In 2015 the UK Government committed to spending 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) on Official Development Assistance (ODA).
It also committed to spending an increasing share of ODA through departments other than the Department for International Development (DFID): "to harness skills and networks across Whitehall to enhance the quality of ODA."
However, a lot of funding under the Prosperity Fund and diplomatic activity is badged as 'ODA' but has a very weak focus on reducing poverty. And scrutinising the ODA spend of the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund is bedevilled by missing information, redacted in the name of national security.
Following Hurricane Irma, the UK provided significant humanitarian assistance to the affected British Overseas Territories. Under the OECD's rules, little of this assistance can count as ODA because almost all of the devastated territories are classed as high-income. The UK wants the rules to reflect that countries suffering disasters can have their national income drastically reduced. This seems logical but other changes on the Government's wishlist are not.
The primary objective for the UK's spending on aid should always be the reduction of poverty, helping he poorest and most vulnerable and ensuring that no-one is left behind.
OUR FOUR KEY CONCLUSIONS
One
High-income countries or territories can fall back into middle-income status --especially if hit by a natural disaster -- but there is no established procedure for such countries or territories becoming eligible for ODA again. We recommend that the OECD introduce a 'reverse graduation' mechanism.
Two
The Conservative Party's 2017 election manifesto included a commitment to seek changes in the ODA definition and – if unsuccessful – to use a UK-specific definition instead. However, we believe unilateral action by the UK to develop and use its own ODA definition would be an own goal.
The UK's reputation as a leading development actor stems from its expertise and professionalism, its commitment to multilateralism and the international system and its commitment to, and delivery against, the 0.7% target. All three of these 'assets’ would be damaged by trying to manipulate the shared understanding of what aid is.
Existing diplomatic activities are being badged as ODA without any additional targeting to lead to a reduction in poverty.
Three
The Government argues that the movement of ODA outside of DFID provides opportunities to harness skills and networks from across Whitehall to enhance the quality of ODA.
However, moving increasing amounts of ODA outside of DFID also creates inherent risk in three areas; coherence, transparency and focus upon poverty reduction. Without effectiveness in these areas, the quality of the UK's ODA output will suffer. We recommend that DFID should have final sign-off of all ODA.
FOUR
We found that, in practice, many Prosperity Fund projects showed very weak targeting at their primary objective, with negligible targeting towards helping the poorest and most vulnerable.
DFID has the experience and know-how to administer ODA in a targeted, effective and transparent way, and should continue to play the central role in the delivery of the UK's ODA.
Poverty reduction should underpin all of the UK's ODA, helping the poorest and more vulnerable and ensuring that no-one is left behind.
DFID's experience in administering ODA means it should sign off on all of the UK’s ODA, tightening up practice in other departments, developing capacity and receiving adequate resources to do so.
The Government has two months to respond to our report. Read our report: "The Definition and Administration of ODA" - House of Commons International Development Committee.
Find out more about our inquiry on our website.
