-child-suicide-bombers-170412041301650.html.

Allen, Nathaniel D. F., Peter M. Lewis, and Hilary Matfess. “Down, Not Out.” Foreign Affairs, June 18, 2015. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/nigeria/2015-06-18/down-not-out.

Blair, David. “Boko Haram Is Now a Mini-Islamic State, with Its Own Territory.” The Telegraph, January 10, 2015, sec. World. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/11337722/Boko-Haram-is-now-a-mini-Islamic-State-with-its-own-territory.html.

“Boko Haram.” Naij.com - Nigeria News. Accessed August 14, 2017. https://www.naij.com/tag/boko-haram.html.

“Boko Haram in Nigeria: Abu Musab Al-Barnawi Named as New Leader.” BBC News, August 3, 2016, sec. Africa. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36963711.

“Boko Haram Is Fighting Itself. Here’s What We Know.” Newsweek, September 8, 2016. http://www.newsweek.com/boko-haram-isis-abubakar-shekau-abu-musab-al-barnawi-496615.

“Boko Haram (Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad - JAS) | Terrorist Groups | TRAC.” Accessed August 14, 2017. https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/boko-haram-jamaatu-ahlis-sunna-liddaawati-wal-jihad-jas.

“Boko Haram Looks Beyond Nigeria in Face of Increasing Military Pressure.” Newsweek, November 11, 2015. http://www.newsweek.com/boko-haram-looks-beyond-nigeria-face-increasing-military-pressure-393082.

“Boko Haram Net Worth Hits $70 Million; Nigeria-Based Jihadist Group Makes Top 10 Richest Terrorists List.” NaijaGistsBlog Nigeria, Nollywood, Celebrity ,News, Entertainment, Gist, Gossip, Inspiration, Africa, July 10, 2014. http://naijagists.com/boko-haram-net-worth-hits-70-million-nigeria-based-jihadist-group-makes-top-10-richest-terrorists-list/.

“Buhari Discusses the Future of the Civilian Joint Task Force.” Council on Foreign Relations, May 20, 2016. https://www.cfr.org/blog/buhari-discusses-future-civilian-joint-task-force.

“Cameroon’s Secret Torture Chambers: Human Rights Violations and War Crimes in the Fight Against Boko Haram.” Amnesty International, July 20, 2017. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/document/?indexNumber=afr17%2f6536%2f2017&language=en.

Campbell, John. “Boko Haram Blocks Oil Exploration in Northeast Nigeria.” Council on Foreign Relations, August 1, 2017. https://www.cfr.org/blog/boko-haram-blocks-oil-exploration-northeast-nigeria.

“Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview.” U.S. Department of State. Accessed August 14, 2017. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239404.htm.

Chiroma, Aaron D. “Boko Haram: A Quest for Dominance or Simply Terrorism on Steroids?” Katehon Think Tank. Geopolitics & Tradition, September 18, 2016. http://katehon.com/article/boko-haram-quest-dominance-or-simply-terrorism-steroids.

Chukwuma, Okoli Al. “Nigeria: Volunteer Vigilantism and Counter-Insurgency in the North-East.” Conflict Studies Quarterly, no. 20 (July 2017): 34–55.

Dabale, Yoknyam. “Boko Haram Is Not a Feminist Problem: A Nigerian Woman’s Perspective | Pambazuka News.” Pambazuka News, February 19, 2015. https://www.pambazuka.org/gender-minorities/boko-haram-not-feminist-problem-nigerian-woman%E2%80%99s-perspective.

Dibia, Okachikwu. “Nigeria: Resolving the Boko Haram Challenge | Pambazuka News,” February 8, 2012. https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/nigeria-resolving-boko-haram-challenge.

Esene, Isi. “Northern States Top Nigeria’s Jobless List according to Figures Released by NBS » YNaija.” YNaija, August 12, 2012. https://ynaija.com/northern-states-top-nigerias-jobless-list-according-to-figures-released-by-nbs/.

“FAQs: Global Poverty Line Update.” Text/HTML. World Bank. Accessed August 14, 2017. http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/brief/global-poverty-line-faq.

Gaffey, Conor. “Al-Shabab Has Overtaken Boko Haram as the Deadliest Militant Group in Africa.” Newsweek, June 2, 2017. http://www.newsweek.com/isis-africa-al-shabaab-boko-haram-619010.

Graham-Harrison, Emma. “How Nigerians Took Boko Haram’s Victims to Their Hearts.” The Observer, February 26, 2017, sec. World news. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/26/nigerians-boko-haram-welcome-refugees.

“GTD Search Results.” Accessed August 14, 2017. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=country&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&region=11.

“Hawala: The Ancient Banking Practice Used to Finance Terror Groups.” Newsweek, February 24, 2015. http://www.newsweek.com/underground-european-hawala-network-financing-middle-eastern-terror-groups-307984.

Hoffman, Leena Koni. “Boko Haram Is Not ISIS. That Doesn’t Mean It’s Not a Threat.” Newsweek, February 9, 2016. http://www.newsweek.com/boko-haram-not-isis-its-still-problem-west-424464.

“Is Boko Haram Really Finished? The Group Has Already Carried out 50 Attacks This Year.” Newsweek, June 21, 2017. http://www.newsweek.com/boko-haram-2017-buhari-nigeria-627912.

“Just in: Boko Haram Frees 82 More Chibok Girls.” The Page Nigeria, May 6, 2017. http://thepageng.com/2017/05/06/just-boko-haram-frees-82-chibok-girls/.

Korybko, Andrew. “Central Africa’s Terrorist Threat Could Spark Another Continental War.” Katehon Think Tank. Geopolitics & Tradition, January 31, 2017. http://katehon.com/article/central-africas-terrorist-threat-could-spark-another-continental-war.

Luchetta, Christina. “Motivations and Empty Promises: Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth.” Mercy Corps, April 8, 2016. https://www.mercycorps.org/research/motivations-and-empty-promises-voices-former-boko-haram-combatants-and-nigerian.

Maclean, Ruth. “Cameroon ‘Torturing People Accused of Supporting Boko Haram.’” The Guardian, July 20, 2017, sec. World news. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/20/cameroon-torturing-people-accused-of-supporting-boko-haram-boko-haram-amnesty-says-security-forces.

Matfess, Hilary. “How Nigeria’s Boko Haram Crackdown Harms Local Economies.” Foreign Affairs, July 17, 2017. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2017-07-17/how-nigerias-boko-haram-crackdown-harms-local-economies.

Matfess, Hilary, Peter M. Lewis, and Nathaniel D. F. Allen. “Unbroken Boko Haram.” Foreign Affairs, March 21, 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/nigeria/2016-03-21/unbroken-boko-haram.

McQue, Katie. “Nigeria Rejected British Offer to Rescue Seized Chibok Schoolgirls.” The Observer, March 4, 2017, sec. World news. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/04/nigeria-declined-uk-offer-to-rescue-chibok-girls.

Mike Rettig, contributor. “West Africa’s Terror Problem Needs a Regional Solution.” Text. The Hill, February 8, 2016. http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international/268580-west-africas-terror-problem-needs-a-regional-solution.

Moore, Jack. “Boko Haram Ahead of ISIS as World’s Deadliest Militant Group, New Study Says.” Newsweek, November 19, 2015. http://www.newsweek.com/boko-haram-ahead-isis-worlds-deadliest-militant-group-new-study-says-396144.

“Nigeria.” MSF USA, December 25, 2013. http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/country-region/nigeria.

“Nigeria Security Tracker.” Council on Foreign Relations, November 15, 2012. https://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483.

“Nigeria’s Breaking Point.” Foreign Affairs, July 19, 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/nigeria/2016-07-19/nigerias-breaking-point.

“Nigeria’s Suffering Civilians.” Foreign Affairs, January 30, 2017. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/west-africa/2017-01-30/nigerias-suffering-civilians.

“Nigeria’s Unbalanced Budget.” Foreign Affairs, May 23, 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/nigeria/2016-05-23/nigerias-unbalanced-budget.

Nwabughiogu, Levinus. “Nigeria: U.S.$9 Billion Needed to Rehabilitate North-East.” Vanguard (Lagos), April 5, 2016. http://allafrica.com/stories/201604050294.html.

Odeyemi, Joshua. “Nigeria: FG May Integrate Civilian JTF Into Military, Police - Buhari.” Daily Trust (Abuja), May 16, 2016. http://allafrica.com/stories/201605161141.html.

Ogene, Ashionye. “Nigerian Vigilantes Aim to Rout Boko Haram.” Al Jazeera, May 31, 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/05/nigerian-vigilantes-aim-rout-boko-haram-2014526123758444854.html.

Okoli, Chukwuma Al. “Self-Help Vigilante Groups Are Reshaping Security against Boko Haram.” The Conversation, July 24, 2017. http://theconversation.com/self-help-vigilante-groups-are-reshaping-security-against-boko-haram-81139.

Othman, Nuhu. “Why Terrorism Thrives in West Africa.” Gatestone Institute, May 11, 2016. http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/8020/terrorism-west-africa.

Rosenzweig, Ma ’ayan. “African Terrorist Groups - Infographic.” ABC News. Accessed August 14, 2017. http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/fullpage/african-terrorist-groups-infographic-23610960.
Section, United Nations News Service. “UN News - Nigeria’s Humanitarian Crisis ‘can No Longer Be Ignored,’ UN Says, Launching $1 Billion Appeal.” UN News Service Section, December 2, 2016. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55702#.WZHfx3eGOCS.

Services, Tribune News. “1st Chibok Girl to Escape Boko Haram to Be Honored in Nigeria.” Chicago Tribune, May 19, 2016. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-chibok-schoolgirl-rescued-boko-haram-20160519-story.html.

“Snapshot.” Accessed August 14, 2017. http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/list-worlds-richest-terror-networks-unveiled-1474351?webSyncID=88618c01-0e6e-9a6d-109a-d782bc25d5d2&sessionGUID=0934ba56-8e17-9242-9325-d7556a3a350c.

Soriwei, Fidelis. “Boko Haram: US Blocks Nigeria from Buying Aircraft from Brazil.” Punch Newspapers, November 13, 2016. http://punchng.com/boko-haram-us-blocks-nigeria-buying-aircraft-brazil/.

Sridharan, Vasudevan. “List of World’s Richest Terror Networks Revealed.” International Business Times UK, November 12, 2014. http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/list-worlds-richest-terror-networks-unveiled-1474351.

“Terrorism in the Central African Republic.” Accessed August 14, 2017. https://www.worlddata.info/africa/central-african-republic/terrorism.php.

“The Eyes in Africa: Taking on West Africa’s Terrorists.” The Economist, November 26, 2016. https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21710826-america-has-been-revving-up-its-efforts-against-range-terrorist-groups-taking.

“The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Deplores the Deaths of Civilians and Six Nigerian Red Cross Aid Workers.” News release. International Committee of the Red Cross, January 18, 2017. https://www.icrc.org/en/document/international-red-cross-and-red-crescent-movement-deplores-deaths-civilians-and-6-nigerian.

“The Wives of Boko Haram.” Foreign Affairs, August 17, 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/nigeria/2016-08-17/wives-boko-haram.

“UNICEF More than Doubles Its Funding Appeal to Provide Life-Saving Assistance for Children in Northeast Nigeria.” UNICEF Nigeria, September 29, 2016. https://www.unicef.org/nigeria/media_10671.html.

“UNICEF_Silent_shame.pdf.” Accessed August 14, 2017. https://www.unicef.org/wcaro/nigeriaregionalcrisis/UNICEF_Silent_shame.pdf.

Wakili, Isiaka. “Nigeria: Presidency - 20,000 Nigerians Killed By Boko Haram.” Daily Trust (Abuja), April 5, 2016. http://allafrica.com/stories/201604050004.html.

Walker, Andrew. “Join Us or Die: The Birth of Boko Haram | Andrew Walker.” The Guardian, February 4, 2016, sec. World news. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/04/join-us-or-die-birth-of-boko-haram.

“Western Soft Power on Africa.” Katehon Think Tank. Geopolitics & Tradition, January 13, 2017. http://katehon.com/article/western-soft-power-africa.

“What Do Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda’s North Africa Branch Have in Common?” Newsweek, March 21, 2016. http://www.newsweek.com/radical-islamist-terrorism-west-africa-439108.

“Why Nigeria’s War against Boko Haram May Be far from over.” Newsweek, June 24, 2017. http://www.newsweek.com/boko-haram-nigeria-muhammadu-buhari-chibok-girls-kidnapped-fulan-nasrullah-628745.

Worker, Secret Aid. “Secret Aid Worker: When Your Crisis Isn’t Cool Enough to Attract the Right People.” The Guardian, March 21, 2017, sec. Global Development Professionals Network. http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2017/mar/21/secret-aid-worker-when-your-crisis-isnt-cool-enough-to-attract-the-right-people.